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Editorial Remarks
This dissertation consists of four chapters; each of them constitutes a self-contained
paper and can be read independently of the others. This implies that some repetition of
arguments etc. is unavoidable. Also, notation and terminology has been chosen in order
to present each paper in the clearest form possible, and consequently some shifts in these
may occur between the chapters. Finally, I should note that due to di¤erent preferences
of my co-authors, the choice of British vs. US English is not uniform across the di¤erent
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Summary
This dissertation consists of four papers, each constituting a chapter. Each of the the
papers is self-contained and can be read independently. All of them, however, share a
common ground as they consider issues related to monetary policy and business cycles
and how they interact.
The rst two papers are joint work with Jesper Gregers Linaa. The rst of these is
entitled What Drives Business Cycles in a Small Open Economy with a Fixed Exchange
Rate? and presents a Bayesian estimation of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(dsge) model on Danish data. That is, the estimation combines likelihood optimization
with Bayesian priors in the spirit of Smets and Wouters (2003). The model describes
a small open economy and is close to Kollmann (2001, 2002) with some important de-
viations, however; to avoid stochastic singularity we need to expand his model with a
variety of structural shocks to make an estimation feasible. Furthermore, since the scope
is to estimate a model on Danish data we drop the Taylor rule and instead introduce
an imperfect peg. The peg is postulated imperfect; although Denmark successfully
has followed a peg, minor movements in the exchange rate have been observed over the
years. A variance decomposition reveals that the Danish business cycle is dominated by
stochastic movements in the labour supply in the long term, while demand shocks play
a major role in the short term. Remarkably, the role of technology is negligible, and
foreign factors only contribute little to the Danish business cycle, especially in the long
term. With respect to the estimation, we generally nd believable estimates although
the degree of price stickiness is remarkably high.
The structural nature of the estimated model for the Danish economy allows one to
hypothesize the welfare consequences of Denmark abandoning its peg on the euro in favour
of an independent monetary policy. That is the scope of the second paper, Assessing the
Welfare Cost of a Fixed Exchange Rate Policy. In this analysis, we restrict ourselves to
focus on operational and implementable monetary rules in the sense of Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004). Specically, we analyse a specic version of a generalised Taylor (1993)
rule, where the central bank sets the interest rate as a function of output growth and
ination.
We conclude that there are sizable benets to be attained from conducting an inde-
pendent monetary policy of this kind in favour of maintaining the peg on which current
Danish monetary policy is founded. Our estimate suggests that the gain in welfare is
equivalent to a permanent increase of 0:8 pct. in the level of consumption. The optimal
Taylor rule is found to be characterised by an aggressive interest-rate response to ination
(i.e., attaching a weight of 3, which is the ceiling of our grid search, to ination) and a
moderate response to output growth (i.e., a weight of 0:8). Contrary to Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004) we do not nd it benecial for the central bank to smooth interest rates
over time.
With regards to the causes of the higher level of welfare under the Taylor rule, we
obtain mixed results: in terms of consumption, the higher welfare is founded in the higher
mean of consumption under the Taylor rule, although the volatility of consumption has
also increased. For labour this result is reverted; under the peg regime labour is more
volatile than under the Taylor rule, while the mean is predicted to be lower under the
peg. Overall, agents prefer the higher consumption, despite higher volatility and more
labour e¤orts.
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The analysis of the Danish economy raise some key issues that partly inspired the last
two papers of this dissertation. The rst issue is the very limited impact of the foreign
economy on the Danish business cycle. In joint work with Jens Søndergaard I analyse the
British economy in a framework similar in nature to that applied to the Danish economy
in the rst paper, although some technical details di¤er, partly inspired by the small open
economy model of Adolfson et al. (2005). The focus of this analysis, which constitutes
the third paper and is entitled The UK Business Cycle and the Echange-Rate Disconnect,
is on the determinants of the uk business cycle, and in particular the interaction between
the British and the foreign economy. As the uk operates an independent monetary policy,
the dynamics of the interest rate and the exchange rate obviously di¤ers from the Danish
case which is reected in some of the changes to the model setup.
Overall, the estimation yields plausible estimates of the structural parameters. Ac-
cording to these estimates, the main source of uctuations in the British economy is
shocks to the technology process. However, our estimation does point towards two areas
where the current empirical dsge literature needs to be reconsidered. The rst is spe-
cic to the uk economy and regards the ination dynamics. The (detrended) ination
series for the uk is remarkably less persistent than those for the us and euro area. As
much of the workhorse price model of the recent medium-scale dsge literature has been
constructed in a us context, where the main challenge was to account for the high persis-
tence of observed ination, it is not well suited as a model for uk ination. The estimated
degree of price stickiness is quite low, which is in line with micro-economic evidence for
the uk, cf. Hall et al. (2000), yet in contrast to that found for the Danish economy, cf.
Chapter 1, and for the euro area (Smets and Wouters, 2003; Adolfson et al., 2005).
Secondly, the foreign economy has no impact on the uk economy whatsoever. This
replicates the result for the Danish economy from Chapter 1, and is at rst sight quite
surprising, why we consider it in detail. Typically, the transmission of foreign real shocks
works through the terms-of-trade (tot) channel. Thus, standard models of the inter-
national real business-cycle literature have found that exogenous changes in the tot
account for about 50 percent of domestic output uctuations, cf. Mendoza (1995). The
terms of trade channel also plays a dominant theoretical role in the new open-economy
macroeconomic (noem) literature (cf. Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001). This could explain
why the Danish economy is little exposed to the foreign economy due to the pegged
exchange rate, yet one would expect a marked foreign impact on the British economy.
Other recent attempts to estimate dsge models of the noem variety with Bayesian
methods, however, suggest that external terms-of-trade shocks have very little e¤ect on
domestic output, cf. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) for the uk, Adolfson et al. (2005) for
the euro area, and Martínez-García (2005) in the case of Spain.
In a recent paper, Justiniano and Preston (2006) investigates this puzzling result in
a structural analysis of Canadian data. The common result across these di¤erent open-
economy structural estimations is that the current versions of noem models su¤er from
the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle, that is, a volatile behaviour of the real exchange rate
that is unrelated to the delevopment of real aggregates (fundamentals) in the respective
economies (see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) for an articulate presentation of this puzzle).
In other words, the noem models that have been estimated in this and other papers
fail to give an economic explanation of the volatile real exchange rate, and thus they
rely on ad-hoc shocks to disconnect the the modeled economy from the large movements
that we observe in the real exchange rate. Consequently, the estimated economy virtually
behaves as a closed economy. Hence, the current dsge models for open economies are still
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unable to provide an adequate description of the interaction with the foreign economy,
and further research is certainly warranted.
The fourth and nal paper, entitledHeterogeneous Price Stickiness in Estimated Semi-
Structural Models of the US Economy, is joint work with Carlos Carvalho. It analyses the
empirical importance of price contracts with di¤erent durations for the overall ination
dynamics. The recent empirical literature on price setting that analyses the datasets
underlying the construction of consumer price indices documents a large amount of het-
erogeneity in the frequency of price changes across di¤erent economic sectors, cf. Bils
and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) for the us economy, and Dhyne
et al. (2006) and references therein for the euro area.
Through calibration of a structural model, Carvalho (2006) showed how such hetero-
geneity has dramatic implications for the dynamic response of economies to monetary
disturbances. In this paper, we proceed with Bayesian estimation of a model where the
supply side is a multi-sector economy with generalised Taylor (1979, 1980) staggered price
setting, in which the extent of price rigidity varies across di¤erent sectors. We close the
model with reduced-form processes for nominal output and an unobserved natural rate
of output.
In the estimation, we incorporate the information from the micro data analyzed by Bils
and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) through our prior on the cross-
sectional distribution of the frequency of price changes, which in turn a¤ects aggregate
dynamics, and estimate the model using aggregate ination and output as observables.
The fact that di¤erent cross-sectional distributions of price stickiness imply di¤erent
aggregate dynamics in principle allows inference about such distribution based solely on
time series of macroeconomic variables. However, we had anticipated, and conrm with
our results, that identication of this distribution is likely to be weak in this context.
Thus the additional value of an approach that makes use of the micro data through the
priors.
Our estimation results suggest that heterogeneity of contract lengths is of critical im-
portance for understanding the joint dynamics of ination and output. When we restrict
the models by imposing the same degree of price stickiness across sectors, we obtain results
that are signicantly worse from a statistical perspective than in the general case with
heterogeneity, and that moreover are economically nonsensical. Hence, heterogeneous
price stickiness o¤ers an explanation and potential solution to the puzzling ndings on
price formation for Denmark and the uk in Chapters 1 and 3, respectively, and e.g., for
the euro area in Smets and Wouters (2003).
Despite very di¤erent empirical methodologies, our results are in line with those ob-
tained by Coenen et al. (2007), who estimate a model with Taylor staggered price setting
and heterogeneous contract lengths of up to four quarters. Our estimation results, how-
ever, suggest that it is important to allow for sectors in which prices last longer than
one year. Neglecting to do so generates too little nominal rigidity relative to the micro-
evidence on the one hand, and on the other hand increases the estimated degree of real
rigidity way beyond what is found when more heterogeneity is allowed for. Thus, Coenen
et al. (2007) nd an incredible amount of real rigidity, while our results implied marked
decreases in the estimated degree of real rigidity to levels that have been deemed plausible
in recent literature (Woodford, 2003, e.g., ).
The results generally conform with the cross-sectional distribution of price contracts
that we derive from the work of Nakamura and Steinsson (2007), based on their statistics
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on the frequency of regular price changes. However, the empirical t seems on par with
that obtained from symmetric priors when contracts of up to two years are considered.
This suggests that once one has the average contract length and the extent of hetero-
geneity in price stickiness right, the specic sectoral masses are not of great importance.
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Chapter 1
What Drives Business Cycles in a Small Open
Economy with a Fixed Exchange Rate?,y
Niels Arne Dam
University of Copenhagen
Jesper Gregers Linaa
Danish Economic Councils
First version, October 2005
Abstract
We decompose the Danish business cycle into ten structural shocks using an
open-economy dsgemodel with infrequent determination of prices and wages which
we estimate with Bayesian techniques. Consistent with the Danish monetary policy
regime, we formulate an imperfect peg on the foreign exchange rate and analyse
the resulting monetary transmission mechanism.
We nd that the Danish business cycle is dominated by stochastic movements
in the labour supply in the long term, while demand shocks play a major role in
the short term. Remarkably, the role of technology is negligible, and foreign factors
only contribute little to the Danish business cycle, especially in the long term. With
respect to the estimation, we generally nd believable estimates although the degree
of price stickiness is remarkably high.
Keywords: Open economy, currency peg, business cycles, Bayesian estimation
JEL Classications: E3, E4, F4
We are grateful to Henrik Hansen, Henrik Jensen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, John Rand and Christo-
pher Sims for valuable comments. Also, we are indebted to Vasco Cúrdia and Daria Finocchiaro for
fruitful discussions and programming advice.
yBoth authors were doctoral students at the University of Copenhagen when this work was conducted.
The viewpoints and conclusions stated are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reect
the views of the Danish Economic Councils.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the determinants of business cycles in a small open
economy with a xed exchange rate. We formulate a dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (dsge) model for a small open economy and estimate it on Danish data using
Bayesian estimation techniques. Hence, our paper belongs to the new open-economy
macroeconomics (noem) research programme (surveyed by Lane, 2001) which analyses
open economies with well-specied microeconomic foundations. Since its inception with
the seminal Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) paper, the noem literature has o¤ered many new
insights and has proven popular with theorists and central bankers alike. However, em-
pirical work has been relatively scarce within this framework, and thus a secondary aim
of this paper is an empirical assessment of the noem frameworks ability to adequately
describe a Scandinavian economy.
We obtain three main conclusions regarding the determinants of the Danish busi-
ness cycle: First, in the short run demand-side and supply-side shocks both contribute
substantially to uctuations, while long-run cycles are driven almost entirely by supply
shocks. Second, even though supply shocks dominate uctuations in the long run, the
inuence from technological shocks is almost negligible while shocks to labour supply are
the main contributor to long-run volatility. Finally, a surprisingly large share of all cycles
appears to be founded in domestic shocks rather than foreign ones. Our model allows for
foreign shocks stemming from three channels; foreign prices, foreign demand and changes
in the international interest rate level of which the latter channel appears to be the most
potent foreign source of uctuation.
We believe the Danish case to be particularly appealing for a structural estimation
for three reasons: First, the dual assumption that the economy is small and open seems
uncontroversial for the Danish economy, whereas we nd the it more problematic for, e.g.,
the German, British and Japanese economies which have been considered in previous
studies; second, the Danish economy has had a clear and unaltered monetary policy
regime since 1987 which validates our empirical identication; and third, we have a reliable
and consistent data set for the Danish economy covering the entire period (1987-2003)
under consideration.
Since our focus is a small open economy, we base our theoretical model on that
proposed by Kollmann (2001, 2002). Kollmann (2001) formulates and calibrates a model
of a small open economy with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities in order to
analyse the responses of nominal and real exchange rates to monetary policy shocks, while
Kollmann (2002) elaborates on this calibrated model and analyses welfare consequences
of di¤erent monetary policies. With respect to the monetary policy, which is of special
interest to us, Kollmann (2001) considers a money-growth rule while Kollmann (2002)
focuses on a generalised Taylor rule (although a perfect peg is also considered). However,
as the Danish monetary policy has consisted of a peg on the euro (and the D-mark
before 1999) with a constant parity since 1987, we introduce an imperfect peg regime to
describe the monetary policy rule under the implicit assumption that the interest rate is
the central bank instrument.1
1As Kollmann (2002), we follow the current trend in this literature and consider the cashless limiting
economy; that is, we consider an economy where money-based transactions are su¢ ciently unimportant
for the utility of real consumption to be safely ignored. Thus, we ignore money and let the interest rate
be the instrument for monetary policy. Woodford (2003) argues convincingly in favour of this approach
which we consider to be the empirically relevant one.
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We adopt the econometric framework of Smets and Wouters (2003), who successfully
pioneered the application of Bayesian estimation techniques to a dsge model. Thus,
they estimated a variant of the complex model describing a closed economy originally
constructed by Christiano et al. (2001, henceforth the cee model) on data for the euro
area. As Smets and Wouters, we structurally identify all volatility in the observed data
which necessitates expansions of Kollmanns model. Thus, we include richer household
preferences and a larger variety of structural shocks in our model.
The estimation of the structural model  the rst of its kind that we are aware of
on Danish data yields plausible results. We do nd a remarkably high degree of price
stickiness, but as we discuss below this is a common feature of the emerging body of
empirical evidence on dsge models, and we discuss di¤erent possible explanations.
Bergin (2003) performs a related exercise; he estimates a variant of the Kollmann
(2001) model on Australian, British and Canadian data and compares with reduced-form
var models. In contrast to us, Bergin uses maximum-likehihood estimation and relies
on a simple Choleski decomposition for identication of the structural shocks. He nds
that the structural model provides a better t than the var model, but is less successful
at forecasting the paths of individual variables.
In another related paper, Lindé (2004) analyses the Swedish business cycle in a dsge
model. The focus is di¤erent from ours, however, as Lindé excludes preference shocks and
nominal rigidities (and thus monetary policy) in his model and estimates it on annual
data in accordance with his emphasis on the relative contributions of technology, scal
policy and foreign factors to economic volatility. In contrast, we emphasise the short-
term implications of the monetary policy regime and abstract from scal policy in our
analysis.
The paper continues as follows; Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 describes the
estimation methodology and the results, Section 4 analyses the properties of the estimated
model and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we build a modied version of the open-economy dsge model with stag-
gered price setting presented in Kollmann (2002). Like him, we consider a small open
economy that produces a continuum of intermediate goods which are aggregated and sold
under imperfect competition to nal-good producers at home and abroad. Producers of
intermediaries only reoptimise prices infrequently a la Calvo (1983), but can di¤erentiate
fully between the domestic and foreign market and price their goods abroad in the local
currency. It follows that prices are sticky in the currency of the buyer, an assumption that
has been forcefully argued by, e.g., Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000). Recently, Bergin
(2003, 2004) has compared local and producer currency pricing in estimated dsge models
and found strong empirical support for local currency pricing. Final goods are produced
from aggregates of the intermediate goods from home and abroad and sold in a perfectly
competitive market. Thus, all trade takes place in intermediary goods. McCallum and
Nelson (1999, 2000) analyse a simpler model based on the same assumption and argue
that it is empirically superior to one with trade in nal goods.
We replace the homogenous and perfectly competitive labour market of Kollmann
(2002) with one of di¤erentiated labour services and rigid wage setting due to Erceg et al.
(2000) and Kollmann (2001) which was also implemented in the ceemodel. Furthermore,
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we follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and assume crra preferences and external habit
formation; thus, the preferences analysed in Kollmann model are a special case of ours.
We maintain, however, the quadratic investment adjustment costs in the relative level of
capital, the debt premium on the interest earned on foreign bonds and the uip shock from
the Kollmann (2002) model. Finally, we introduce an imperfect peg regime for monetary
policy with a persistent policy shock.
In this section we outline the various components of the rather rich model.2
2.1 Households
Like Erceg et al. (2000) we assume a continuum with unity mass of symmetric households
with index j who obtain utility from consumption of the nal good Ct (j) and disutility
from labour e¤orts lt (j). Thus, they are all characterized by the following preferences:
E0
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct (j) ; lt (j))
#
; (1)
U (Ct ; lt (j)) = 
b
t
"
Ct (j)
1 C
1  C   
L
t
lt (j)
1+L
1 + L
#
; C ; L > 0
where bt represents a shock to the discount rate and 
L
t represents a shock to the labour
supply, while the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion C is also the inverse intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and L represents the inverse Frisch labour supply elasticity;
nally, j 2 [0; 1] signies the household. We follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and
assume external habit formation in consumption; that is, utility is obtained from
Ct (j) = Ct (j)  hCt 1; 0  h  1; (2)
where hCt 1 is the habit stock at time t which is external in the sense that it is pro-
portional to the past aggregate consumption level that is considered exogenous to the
individual household. We further assume a security market where households completely
diversify their individual income uncertainty, so that consumption is equalised across
households; Ct (j) = Ct; 8j.
Each household supplies an idiosyncratic variety of labour service lt (j). These labour
services enter as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate in the intermediate-goods rm production;
thus, letting lt (s; j) be the amount of labour service j utilized by rm s we nd that rm
s uses the following amount of labour services;
Lt (s) =
Z 1
0
lt (s; j)
1
1+t dj
1+t
: (3)
Here, t is the net wage markup which is assumed to be an i.i.d. process with mean
 > 0.
Wage setting is staggered a la Calvo (1983). That is, in each period household j only
optimises its wage wt (j) with probability 1 D. The household takes the average wage
rate Wt =
hR 1
0
wt (j)
  1
1+t dj
i (1+t)
as given when it chooses its optimal wage wt;t and
2A technical appendix with a thorough derivation of the model and its steady state is available in
Chapter 5.
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will meet any demand for the given type of labour;3
lt (j) =
Z 1
0
lt (s; j) ds: (4)
In addition to consumption, households can invest in domestic and foreign one-period
bonds as well as in domestic capital. Capital Kt earns rental rate Rt and accumulates as
follows with  measuring depreciation;
Kt+1 = Kt (1  ) + It   
2
(Kt+1  Kt)2
Kt
; 0 <  < 1;  > 0; (5)
where It is investment. Here, we have followed Kollmann (2002) and assumed quadratic
adjustment costs. Domestic bonds At earns net interest it, while the interest i
f
t accruing
to foreign bonds Bt held by domestic agents deviates from the foreign interest level it as
follows; 
1 + ift

= 
t (1 + i

t ) ; (6)

t = t exp

 etBt+1
Pt

;  =
eP xQx
P
; (7)
where et is the nominal exchange rate and Pt is the price of nal goods, while  is the
steady-state value of export in units of the domestic nal good. Thus, the interest on
foreign bonds is growing in the foreign debt level which ensures the existence of a unique
equilibrium, cf. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), while t is a stochastic shock which we
motivate with the empirically observed departure from the uncovered interest parity. We
style t a uip shock but abstain from a deeper explanation of its nature; Bergin (2004)
o¤ers a good discussion of uip shocks in the noem literature.
Households own equal shares of domestic rms and thus earn prot from the intermediate-
goods rms (t (j)) in addition to rental rates Rt on the capital, wage income from their
labour services and payments from their state-contingent securities (St (j)). Hence, the
budget constraint of household j is
At+1 (j) + etBt+1 (j) + Pt (Ct (j) + It (j)) = (8)
At (j) (1 + it 1) + etBt (j)

1 + ift 1

+RtKt (j) + t (j) + wt (j) lt (j) + St (j) :
Thus, households decide their consumption, wages and investments in accordance
with the solution to the following problem;
max
fCt(j);At+1(j);Bt+1(j);Kt+1(j);wt;tg1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct (j) ; lt (j))
#
; (9)
s.t. (1)-(8).
3Note that the optimal wage in any period is identical across households, which is the reason why
wt;t can be written without index j.
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The rst-order conditions for domestic and foreign bonds yield regular Euler conditions;
(1 + it)Et

t;t+1

= 1; (10)
1 + ift

Et

t;t+1
et+1
et

= 1; (11)
t;   (UC;=UC;t) (Pt=P ) ; UC;t 
@U (Ct ; Lt)
@Ct
; (12)
where t; discounts prots at time  . One should bear in mind, however, that in this
case UC;t depends on Ct 1 as well as Ct due to our assumption of external habits.
The optimal wage level wt;t is the solution to the following rst-order condition;
1X
=t
(D) t


w
  1+2

t;t Et

UC;
P
wt;t   (1 +  )UL;

= 0;
where D t is the probability that the chosen wage level wt;t is still in e¤ect in period
 . Thus, the infrequent and stochastic reoptimisation implies that the household must
weigh the marginal utility of consumption against the disutility of labour in all future
periods when it sets its wage level. Finally, under the Calvo-like assumptions of the wage
setting, the aggregate wage level evolves as follows;
Wt =
h
D (Wt 1)
  1
t + (1 D) (wt;t) 
1
t
i t
:
2.2 Final Goods
Final goods Zt are produced using intermediate-good bundles from home
 
Qdt

and abroad
(Qmt ) respectively. These intermediary aggregates are combined with a Cobb Douglas
technology;4
Zt =

Qdt
d
d 
Qmt
m
m
; d; m < 1 d + m = 1:
Each bundle of intermediate goods is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate. Here, we follow the
assumptions of the cee model and let the net markup rate t be an i.i.d. process with
mean ;
Qit =
Z 1
0
qi (s)
1
1+t ds
1+t
; i = d;m:
Assuming that domestic rms face the problem of minimizing the cost of producing
Zt units of the nal good, demands for goods produced domestically and abroad can be
written as
Qit = 
i Pt
P it
Zt; i = d;m;
Pt =
 
P dt
d
(Pmt )
m ;
where the appropriately dened price index Pt is the marginal cost of the nal-goods
4Bergin (2004) estimates a model where domestic and foreign intermediary goods are combined with
the more exible ces technology. He nds that the special Cobb-Douglas case is in accordance with the
data.
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producing rm. With perfect competition in the nal-goods market, Pt is also the price
of one unit of the nal consumption good.
2.3 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced from labour Lt and capital Kt using Cobb-Douglas
technology. Thus, the production function of rm s is
yt (s) = tKt (s)
 Lt (s)
1  ; 0 <  < 1;
where t is the aggregate level of technology. Producers operate in a monopolistic com-
petitive market, where each producer sets the price of her variety, taking other prices as
given and supplying whatever amount is demanded at the price set.
Firms rent capital at the rate Rt and compensate labour with wages Wt. Hence, any
rms marginal costs are
MCt =
1
t
W 1  t R
 
t  
  (1   ) (1  ) : (13)
Producers sell their good variety to both domestic and foreign nal-goods producers
(that is, yt (s) = qdt (s) + q
x
t (s)) and are able to price discriminate between the two
markets. As is well-known from the Dixit-Stiglitz models, nal-good producers demand
individiual varieties of intermediaries as follows
qit (s) =

pit (s)
P it
  1+t
t
Qit; i = d;m;
and thereby rm prots can be written as
dx
 
pdt (s) ; p
x
t (s)

=
 
pdt (s) MCt

qdt (s) + (etp
x
t (s) MCt) qxt (s) :
We furthermore assume that foreign exporters produce at unit costs equivalent to the
aggregate foreign price level P t and thus generate the following prots in the domestic
market;
m (pmt (s)) = (p
m
t (s)  etP t )

pmt (s)
Pmt
  1+t
t
Qmt :
Demands from foreign nal-goods producers are assumed to be of the Dixit-Stiglitz
form as well;
qxt (s) =

pxt (s)
P xt
  1+t
t
Qxt ; Q
x
t =

P xt
P t
 1
Y t ;
where the foreign aggregates P t ; Y

t are exogenous.
As in the case of wages, we follow Calvo (1983) and assume that a rm only reoptimises
its prices in any given period with probability 1   d. Given that domestic rms seek to
maximise prots discounted with a pricing kernel based on household utility (cf. equation
(12)), a rm that reoptimises its domestic price faces the following problem;
pdt;t = argmax
!
1X
=t
d tEt

t;
dx (!; pxt (s))

:
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As rms set prices in the domestic and foreign market separately, the constant marginal
costs cf. equation (13) implies that the two price setting problems are independent.
Hence, the optimal price pdt;t is determined from the following rst-order condition;
1X
=t
d tEt
24 pdt;t   (1 +  )MC t;
 
pdt;t
P d
!  1+
 Qd
pdt;t
35 = 0; (14)
which illustrates an essential feature of Calvo pricing; because of the infrequent and
stochastic price setting rms must consider expectations of all future levels of marginal
costs and demands when calculating their optimal price. The optimal price in the export
market
 
pxt;t

is determined analogously.
Import rms are owned by risk-neutral foreigners who discount future prots at the
foreign nominal interest rate Rt;   1s=t (1 + is) 1. Thus, when they reoptimise, they
set their prices in order to maximize discounted future prots measured in foreign units;
pmt;t = argmax
!
1X
=t
d tEt [Rt;m (!) =e ] ;
P it =
h
d
 
P it 1
  1
t + (1  d)  pit;t  1t i t ; i = d;m; x:
2.4 Market Clearing
All intermediaries are demanded from either domestic or foreign nal goods producers,
while nal goods can either be consumed or invested in capital. Hence, equilibria in the
markets for intermediate and nal goods require
Yt = Q
d
t +Q
x
d;
Zt = Ct + It: (15)
Equalising the supply and demand for capital implies
Kt =
Z
Kt (s) ds:
Finally, we assume that only domestic agents hold the domestic bond, implying that
At =
R
At (j) dj = 0 in equilibrium.
Aggregating and manipulating the household budget constraint (8) and using the
nal-good market equilibrium (15) yields the following equation which simply states that
the net foreign assets position (nfa) changes with accruing interest and the net export.
etBt+1 + Pt (Ct + It) = etBt

1 + ift 1

+RtKt +WtLt + P
d
t Q
d
t + etP
x
t Q
x
t   (RtKt +WtLt))
Bt+1 = Bt

1 + ift 1

+ P xt Q
x
t  
Pmt
et
Qmt :
2.5 Monetary Policy
We postulate an imperfect peg against the euro as the monetary policy; in our model the
interest rate is the instrument, which is thus used to keep et constant up to an exogenous
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policy shock t with unity mean;
et = et: (16)
Log-linearizing equations (6) and (7) yields the following relation between the internal
foreign interest rate and that paid to domestic holders of foreign bonds;
{^ft = {^

t + ^t   B^t:
Combining this relation with log-linearised versions of equations (10) and (11) yields
Ete^t+1 = {^t   {^ft = {^t   {^t +

B^t   ^t

;
{^t  log

1 + it
1 +{

; ^t  log (t=) ; B^t  Bt
P xQx
;
which we can combine with (16) to obtain
{^t = {^

t +

^t   B^t

+ Et^t+1;
that is, the interest rate responds (virtually) one-to-one with the foreign interest rate and
the uip shock and is additionally skewed by the spread and the policy shock.
2.6 Solving the model
We log-linearise the model around its deterministic steady state and solve the resulting
linear rational expectation system with the Sims (2002) method.The log-linearised system
is summarised in Appendix A, while the method used to solve it is described in Appendix
B.
3 Estimation
We now consider the results and underlying assumptions of our estimation. Before we list
our specic assumptions and report our estimation results, however, we briey motivate
the Bayesian methodology that we utilise.
3.1 Estimation Methodology
We seek suitable econometric tools to quantify and evaluate our postulated structural
model of the Danish economy given our set of observed time series. Building on the
seminal analysis in Smets and Wouters (2003), we follow what Geweke (1999) styled the
strong econometric interpretation of our dsge model. This implies that we postulate a
full probabilistic characterisation of our observed data which allows us to estimate the
structural parameters through classical maximum-likelihood methods; or alternatively
following Bayesian methodologythrough combining the likelihood function with prior
distributions on the structural parameters and maximise the resulting posterior density.
In this paper we follow the Bayesian approach which allows us to formalise the use
of any prior knowledge we may have on the structural parameters. On a more practical
level it also helps stabilise the nonlinear minimization algorithm which we use for the
estimation. Given the limited length of our sample, reasonable assumptions for the prior
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distributions (including restrictions on the support of certain parameters such as, e.g.,
standard deviations) are likely to be essential for obtaining plausible estimates. On the
other hand, we utilise prior distributions we believe to be broad enough in order for the
data to inform us on the structural parameters of the theoretical model.
Our model includes ten structural shocks and nine observed variables. Thus, we can
proceed on the assumption that there is no measurement error in the data set without
facing the problem of stochastic singularity. In other words, we attribute all stochastic
volatility to identied structural shock processes. This approach was succesfully carried
out in the Smets andWouters (2003) analysis of a close variant of the cee closed-economy
model.
Alternative ways of estimating dsge models do exist; Christiano et al. (2001), e.g., es-
timate their model using gmm techniques based on a loss criterion measuring the distance
from impulse-response functions of a monetary policy shock generated by an identied
var and the parameterized dsge model, respectively. This, however, does not appeal to
us; we acknowledge that consistency between the predictions of a var and a dsge model
is a strong indication that the predicted outcome of a given experiment is robust. We
believe, however, that these predictions should be obtained apart from each other. In
particular, the sketched method of estimation depends critically on the right identicatin
of the var model a controversial issue on its own that will have signicant e¤ects on
the estimation. By maximising a likelihood function combined with priors, we link the
dsge model and its way of propagating shocks directly to the observed patterns in the
data, thus avoiding controversial assumptions of the identication of a var model.
3.2 Data
We treat Denmark as the home country and a weigthed average of a Germany, France
and the Netherlands as the foreign country. For Denmark we include observations of real
gdp, total real consumption, the gdp deator, total employment adjusted for variations
in hours worked, and a three-month money-market interest rate, corresponding to the
theoretical variables Y;C; P; L and i. We are unable to nd a satisfactory measure for
wages; although a suitable measure is availabe in the mona databank, is only observed
annually and thus unsuited for our analysis. We use quarterly data for the period 1987-
2003 as the last adjustment of the parity between the Danish krone and the D-mark
occured in January 1987.
Due to the data break in German gdp implied by the unication of East and West
Germany in 1991, we have manipulated the German real gdp series; specically we ran
an ols regression including only a linear time trend and a unication step dummy taking
the value of one from 1991 onwards. Using the obtained coe¢ cient we shifted the level
of gdp and obtained our measure of German real gdp.
Since our model assumes that the home country is pegging the foreign country, and the
Danish krone was e¤ectively pegged to the D-mark before the current peg on the euro, our
foreign aggregate should at the same time be broad enough to cover as much as possible
of the Danish trade and narrow enough that we can plausibly claim that the relevant
exchange rate for the foreign area was historically the D-mark. We settled on Germany,
France and the Netherlands which constituted 28 percent of Danish exports in 2003. We
used their relative weights from the current e¤ective exchange rate for the Danish krone
as calculated by Danmarks Nationalbank which are 69, 17 and 14 percent for Germany,
France and the Netherlands, respectively. For this eu aggregate we include observations
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of geometric averages of real gdp and the gdp deator, and of the D-mark/euro exchange
rate vis-à-vis the Danish krone and a German three-month money-market interest rate,
matching the theoretical variables Y ; P ; e and i. The data and their sources are further
detailed in Appendix C.
Our log-linearized model describes stationary deviations from a steady state, so we
follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and remove a linear trend from the log of our gdp,
consumption and labour supply series. We further adjust the price series for a nominal
trend in ination and remove the same trend from the interest rates.
3.3 Prior Distributions
We x a subset of key parameters which are likely to be poorly determined in a model
that only considers deviations from the steady state. In a Bayesian sense, we assume
very xed prior distributions, namely ones with no variance. Thus, the discount factor
 is xed at 0.99, implying an approximate quarterly return of 1 percent, while the
depreciation rate of capital  is set at 0.025. The capital share  is set at 0.33, while
the share of domestic intermediates in nal production d is xed at 0.7, and the net
steady-state mark-up rate  is xed at 0.2. Furthermore, we follow Kollmann (2002) and
set the capital mobility parameter  at 0.0019 in accordance with the empirical ndings
of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002). Finally, we x  at unity corresponding to a foreign
technology equal to that assumed for the home country.
This leaves us with six structural parameters capturing nominal rigidities, preferences
and capital adjustment costs, as well as 17 parameters dening the structural shock
processes. We assume beta distributions for parameters restricted to the range between
0 and 1, inverse gamma distributions for the standard deviations of the shock innova-
tions, and gamma distributions for the remaining parameters. Thus, all parameters are
restricted to take on positive values.
The Calvo parameters d and D are assumed to follow beta destributions with mean
0.75, which would imply that prices and wages are reoptimised every year on average.
We keep the distributions tight (standard deviations are set at 0.03) since we consider
price and wage contracts lasting more than 2 years on average implausible.
We assume that the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substition C follows a gamma
distribution with mean 1, corresponding to log preferences, while the inverse elasticity of
work e¤ort L is assumed to be gamma distributed with mean 2 and a variance broad
enough to cover the lower values obtained in the microeconometric studies and the higher
values used in the rbc literature.
We further assume that the autocorrelation parameters  for the persistent struc-
tural shocks all follow a gamma distribution with mean 0.85 and a standard devation of
0.06; the tight distributions around these high autocorrelations ensure that the persistent
structural shocks are distinguishable from the i.i.d. shocks. All variances are assumed to
follow inverse gamma distributions (which are the conjugate prior distributions in this
case), and we have drawn on the assumptions in Smets and Wouters (2003), the calibra-
tions in Kollmann (2002) and regressions on our data set to determine the mean of each
distribution.
All the assumptions on prior distributions are summarised in Table 1.
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3.4 Posterior Estimates
We show our estimation results in Table 1. First, we report the mode of the posterior
distribution using a numerical minimisation routine. These estimates are shown along
with standard errors derived from the numerically calculated Hessian. Secondly, we
report the median and the 5th and 95th percentiles from the posterior distributions. These
distributions were simulated with Markov-chain Monte-Carlo methods. In particular, we
ran a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with 60,000 draws from a multivariate Gaussian
jumping distribution.5
The prior and posterior distributions of the 23 estimated parameters are also illus-
trated in Figures 1 to 3. Most parameters are estimated to be signicantly di¤erent from
zero. The exceptions are the standard deviations of the innovations to the foreign inter-
est rate and of the wage markup shock. Since we did not have observations of the wage
level, it is not too surprising that the wage markup shock is estimated to be insignicant.
The absence of a time series for wages is also a likely explanation for the striking simi-
larity between the prior and posterior distribution of the wage rigidity parameter. The
autocorrelations of the persistent structural shocks lie in the range from 0.82 (the level
of technology) to 0.96 (labour supply); thus, the data have not caused them to diverge
much from our prior assumptions.
Our estimates of the preference parameters seem plausible. The labor supply elasticity
is approximately one and the intertemporal elasticity of substition is a half, so that both
belong to the range of values regularly applied in similar analyses. The estimate for the
external habit stock h lies between a third and a half; this is on the lower side compared
with the literature at large, but should be equally uncontroversial.
The estimated nominal rigidities are more problematic. The rst thing that stands
out is the large discrepancy between our prior beliefs and the posterior distribution of
the Calvo price parameter d. The posterior mode is 0.94, corresponding to an average
duration of intermediary price contracts of four years. Given a strict interpretation of
the Calvo pricing model, our estimate is blatantly implausible. Obviously, our imple-
mentation of Calvo pricing is the simplest one possible, and a rst attempt to improve
it would be to add indexation to past ination as in the cee model.6 However, when
Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate this more elaborate model, they obtain results that
are very similar to ours; hence, we are skeptical that this expansion of the pricing model
will yield an estimated Calvo parameter in the range we consider plausible. Another
obvious extension is to consider separate Calvo parameters for import and export prices,
5More accurately, we made 61,000 draws but discarded to rst thousand in order to avoid problems
with the initial point. We used the inverse Hessian calculated at the posterior mode scaled down by a
factor eight as covariance matrix in the jumping distribution.
6By indexation to past ination we mean that prices and wages which are not reoptimized in a given
period are adjusted for past aggregate ination instead. We refer the reader to Woodford (2003, ch. 3)
for a thorough discussion of indexation in the Calvo pricing model.
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although one would have to include observed time series of these prices to improve the
estimation this way.
Smets and Wouters speculate that the high price stickiness is in part due to the
assumption of constant returns to scale in the intermediary-goods sector as conrmed
empirically by Galí et al. (2001), this assumption implies an upward bias in the price
rigidity if the returns to scale are in fact decreasing. Alternatively, Altig et al. (2005) show
that if one replaces the assumption of an economy-wide rental market for capital with
one of rm-specic capital, the implied Calvo price parameter is reduced signicantly;
thus, in their benchmark model (a variant of the closed-economy cee model) the average
time between price reoptimisations is reduced from 5.6 to 1.5 quarters, as they change
the assumption regarding the capital market. Both arguments indicate that the cause
of the implausibly high estimate of the Calvo parameter may just as well lie outside the
specic formulation of the pricing model.
The other troubling result of our estimation is the large variance of the price markup
shock. We suspect the high volatility is caused by two factors; rst, we have neither
public spending nor investment shocks in the model to explain the stochastic nature of
demand; second, we believe that the large variance is compensating for the restrictive
version of the Calvo pricing model we have implemented.
According to our estimation, the capital adjustment cost parameter  follows a tight
posterior distribution located very close to the prior mean. Our experience with the esti-
mation algorithm and the impulse-response functions indicate that the model properties
change markedly with even small changes in .
We nd plausible estimates for the remaining parameters which dene the structural
shock processes.
The observed time series (solid lines) and the one-step-ahead predictions (dashed
lines) from the Kalman lter are shown in Figure 4. Given the simplicity of the presented
model, we nd the t to be overall satisfactory, although the restrictive Calvo model yields
a somewhat problematic t for prices, and the model is not quite capable of explaining
the large and persistent swings in the observed labour supply.
4 Analysing the Properties of the Estimated Model
4.1 Impulse Response Analysis
We now consider the e¤ects of shocking the exogenous processes of the model. First,
we focus on the e¤ects of an expansionary monetary policy shock and a drop in the
foreign interest rate level, respectively. Subsequently, we briey consider the e¤ects of
an uanticipated rise in the technology level and in the foreign demand. The impulse-
response functions to innovations in these four shocks are shown in Figures 5-8; we depict
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the median (solid line) and the 5th and 95th percentiles (dashed lines) as calculated from
1,000 draws from the posterior distributions.
We begin with an analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism, by which we
mean the endogenous responses to a change in the domestic interest rate which is the
instrument of the central bank in our model. As discussed in section 2.5, an expansionary
monetary policy shock under our peg regime implies setting the interest rate below the
level required to keep the exchange rate constant. Thus, technically, the expansive policy
shock is equivalent to a temporary devaluation, and we implement it through a positive
innovation to t.
The e¤ects of an expansionary monetary policy shock are shown in Figure 5. We
see that a devaluation implies a positive response in consumption and investments and,
hence, output. The expansive e¤ect of a devaluation on output peaks one quarter after
the devaluation with an increase in output of .8 percent following a 1 percent devaluation.
Investments respond more strongly and peaks instantaneously with a 2.9 percent response.
The transmission mechanism is as follows; the opportunity cost of consumption decreases
with the lower interest rate, as it gets less benecial to hold domestic bonds. Hence,
aggregate demand rises which increases demand for labour and capital. This stimulates
investments and pushes up marginal costs as wages and the rental price of capital increase.
Since prices on the intermediary goods are determined as a markup on marginal costs,
they increase correspondingly. Note, however, that the rise in the price on exported
intermediaries (measured in the foreign currency) is less than a third of the rise the in
domestic price level. The explanation is that by assumption the rm sets the price in
the foreign currency, but seeks to maximise prots measured in local currency; thus, as
the devaluation itself provides a sizeable increase in prots from exported intermediaries,
maintaining the optimal markup requires a relatively smaller rise in the export price.
In total, the devaluation creates ination, and prices peak after 10 quarters with an
estimated rise of .15 percent.
In Figure 6 we consider the e¤ects of shocking the level of the foreign interest rate.
The peg regime implies that the central bank lowers the domestic interest rate one-for-one
with the foreign decrease in order to keep the nominal exchange rate xed, and thus the
main di¤erences between the former experiment and the present are (i) the positive co-
movement in the domestic and foreign interest rate levels; and (ii) the fact that the in the
present experiment the exchange rate is xed. The real e¤ects of this shock are similar
to the ones above; the nominal e¤ects, however, di¤er. Notably, the determinants of
the import price are una¤ected, while the prices set domestically experience long-lasting
swings. Domestic producers initially increase their prices because of the higher demand.
As capital accumulates and pushes the rental rate down, while the interest rates on bonds
return to towards the steady-state level, investment and output demand drop below their
initial levels, and rms respond by lowering their prices. Thus, while prices rise at rst,
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Figure 6: Responses of a shock to the foreign interest rate
they begin to fall after approximately 6 quarters and fall below the initial level after
three years; only after some eight years do they begin a slow return towards the long-run
equilibrium.
With regards to the technology shock depicted in Figure 7, we see that a positive
shock to technology results in an initial drop in output. This is in sharp contrast to
a standard rbc model. The reason is the estimated high degree of price stickiness in
intermediaries. Thus, even though the positive shock to technology shifts the supply
curve of the rms to the right, the price inertia causes the short-run supply curve to be
almost horizontal, and thus the direct supply-side e¤ect on output is small. Furthermore,
a given level of production can now be reached using fewer production resources due to the
higher level of productivity, causing employment as well as capital demand to decrease.
In turn, households wish to hold less capital stock and disinvest. Thus, total demand for
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Figure 7: Responses to a shock to technology
nal goods has fallen, and in equilibrium this e¤ect dominates the positive supply e¤ect,
implying a lower output equilibrium than before the shock. Over time, however, prices do
fall because of the highly persistent technology shock that has decreased marginal costs,
and as demand responds to the lower prices, capital is accumulated and investments rise.
The e¤ects of shocking the foreign demand are found in Figure 8. No surprises here; an
increased demand from abroad increases demands for intermediaries; this raises demand
for capital and labour pulling the rental rate and wages up, hence increasing marginal
costs. Domestic producers of intermediary goods respond by increasing their prices, and
consequently the price of domestic goods goes up. With Pd and Px increasing, P goes up
as well.
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Figure 8: Responses to a foreign demand shock
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4.2 Variance Decomposition
In Table 2 and 3 we present a variance decomposition of the forecast mean squared errors
(mse) at various time horizons measured in quarters which is based on 1,000 draws from
the posterior distribution. Decomposing the contribution of the individual shocks to the
movements in the endogenous variables yields some interesting conclusions. First, we
note that technological innovations do not contribute much to the volatility in gdp in
neither the short run nor in the long run. This result stands in sharp contrast to the
baseline rbc model that relies on technological shocks as the sole driving force behind
business cycles. Thus, our results strongly indicate that a model with a more elaborate
set of structural shocks is important for understanding the forces that drive the economy.
A likely explanation for the modest role of technology shocks follows from the feature
of our estimated model documented in Section 4.1 above; namely, that output initially
responds negatively to a positive technology shock; in contrast, the initial output response
to a positive labour supply shock is positive.7 This is likely to support the latter as the
dominant supply shock process of the two, as we believe this property to be in better
accordance with the correlations of the observed data. We note that Smets and Wouters
(2003) nd that technology plays a minor role in the business cycle of the euro area and
is clearly dominated by schocks to labour supply, and thus we regard our results to be
consistent with theirs. In contrast, Bergin (2003) nds that output volatility is dominated
by technology shocks, but it is worth noting that he does not consider shocks to labour
supply in his analysis.
Second, demand-side shocks mainly preferences have a sizeable impact in the short
run, while supply shocks drive cycles in the long run; despite the apparently limited
role of technological shocks, we note that the supply side do contribute substantially
to uctuations in gdp. Initially, shifts in labour supply account for 23 percent of the
volatility in gdp and more than two-thirds of the volatility in investments. In the long run
labour supply shocks account for between 80 and 90 percent of all volatility in private
consumption, investments and, hence, gdp. In the short run, however, we see that
shocks to the discount rate yield the largest impact on gdp. Also, varying price markups
contribute heavily. This pattern does not change much in the medium term.
Third, somewhat surprisingly we see that business cycles in Denmark to a large degree
appear to be founded domestically. Although Denmark is a highly open economy, less
than 10 percent of the volatility in the short and medium term can be directly traced
to foreign sources, by which we mean foreign gdp, prices and interest rates. However,
shocks to price mark-ups also have a component that is determined abroad, as we have
not distinguished between markup shocks from domestic and foreign producers. Taking
this into consideration, at most 40 percent of the short run volatility can be attributed
7This particular property of the model is not further discussed in the paper. Documentation is
available upon request.
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Table 2: Variance Decomposition
C I Y
t = 0 Preferences 0.67 0.82 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.25 0.32 0.41
Labour supply 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.58 0.67 0.75 0.16 0.26 0.37
Technology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
uip 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Price mark-up 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.12 0.19 0.27
Wage mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.15
Foreign int. rate 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.1
Foreign price 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Foreign demand 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05
mse (in pct.) 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.50 0.61 0.77 0.03 0.04 0.04
t = 4 Preferences 0.47 0.63 0.78 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.39 0.53
Labour supply 0.12 0.24 0.39 0.54 0.64 0.73 0.08 0.12 0.18
Technology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
uip 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Price mark-up 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.24 0.34
Wage mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.18
Foreign int. rate 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.1
Foreign price 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Foreign demand 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.08
mse (in pct.) 0.08 0.13 0.19 1.37 1.68 2.09 0.1 0.13 0.18
t = 12 Preferences 0.19 0.31 0.45 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.19 0.29
Labour supply 0.44 0.59 0.73 0.51 0.6 0.69 0.4 0.49 0.59
Technology 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
uip 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Price mark-up 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.2 0.27 0.12 0.17 0.22
Wage mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.11
Foreign int. rate 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05
Foreign price 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Foreign demand 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.06
mse (in pct.) 0.17 0.29 0.48 1.73 2.1 2.61 0.2 0.28 0.4
t = 100 Preferences 0.04 0.11 0.23 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.11
Labour supply 0.67 0.84 0.94 0.7 0.78 0.84 0.72 0.84 0.93
Technology 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
uip 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Price mark-up 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.1
Wage mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04
Foreign int. rate 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02
Foreign price 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign demand 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03
mse (in pct.) 0.36 0.84 2.48 3.03 4.12 5.86 0.53 1.03 2.55
Note: The variance decomposition calculation is based on 1,000 draws from the
posterior distribution. In the rst and third column for each enogenous variable
we report the 5th and 95th percentiles respectively, while the middle column in
bold states the median.
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition, II
i W R
t = 0 Preferences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.21
Labour supply 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.92 0.97 0.48 0.61 0.75
Technology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.16
uip 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Price mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.1
Wage mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06
Foreign int. rate 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Foreign price 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign demand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
mse (in pct.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.41 0.64
t = 4 Preferences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.23
Labour supply 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.94 0.98 0.61 0.75 0.86
Technology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07
uip 0.61 0.7 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Price mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06
Wage mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy 0.05 0.11 0.2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Foreign int. rate 0.13 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Foreign price 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign demand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
mse (in pct.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 2.80 4.84 2.08 3.33 5.53
t = 12 Preferences 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.16
Labour supply 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.72 0.83 0.9
Technology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04
uip 0.54 0.63 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Price mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Wage mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Foreign int. rate 0.15 0.21 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Foreign price 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign demand 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
mse (in pct.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.90 8.18 11.93 4.14 6.19 9.47
t = 100 Preferences 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.12
Labour supply 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.78 0.85 0.9
Technology 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
uip 0.5 0.59 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Price mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Wage mark-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Foreign int. rate 0.15 0.2 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Foreign price 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign demand 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
mse (in pct.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.42 11.3 16.58 5.66 7.41 10.22
Note: The variance decomposition calculation is based on 1,000 draws from the
posterior distribution. In the rst and third column for each enogenous variable
we report the 5th and 95th percentiles respectively, while the middle column in
bold states the median. 31
to foreign impulses dropping to 5-6 percent in the long run. Interestingly, this result
conforms with Lindé (2004) who nds that foreign factors play a minor role in the Swedish
business cycles, especially in the long run. This weak link to the foreign economies might
explain why Denmark seems to have been left relatively una¤ected by the international
slowdown since 2001.
Recently, there has been an intense debate about the response of labour supply (mea-
sured in hours worked) to technological innovations as well as the contribution of these
innnovations to volatility in activity. On the one hand, Galí (2004) and Galí and Ra-
banal (2004) argue strongly in favour of a very limited role of technology in this respect,
while McGrattan (2004) defends the technology driven business cycle and the rbc model.
With regards to the response of hours to technological innovations, Galí (1999) argues
that hours fall after a positive shock to technology, while Christiano et al. (2004) nd
that hours increase. And recently, Uhlig (2004) concluded that the response is slightly
positive, but insignicant. On both accounts, our ndings are in accordance with those
of Galí.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we formulated and estimated a dsge model of a small open economy with
several rigidities in order to facilitate a structural decomposition of the Danish business
cycle. We identied ten structural shocks and quantied their relative contributions to
the volatility of six central variables; consumption, investments, output, interest rates,
wages and capital gains.
Somewhat surprisingly, we nd that uctuations in the Danish economy stem pre-
dominantly from domestic shocks, despite the fact that the Danish economy by most
standards is considered to be an open economy. In the short run, output cycles are mainly
driven by demand shocks, with shocks to preferences being the largest, yet supply-side
shocks also play an important role; thus, shocks to labour supply account for one-fourth
of the short-term uctuations, whereas the contribution from technology shocks is almost
negligible.
In the longer run we nd that cycles are mainly driven by supply shocks. Specically,
labour supply accounts for 85 percent of all output volatility after 25 years. Technology
shocks do not contribute at all. The nding that demand factors matter greatly for
the short-term cycles, while long-run cycles are driven by the supply side is consistent
with the traditional distinction between Keynesian models for short-run modelling and
classical model long-run modelling.
We paid special attention to the monetary transmission mechanism when we analysed
the properties of our estimated model. We nd that a one percent devaluation implies
a 0.8 percent rise in output, peaking after two quarters. This experiment leads to a
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similar short-run stimulus of the real economy as a negative shock to the international
interest rate. In both scenarios the central bank lowers the domestic interest rate; in the
rst scenario the bank deviates temporarily from the peg with an expansionary monetary
policy shock, while it responds to the foreign interest shock in the second scenario in
order to maintain the exchange rate peg.
Overall, we consider the estimation to be satisfactory. However, we do acknowledge
three critical aspects in relation to the estimation of the model. First, we obtain a very
high degree of price stickiness in the intermediate sector, corresponding to rms only
being able to re-optimise prices only once every fourth year on average. This is, however,
a well-known problem in this literature, and ex ante we did not expect to solve it. We
did, however, discuss some of the recent explanations that have been suggested recently;
of these changing the assumption regarding the capital market seems particularly fruitful,
and we should like to implement this in future work.
The second problem concerns the contemporaneous negative reaction in output follow-
ing a technology shock, and is related to the rst problem. Since the short-run supply is
almost horizontal, the immediate impact from a technology shock is small. When rms
production technology at the same time have improved, demands for capital decrease
ceteris paribus. Hence investments fall and more than outweigh the rise in consump-
tion causing output to fall. This implausible property could probably be avoided by
introducing variable capital utilisation in the model.
Thirdly, the price markup shock is estimated to be implausibly volatile. We suspect
two reasons for this result; (i) we have chosen the most simple and thus inexible version
of the Calvo pricing model; and (ii) we have ignored government spending and investment
shock on the demand side. Thus, we leave much of the price dynamics to be accounted
for by the markup shock. This result suggests that future work within this framework
should consider a more exible model for the price setting of domestic and foreign rms
and include more demand components in the nal goods market.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to estimate a dsge model
on Danish data. Despite the problems just mentioned, we consider the estimated model
to be a major step forward in establishing a suitable framework for the analysis of the
Danish business cycle. Not only do we believe to have captured essential features of the
Danish economy, we also have a utility-based metric for evaluating the welfare e¤ects of
di¤erent policies. One obvious question that begs to be answered is the consequences
of alternative monetary policy regimes to the current peg. We are currently seeking to
implement a generalised Taylor rule in a close variant of the estimated model presented
in this paper and quantifying the implied changes in welfare.
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A Log-linearised Model
Q^dt = P^t + Z^t   P^ dt ; (17)
Q^mt = P^t + Z^t   P^mt ; (18)
Q^xt =  P^ xt + P^ t + Y^ t ; (19)
P^t = 
dP^ dt +
 
1  d P^mt ; (20)
L^t = R^t   W^t + K^t; (21)
K^t =  ^t   (1   ) R^t + (1   ) W^t + Y^t; (22)dMCt =  ^t + (1   ) W^t +  R^t; (23)
^t+1 = U^Ct+1   U^Ct + P^t   P^t+1; (24)
P^ dt   dP^ dt 1 = (1  d) (1  d)
hdMCt + ^ti+ dEt hP^ dt+1   dP^ dt i ; (25)
P^ xt   dP^ xt 1 = (1  d) (1  d)
dMCt   e^t + ^t+ dEt hP^ xt+1   dP^ xt i ; (26)
P^mt   dP^mt 1 = (1  d) (1  d)

e^t + P^

t + ^t

+ dEt
h
P^mt+1   dP^mt
i
; (27)
W^t  DW^t 1 = (1 D) (1 D)

P^t + U^L;t   U^C;t + ^t

+DEt
h
W^t+1  DW^t
i
;
(28)
K^t+1 = (1  ) K^t + I^t; (29)
B^t+1 = (1 +{) B^t + P^
x
t + Q^
x
t   P^mt + e^t   Q^mt ; B^t 
Bt
P xQx
; (30)
U^C;t = ^
b
t  
C
(1  h)C^t +
hC
(1  h)C^t 1; (31)
U^L;t = ^
b
t + ^
L
t + LL^t; (32)
 (1 + ) K^t+1 = Et^t+1   P^t +  (1  )EtP^t+1 + [1   (1  )]EtR^t+1 + K^t + EtK^t+2;
(33)
{^t =  Et^t+1; (34)
{^ft =  Et^t+1   Ete^t+1 + e^t; (35)
{^ft = {^

t + ^t   B^t+1; (36)
e^t = ^t; (37)
Y^t = 
dQ^dt +
 
1  d Q^xt ; (38)
Z^t =
C
Z
C^t +
I
Z
I^t: (39)
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The system has 24 endogenous and 10 exogenous variables. Of the latter we assume
that the markup shocks and the uip shock (t; t; t) are i.i.d. and the remaining seven
are ar(1) processes;
^
b
t = %
b^
b
t 1 + "
b
t ; (40)
^
l
t = %
l^
l
t 1 + "
l
t; (41)
^t = %
t^t 1 + "tt; (42)
^t = %
m^t 1 + "
m
t ; (43)
{^t = %
i^t 1 + "
i
t; (44)
P^ t = %
P P^ t 1 + "
P
t ; (45)
Y^ t = %
Y Y^ t 1 + "
Y
t : (46)
B Solving the Log-linearised Model with gensys
We solve the log-linearised system (17)-(46) with the gensys method developed by Sims
(2002). For this purpose we collect the 23 endogenous variables with 6 lagged variables
and 9 exogenous processes (excluding the policy shock t) in the (38 1) vector t;8
t : B^t; C^t; e^t; {^t; {^
f
t ; I^t; K^t; L^t;dMCt; P^t; P^ dt ; P^ xt ; P^mt ; Q^dt ; Q^xt ; Q^mt ; R^t; ^t+1; U^C;t; U^L;t; W^t; Y^t; Z^t;
K^t 1; P^ dt 1; P^
x
t 1; P^
m
t 1; W^t 1;
^
b
t ; ^
l
t; ^t; ^t; ^t; ^t; {^

t ; P^

t ; Y^

t :
The i.i.d. shocks are included in the vector "t 
 
"bt ; "
l
t; "
t
t; ^t; "
m
t ; "
pm
t ; "
wm
t ; "
i
t; "
P
t ; "
Y
t

includes the set of i.i.d. shocks, and the seven expectational errors are included in the
vector t =
 
dt ; 
x
t ; 
m
t ; 
W
t ; 
K
t ; 
A
t ; 
B
t

so that we can write the model in the canonical
var(1) gensys form;
 0t =  1t 1 +	"t +t:
8Hence, we add six identity equations to the system (17)-(46), corresponding to the six lagged en-
dogenous variables included in t, and two denitions of the mark-up shocks (^t = "
mp
t ; ^t = "
mw
t ).
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Applying the gensys method recasts the system in the solved form
t = 1t 1 +zZt:
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C Data
We use quarterly data for the period 1987-2003. The sources of our data set are specied
in Table 4.
Table 4: Data Sources
Variable Database Mnenomic
GDP
[1] Denmark mona fy
[2] Germany eo deu_gdpvq
[3] France mei fra_expgdp_vnbqrsaq
[4] Netherlands mei nld_expgdp_lnbqrsaq
Prices
[5] Denmark mona pfy
[6] Germany eo deu_pgdpq
[7] France mei fra_expgdp_dnbsaq
[8] Netherlands mei nld_expgdp_dnbsaq
Interest rates
[9] Denmark ew dnk14010
[10] Germany ifs s13460c00zfq
Exchange rate
[11] DEM/DKK ew dnk19008
Miscellaneous Danish variables
[12] Consumption mona fcp
[13] Private employment mona qp
[14] Public employment mona qo
[15] Self-employed mona qs
[16] Working hours pr. week (max) mona maxtid
[17] Employment ([13] + [14] + [15]) [16]0:7
mona: Model of the Danish Central Bank (cf. Christensen and Knud-
sen, 1992); eo: oecd Economic Outlook; mei: oecd Main Economic
Indicators; ifs: imf International Financial Statistics. Data from the
latter three sources were provided by EcoWin.
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Abstract
This paper performs a welfare analysis based on the hypothetical scenario that
Denmark gave up its peg and started conducting monetary policy according to a
Taylor rule. For this we rely on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for
a small open economy that was estimated on Danish data using Bayesian methods.
We obtain the result that the gain in welfare is equivalent to a permanent increase
of around 0.8 pct in the level of consumption. Examining a range of alternative
scenarios does not change this conclusion qualitatively, unless we assume a degree of
policy errors under the Taylor rule that is substantially larger than those estimated
by other studies.
Keywords: Open economy, Monetary policy, Business cycles, Welfare
JEL Classications: E3, E4, E5, F4
We are grateful to Henrik Jensen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, Christian
Schultz and Jens Søndergaard for valuable comments, and to Michel Juillard for help with the dynare
program.
yBoth authors were doctoral students at the University of Copenhagen when this work was conducted.
The viewpoints and conclusions stated are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reect
the views of the Danish Economic Councils.
40
1 Introduction
With the recent enlargement of the European Union there is now a sizeable number
of countries bordering the euro area who are facing a complex question on their future
monetary policy. In the longer term, the question will be whether these countries should
adopt the euro or conduct an independent monetary policy as Sweden and Great Britain
have been doing with considerable success. Recent papers on the optimality of currency
areas versus independent monetary policies include Benigno and Benigno (2000) and
Benigno (2004).
Yet, it remains an open question how long the new eu members would have to wait
before they could fully join the monetary union. Arguably, they could be in a waiting
position for years where they will be pegging the euro and thus essentially be passively
adopting the monetary policy conducted by the ecb. Thus, it would be of general
interest to seek to quantify the welfare consequences of pegging the euro compared with
an independent monetary policy regime. Due to the combination of dramatic changes in
their economies over the last decade and a very limited set of time series on key aggregate
measures, obtaining reliable estimates on the welfare implications of di¤erent monetary
policy regimes for the new eu members from central and eastern Europe is, alas, a very
di¢ cult task.
Incidentally, Denmark o¤ers an interesting case study on this exact question. Al-
though a member of the erm for years, Denmark has opted out of the third stage of the
emu for political reasons (which mainly has to do with an eu-skeptic population). As a
consequence, Denmark has e¤ectively had a xed exchange-rate policy for decades now;
thus, since 1987 the monetary policy has kept a constant parity on the D-mark/euro.
This paper seeks to quantify the welfare implications of this peg regime compared with
a hypothetical independent monetary policy regime which seeks to stabilise ination and
output volatility. Thus, since the Danes have twice rejected to adopt the euro, this paper
provides an answer to the question of which alternative monetary policy is the optimal
one.
In order to address this question, we formulate a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium
(dsge) model for the Danish economy and calculate a second-order approximation around
its steady state. We have chosen this solution method since rst-order approximations
are not adequate for welfare analysis of stochastic models, cf. Kim and Kim (2003) and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
The model itself builds on the one presented in Kollmann (2002). However, while
Kollmann bases his welfare analysis on a calibration of the structural parameters of his
model, we rely on the model that was estimated on Danish data in Dam and Linaa
(2005). This model makes three important departures from the one in Kollmann (2002).
Firstly, in the xed-exchange rate case we do not consider a peg that is perfect; instead
we postulate that the central bank is only able to keep the exchange rate stable up to an
exogenous shock, reecting the (minor) uctuations observed in the exchange rate around
its parity. Secondly, we replace Kollmanns assumption of a competitive labour market
with one of di¤erentiated labour and monopolistic competition amongst the households
leading them to raise wages above the competitive level; in addition, we impose wage
rigidities a la Calvo (1983) by assuming that households are unable to revise their wage
demands every period. Thirdly, we generalise the utility function applied in Kollmann
(2002) so that the key elasticities as well as habits reecting household preferences are
estimated. All in all, the model underlying our analysis has richer dynamics which ceteris
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paribus improves its empirical plausibility. This should fascilitate the reliability of the
quantitative welfare cost that we deduce in this paper.
There are potentially important matters not included in the current analysis; if Den-
mark decided to adopt a Taylor rule, risk aversion from foreign investors might induce a
reduction in direct investment ows into Denmark caused by an increased uncertainty re-
garding the exchange rate. Furthermore, also Danish exporters face uncertainty regarding
the exchange rate and could need to engage in costly arrangements with nancial inter-
mediaries in order to eliminate this uncertainty when trading with agents abroad. Finally,
we ignore issues related to the potential budget discipline being put on the Government
in order to keep a peg credible.
Abstaining from these issues we conclude that there are benets to be attained from
letting monetary policy be conducted according to a Taylor rule (cf. Taylor, 1993; Wood-
ford, 2003) instead of maintaining the peg which is the current goal of Danish monetary
policy. Our estimate suggests that the gain in welfare is equivalent to a permanent in-
crease of 0:8 pct in the level of consumption. The optimal Taylor rule is found to be
characterised by attaching a weight of 3 (which is the ceiling of our grid search) to ina-
tion and a weight of 0:8 on output growth. Contrary to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b)
we do not nd it benecial for the central bank to smooth interest rates over time.
With regards to the causes of the higher level of welfare under the Taylor rule, we
obtain mixed results: in terms of consumption, the higher welfare is founded in the higher
mean of consumption under the Taylor rule, although the volatility of consumption has
also increased. For labour this result is reverted; under the peg regime labour is more
volatile than under the Taylor rule, while the mean is predicted to be lower under the
peg. Overall, agents prefer the higher consumption, despite higher volatility and more
labour e¤orts.
Two related studies are Ambler et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a).
Ambler et al. (2003) apply maximum-likelihood techniques to estimate a dsge model
without capital of a small open economy and search for the optimal Taylor rule. They
do not, however, consider a xed exchange-rate regime, as the benchmark model in their
study is a Taylor rule estimated on Canadian data. They obtain the result that the gain
in welfare is equivalent to a permanent increase of 1:4 pct in the level of consumption
compared with the level of welfare under the historical Taylor rule. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004a) analyse the closed-economy model laid out and estimated by Christiano
et al. (2001). Contrary to existing studies, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) nd that in-
ation should be attached a value of just 1, giving room for what they style a signicant
degree of optimal ination volatility. This is explained by the presence of indexation to
past ination.
This paper goes on as follows: In Section 2 the model is laid out, and in Section 3
it is parameterised. In Section 4 the welfare measure and the solution method is being
described and in Section 5 we use this to nd the optimal Taylor rule. In Section 6 the
results are presented and in Section 7 we analyse the robustness of the results. Section 8
concludes.
2 Model
The model is basically identical to the one used by Dam and Linaa (2005) which again
draws heavily on the model presented in Kollmann (2002). Like him, we consider a small
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open economy that produces a continuum of intermediate goods which are aggregated
and sold under imperfect competition to nal-good producers at home and abroad. Pro-
ducers of intermediaries only reoptimise prices infrequently a la Calvo (1983), but can
di¤erentiate fully between the domestic and foreign market and price their goods abroad
in the local currency. It follows that prices are sticky in the currency of the buyer, an
assumption that has been forcefully argued by, e.g., Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000).
Recently, Bergin (2003, 2004) has compared local and producer currency pricing in esti-
mated dsge models and found strong empirical support for local currency pricing. Final
goods are produced from aggregates of the intermediate goods from home and abroad
and sold in a perfectly competitive market. Thus, all trade takes place in intermediary
goods.
We replace the homogenous and perfectly competitive labour market of Kollmann
(2002) with one of di¤erentiated labour services and rigid wage setting due to Erceg
et al. (2000) and Kollmann (2001) which was also implemented in the Christiano et al.
(2001) model (henceforth the cee model). Furthermore, we follow Smets and Wouters
(2003) and assume crra preferences and external habit formation; thus, the preferences
analysed in Kollmanns model are a special case of ours. We maintain, however, the
quadratic investment adjustment costs in the relative level of capital, the debt premium on
the interest earned on foreign bonds and the uip shock from the Kollmann (2002) model.
Finally, we introduce an imperfect peg regime for monetary policy with a persistent policy
shock.
An important deviation from Dam and Linaa (2005) is that in this paper we treat
mark-up rates as constants rather than allowing them to follow a stochastic process. The
reason is a technicality; our method of obtaining a second-order approximation requires
that we write the non-linear system as a multivariate rst-order expectational di¤erence
equation. To our knowledge it is not possible to write a model with stochastically varying
markups in this form, and thus we introduce constant markups. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004a) made an equivalent simplication when they considered optimal monetary policy
in the cee model.
In this section we outline the various components of the model.1
2.1 Households
Like Erceg et al. (2000) we assume a continuum with unity mass of symmetric households
who obtain utility from consumption of the nal good and disutility from labour e¤orts.
Thus, they are all characterized by the following preferences:
E0
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct (j) ; lt (j))
#
; (1)
U (Ct ; lt (j)) = 
b
t
"
Ct (j)
1 C
1  C   
L
t
lt (j)
1+L
1 + L
#
; C ; L > 0
where bt represents a shock to the discount rate and 
L
t represents a shock to the labour
supply, while the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion C is also the inverse intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and L represents the inverse Frisch labour supply elasticity;
1A technical appendix with a thorough derivation of the model is available in Chapter 5.
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nally, j 2 [0; 1] signies the household. We follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and
assume external habit formation in consumption; that is, utility is obtained from
Ct (j) = Ct (j)  hCt 1; 0  h  1; (2)
where hCt 1 is the habit stock at time t which is external in the sense that it is pro-
portional to the past aggregate consumption level that is considered exogenous to the
individual household. We further assume a security market where households completely
diversify their individual income uncertainty, so that consumption is equalised across
households; Ct (j) = Ct; 8j.
Each household supplies an idiosyncratic variety of labour service lt (j). These labour
services enter as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate in the intermediate-goods rm production;
thus, letting lt (s; j) be the amount of labour service j utilized by rm s we nd that rm
s uses the following amount of composite labour services;
Lt (s) =
Z 1
0
lt (s; j)
1
1+ dj
1+
;  > 1; (3)
where  turns out to be the net wage markup.
As was the case of intermediary prices, wage setting is staggered a la Calvo (1983).
That is, in each period household j only optimizes its wage wt (j) with probability 1 D.
The household takes the average wage rate Wt =
hR 1
0
wt (j)
  1
1+t dj
i (1+t)
as given when
it chooses its optimal wage wt;t and will meet any demand for the given type of labour;2
lt (j) =
Z 1
0
lt (s; j) ds: (4)
In addition to consumption, households can invest in domestic and foreign one-period
bonds as well as in domestic capital. Capital Kt earns rental rate Rt and accumulates as
follows with  measuring depreciation;
Kt+1 = Kt (1  ) + It   
2
(Kt+1  Kt)2
Kt
; 0 <  < 1;  > 0; (5)
where It is investment. Here, we have followed Kollmann (2002) and assumed quadratic
adjustment costs. Domestic bonds At earns net interest it, while the interest i
f
t accruing
to foreign bonds Bt held by domestic agents deviates from the exogenously given foreign
interest level it as follows;
1 + ift

= 
t (1 + i

t ) ; (6)

t = t exp

 etBt+1
Pt

;  =
eP xQx
P
; (7)
where et is the nominal exchange rate and Pt is the price of nal goods, while  is the
steady-state value of export in units of the domestic nal good. Thus, the interest on
foreign bonds is growing in the foreign debt level which ensures the existence of a unique
equilibrium, cf. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), while t is a stochastic i:i:d: shock
2Note that the optimal wage in any period is identical across households, which is the reason why
wt;t can be written without index j.
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which we motivate with the empirically observed departure from the uncovered interest
parity. We style t a uip shock but abstain from a deeper explanation of its nature; Bergin
(2004) o¤ers a good discussion of uip shocks in the new open-economy macroeconomic
(noem) literature.
Households own equal shares of domestic rms and thus earn prot from the intermediate-
goods rms (t (j)) in addition to rental rates Rt on the capital, wage income from their
labour services and payments from their state-contingent securities (St (j)). Hence, the
budget constraint of household j is
At+1 (j) + etBt+1 (j) + Pt (Ct (j) + It (j)) = (8)
At (j) (1 + it 1) + etBt (j)

1 + ift 1

+RtKt (j) + t (j) + wt (j) lt (j) + St (j) :
Thus, households decide their consumption, wages and investments in accordance
with the solution to the following problem;
max
fCt(j);At+1(j);Bt+1(j);Kt+1(j);wt;tg1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct (j) ; lt (j))
#
;
s.t. (1)-(8).
The rst-order conditions for domestic and foreign bonds yield regular Euler conditions;
(1 + it)Et

t;t+1

= 1; (9)
1 + ift

Et

t;t+1
et+1
et

= 1; (10)
t;   (UC;=UC;t) (Pt=P ) ; UC;t 
@U (Ct ; Lt)
@Ct
; (11)
where t; discounts prots at time  . One should bear in mind, however, that in this
case UC;t depends on Ct 1 as well as Ct due to our assumption of external habits.
Having assumed that the household always meets demand for labour at its chosen
wage level, the optimal wage rate at time t is
wt;t =
0BB@
P
(D) tEt

bt
L
t (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
 L1+L

P
(D) tEt

UC;
P
W
1+

 L

1CCA

+(1+)L
:
where Wt is the aggregate wage level determined as
Wt =
h
D (Wt 1)
  1
 + (1 D) (wt;t) 
1

i 
:
Thus, the infrequent reoptimisation implies that households must consider expectations
of all future wage levels and labour supplies when they set their optimal wage.
2.2 Final Goods
Final goods Zt are produced using intermediate-good bundles from home
 
Qdt

and abroad
(Qmt ) respectively. These intermediary aggregates are combined with a Cobb Douglas
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technology;
Zt =

Qdt
d
d 
Qmt
m
m
; d + m = 1:
Each bundle of intermediate goods is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate, where v turns out to be
the net markup rate;
Qit =
Z 1
0
qi (s)
1
1+ ds
1+
; i = d;m:
Assuming that domestic rms face the problem of minimizing the cost of producing
Zt units of the nal good, demands for goods produced domestically and abroad can be
written as
Qit = 
i Pt
P it
Zt; i = d;m;
Pt =
 
P dt
d
(Pmt )
m ;
where the appropriately dened price index Pt is the marginal cost of the nal-goods
producing rm. With perfect competition in the nal-goods market, Pt is also the price
of one unit of the nal consumption good.
2.3 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced from labour Lt and capital Kt using Cobb-Douglas
technology. Thus, the production function of rm s is
yt (s) = tKt (s)
 Lt (s)
1  ; 0 <  < 1;
where t is the exogenously given aggregate level of technology. Producers operate in
a monopolistic competitive market, where each producer sets the price of her variety,
taking other prices as given and supplying whatever amount is demanded at the price
set.
Firms rent capital at the rate Rt and compensate labour with wages Wt. Hence, any
rms marginal costs are
MCt =
1
t
W 1  t R
 
t  
  (1   ) (1  ) : (12)
Producers sell their good variety to both domestic and foreign nal-goods producers
(that is, yt (s) = qdt (s) + q
m
t (s)) and are able to price discriminate between the two
markets. As is well-known from the Dixit-Stiglitz models, nal-good producers demand
individual varieties of intermediaries as follows
qit (s) =

pit (s)
P it
  1+

Qit; i = d;m;
and thereby rm prots can be written as
dx
 
pdt (s) ; p
x
t (s)

=
 
pdt (s) MCt

qdt (s) + (etp
x
t (s) MCt) qxt (s) :
We furthermore assume that foreign exporters produce at unit costs equivalent to the
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aggregate foreign price level P t and thus generate the following prots in the domestic
market;
m (pmt (s)) = (p
m
t (s)  etP t )

pmt (s)
Pmt
  1+

Qmt :
Demands from foreign nal-goods producers are assumed to be of the Dixit-Stiglitz
form as well;
qxt (s) =

pxt (s)
P xt
  1+

Qxt ; Q
x
t =

P xt
P t
 1
Y t ;
where the foreign aggregates P t ; Y

t are exogenous.
As in the case of wages, we follow Calvo (1983) and assume that a rm only reoptimises
its prices in any given period with probability 1   d. Given that domestic rms seek to
maximise prots discounted with a pricing kernel based on household utility (cf. equation
(11)), a rm that reoptimises its domestic price faces the following problem;
pdt;t = argmax
!
1X
=t
d tEt

t;
dx (!; pxt (s))

;
As rms set prices in the domestic and foreign market separately, the constant mar-
ginal costs cf. equation (12) imply that the two price setting problems are independent.
Hence, the optimal price pdt;t is determined from the following rst-order condition;
pdt;t = (1 + )
P1
=t d
 tEt
h
t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qdt+MC
i
P1
=t d
 tEt
h
t; (P
d
 )
1+
 Qd
i :
Import rms are owned by risk-neutral foreigners who discount future prots at the
foreign nominal interest rate Rt;   1s=t (1 + is) 1. Thus, they set their prices in order
to maximize discounted future prots measured in foreign currency;
pmt;t = argmax
!
1X
=t
d tEt [Rt;m (!) =e ]
which again implies a condition for the optimal price pmt;t similar to that for p
d
t;t.
Finally, the aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz prices of the intermediate goods are as follows;
P it =
h
d
 
P it 1
  1
 + (1  d)  pit;t  1 i  ; i = d;m; x:
2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
All intermediaries are demanded from either domestic or foreign nal goods producers,
while nal goods can either be consumed or invested in capital. Hence, equilibria in the
markets for intermediate and nal goods require
Yt = Q
d
t +Q
x
d;
Zt = Ct + It: (13)
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Turning to the capital market, aggregate demand for capital is
Kt =
Z 1
0
Kt (s) ds =
1
t

 
1   
Wt
Rt
1  
qdt (s) + q
x
t (s)

;
and, hence, equilibrium in the capital market (Kt = Kt) implies
Kt =
1
t

 
1   
Wt
Rt
1  "Pdt
P dt
  1+

Qdt +
Pxt
P xt
  1+

Qxt
#
;
where we introduce
P it 
Z 1
0
 
pit
  1+

  
1+
; i = d; x:
Under the assumptions of the Calvo pricing model, these indices of individual prices
evolve as follows;
P it =
h
d
 P it 1  1+ + (1  d)  pit;t  1+ i  1+ ; i = d; x:
Finally, we assume that only domestic agents hold the domestic bond, implying that
At = 0 in equilibrium.
Aggregating and manipulating the household budget constraint (8) and using the
nal-good market equilibrium (13) yields the following equation which simply states that
the net foreign assets position (nfa) changes with accruing interest and the net export.
etBt+1 + Pt (Ct + It) = etBt

1 + ift 1

+RtKt +WtLt
+P dt Q
d
t + etP
x
t Q
x
t   (RtKt +WtLt))
Bt+1 = Bt

1 + ift 1

+ P xt Q
x
t  
Pmt
et
Qmt :
2.5 Monetary Policy
We have two monetary policy regimes to consider. The rst one is a peg regime, as
presented in Dam and Linaa (2005), and the second one is a regime in which the central
bank conducts monetary policy according to a Taylor rule, rst suggested by Taylor
(1993) and thoroughly discussed in, e.g., Woodford (2003).
With regards to the peg regime, we postulate that it is impossible for the central
bank to keep the exchange rate fully xed. This is motivated from noting that although
the Danish central bank successfully has been able to keep the Danish krone stable vis-
a-vis its anchor, minor movements in the exchange rate of rst D-mark and then (to
a lesser extent) the euro has occured. Hence, we assume that the central bank can
keep the exchange rate xed around its parity (equal to the steady state value) up to a
multiplicative exogenous policy shock pegt with unity mean;
et = e
peg
t :
We assume that pegt = %
mpegt 1 + "
m
peg;t where "
m
peg;t is a Gaussian innovation with mean
0 and standard deviation mpeg, and 0  %m < 1 is the policy error autocorrelation. The
intuition of this policy is clearest if we combine it with the Euler equations (9)-(10) and
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the equations (6)-(7) describing the wedge on the international interest rate and perform
a log-linearisation around the steady state. Then we obtain the following equation for
the domestic interest rate;
{^t = {^

t +

^t   B^t

+ Et^
peg
t+1;
where hats indicate a relative deviations from the steady state with proper normalisa-
tions.3 Thus, the interest rate responds (virtually) one-to-one with the foreign interest
rate and the uip shock. Furthermore, a positive spread between the foreign and domestic
interest rates emerges as the net foreign position of the domestic country becomes neg-
ative et vice versa. Besides being intuitively appealing, the debt premium also ensures
the existence of a unique deterministic steady state.
The alternative Taylor rule is discussed in Section 5 below.
3 Parameterisation
To perform a quantitative welfare analysis and to produce impulse-response functions
we need to assign values to the parameters in the model. In Dam and Linaa (2005) we
estimated the model using a Bayesian estimation technique; that is, we used the Kalman
lter to evaluate the likelihood of a log-linearised version of the model and combined that
information with our prior assumptions on the structural parameters in order to obtain
the posterior estimates. However, since we had to lave the markup rates as constants
in this analysis as discussed above, we necessarily have to deviate from the estimation
results obtained in that paper. Before justifying the values chosen for the parameters we
begin by summarising the parameterisation in Table 1.
Regarding preferences, these posterior estimates imply a labor supply (Frisch) elastic-
ity of approximately one and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of a half. Thus,
our labour supply elasticity is in accordance with a rich body of microeconometric nd-
ings, yet in the lower range of the values typically used in the rbc literature. The estimate
for the external habit stock h lies between one third and a half; this is on the lower side
compared with the literature at large, but should be uncontroversial.
The estimated Calvo parameters imply that prices and wages are updated every four
years and one year, respectively. While the latter is plausible, the former implies an
implausibly high degree of price rigidity. We discuss potential causes of this puzzling
nding in Dam and Linaa (2005) and we return to its implication for the welfare analysis
in Section 7.
As mentioned, a di¤erence between the current peg model and the model presented
in Dam and Linaa (2005) is the absence of stochastic movements in the mark-up rates
in this paper. Hence, we have xed  and  at the values used as means in the markup
processes in Dam and Linaa (2005). In that paper we also obtained a value of L which
was very high; we have thus attached a new value to this parameter based on obtaining
a predicted standard deviation of Yt (in the peg model) that approximately matches that
of its empirical counterpart, gdp.
Apart from this, and apart from the values of d; ; ;  ;  and  which were kept
xed in the estimation of the model in Dam and Linaa (2005), we use the values obtained
as modes in our posterior distribution.
3We refer the reader to Dam and Linaa (2005) for the exact details of a log-linearisation of the model.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
d Share of domestic intermediaries in nal prod. 0:7
 Discount factor 0:99
 Depreciation rate 0:025
 Capital share 0:33
 Capital mobility parameter 0:0019
d Calvo, intermediaries 0:941
D Calvo, wages 0:770
h Habit persistence 0:433
C Household inverse ies 1:709
L Inverse Frisch elasticity 1:032
 Capital adj. cost 14:422
 Wage markup 0:2
 Price markup 0:2
Shocks, persistence
%b Discount rate 0:825
%l Labor supply 0:962
%t Technology 0:824
%m Peg 0:899
%i Foreign interest rate 0:877
%P Foreign price level 0:925
%Y Foreign gdp 0:912
Shocks, volatility
b Discount rate 0:041
l Labor supply 0:0295
t  100 Technology 1:073
U  100 uip 0:342
mpeg  100 Peg 0:739
mTR Monetary policy shock (Taylor rule) 0:08
i  100 Foreign int. rate 0:102
P  100 Foreign price level 0:337
Y  100 Foreign gdp 0:786
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4 Welfare Measure and Solution Method
Our measure of welfare is the unconditional expectation of household utility;
E
Z 1
0
U
 
Ckt   hCkt 1; lkt (j)

dj

;
where k refers to the particular policy rule. As discussed thoroughly in Kim et al. (2003),
this amounts to comparing welfare in the di¤erent stochastic steady states associated with
each monetary policy rule under consideration; hence, this measure implicitly disregards
any welfare e¤ects stemming from the transition between the initial state of the economy
and the stochastic steady state under the considered rule.
Integrating utility over the households is unproblematic with respect to consumption
as we have assumed a security market that equates consumption across them, cf. Subsec-
tion 2.1. Labour supply, however, has not been smoothed between the households, and
thus we need to pay attention to the integral of the disutility of labour. Integrating over
the disutility yields Z 1
0
lt (j)
1+L dj = L1+Lt
Wt
Wt
  1+

(1+L)
;
where
Wt 
Z 1
0
wt (j)
  1+

(1+L) dj
  
(1+)(1+L)
:
Due to the assumptions of the Calvo-like wage setting, this index of wage dispersion
evolves as follows;
Wt =

DW 
1+

(1+L)
t 1 + (1 D)w
  1+

(1+L)
t;t
  
(1+)(1+L)
:
Thus, the welfare measure can be cast as follows;
E
Z 1
0
U
 
Ckt   hCkt 1; lkt (j)

dj

=
bt
1  C
 
Ct   h Ct 1
1 C  btLt
1 + L
L1+Lt
Wt
Wt
  1+

(1+L)
:
Given the complexity of our non-linear model, an analytical solution is unattainable.
Instead, we obtain a second-order approximation with the dynare program.4 We have
chosen this solution method since rst-order approximations are not adequate for welfare
analysis of stochastic models. We refer the reader to Kim and Kim (2003) for an example
of the inadequacy of rst-order approximations, and to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b)
for a thorough discussion of the merits of second-order approximations.
Application of the dynare solution method requires that we write our model in the
following general from;
Et [t;t+1; "t; "t+1] = 0; (14)
where t is a vector of the endogenous variables of the model, while "t is a vector con-
4The dynare program is an ongoing project at cepremap and can be downloaded at
www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/ where documentation is also available.
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taining the innovations to the structural shock processes.5 Thus we recast the model in
the iterative form of (14) where we also normalise all nominal variables with the price of
domestic (or foreign) nal goods. The normalisation is carried out since the Taylor rule
will only pin down the ination rate, not the price level, and we want to work with a
stationary system. This version of the model is summarised in Appendix A.6
5 Finding the Optimal Taylor Rule
Our alternative to the existing peg is an independent monetary policy rule belonging to
the generalised family of Taylor rules. In particular, we restrict ourselves to the following
variant of the interest rule;
it = iit 1 + (1  i)

 (t   1) + y

Yt
Yt 1
  1

+ TRt ;
where the s are the policy parameters which should be optimised to the economy in
question, while TRt is a Gaussian i:i:d: noise term reecting monetary policy shocks. The
standard deviation of this shock cannot be estimated on Danish data since this monetary
regime has never existed. Instead the parameter mTR is attached a value equal to 0.0008,
which is the posterior mode estimate found by Smets and Wouters (2003) on data for the
euro area. We return to this issue in Section 7 below.
We perform a grid search of the policy parameters in the ranges i 2 [0; 0:9] ;  2 [0; 3]
and y 2 [0; 3]. We consider increments of 0:15 for the smoothing parameter i which is
usually introduced in order to capture empirically observed policy inertia; we include it
in this normative exercise, however, since smoothing can improve welfare in some cases
as shown by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b). For  and y we consider increments of
0:10. Thus, we solve the model for 6727 di¤erent congurations of the Taylor rule.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) formulate three requirements to what they style
operational rules; they must (i) respond only to a limited set of readily observed variables;
(ii) induce a locally unique rational-expectations equilibrium; and (iii) satisfy the non-
negativity constraint on nominal interest rates. The rst requirement is clearly fullled,
as we only consider observed variables in the rule in the form of realised levels or growth
rates of overall ination, gdp (and the nominal exchange rate). In light of the controversy
regarding the actual calculation of output gaps, we nd that this restriction on the
functional form of the rule is justied.7 To meet the second requirement we only consider
congurations of the rule that yield a determinate equilibrium in a radius of 0:2 of the
parameters under consideration. This is done in order to avoid congurations close to
bifurcation points which tend to invalidate the welfare calculations, cf. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004b). Thirdly, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) and formulate the
non-negativity constraint indirectly through a condition that unconditional expectation
of the interest rate should be greater than twice its standard deviation (E [it] > 2it).
This requirement is fullled for both the peg and the preferred Taylor rule regime.
5See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004c) for a presentation and derivation of the solution method we
apply through dynare.
6The transformation of the nominal model to real terms is documented in the technical appendix.
7Here it could be argued that the central bank does not have information on Yt at time t when it is to
choose it. We acknowledge that, but defends our choice by claiming that the central bank should have
a relatively reliable forecast regarding Yt at time t:
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Figure 1: Unconditional utility as a function of the Taylor rule parameters
We rst consider the simple version of the Taylor rule, that is, one with no interest
smoothing (i = 0). The unconditional utility is shown as a function of the two policy
rule parameters in Figure 1.8 The maximum utility is obtained for the conguration 
; y

= (3; 0:8).
Interestingly, the optimal rule does not change when we introduce interest smoothing.
That is, unconditional utility is maximised at
 
; y; i

= (3; 0:8; 0) which is illustrated
in Figure 2.9 Hence, this rule will be the prefered one in the following section where we
compare its merits with those of a xed exchange rate.
Woodford (2003) establishes the optimality of a Taylor rule in a model similar in
spirit to the one we have formulated. However, the optimality requires an output gap
measure in the rule based on an economy with no nominal rigidities, while ine¢ ciencies
in the economy are assumed to have been eliminated through taxes and subsidies. Hence,
optimality of our Taylor rule is unlikely in a wider sense, and thus the welfare gains which
we nd from an independent monetary policy compared with the existing peg regime only
constitute a lower bound on the gains that could be obtained. We do, however, believe
that the familiarity and straightforward operationality of the rules we consider is in itself
an asset that motivates interest in this particular choice of monetary policy.
8Congurations of the policy rule that implies a determinate equilibrium with E [U ] <  2:3 are
assigned that value in Figure 1 for instructive purposes. The calculations have su¤ered from numerical
problems which we have not been able to resolve. Thus, a few of the points have been obtained from
interpolation from neighbourhood points within an 0:03 radius. Details are available upon request.
9Congurations of the policy rule that implies a determinate equilibrium with E [U ] <  2:25 are
assigned that value in Figure 2 for instructive purposes. The remarks on interpolation in Footnote 8 also
applies here.
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Figure 2: Unconditional utility and interest rate smoothing
6 Results
In this section we analyse the welfare implication of the two monetary policy regimes
under consideration as well as their causes.
6.1 Welfare
We measure the welfare gain of a Taylor rule over the existing peg regime through com-
pensating variation. That is, we calculate the relative permanent change in consumption
that equates the unconditional utility of households under the peg regime with that ob-
tained under the optimal Taylor rule. Thus, the compensating variation of consumption
is dened as the  that solves the following equation;
E
Z 1
0
U
 
CTRt   hCTRt 1; lTRt (j)

dj

= E
Z 1
0
U
 
(1 + )
 
Cpegt   hCpegt 1

; lpegt (j)

dj

:
We see from Table 2 that moving from a peg regime to one where the monetary policy
is set according to a Taylor rule results in a welfare improvement of 0:79 pct measured
in units of consumption goods. On the one hand, we note that although consumption is
more volatile under the Taylor regime compared with the peg, the level of consumption
has increased. With regards to labour supply this result is reverted; labour supply is
more volatile under the peg than in the Taylor rule regime, while the mean of labour
supply is lower under the peg. Overall, the household prefers the higher consumption
under the Taylor regime even though they need to work more in order to obtain this.
Contrary to Kollmann (2002) we nd that volatility in output is higher under a
Taylor rule than under the peg. This observation is attributed the existence of the highly
persistent labour supply shock we consider in this paper. Decomposing the contribution
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Table 2: Welfare Analysis
Std. deviations (in pct) Peg Taylor
Y 2:85 3:36
C 3:22 4:99
I 7:03 10:75
L 4:25 4:09
i 0:44 0:19
 0:11 0:07
Means (in pct)
Y  0:64  0:25
C  1:16  0:44
I  1:26 0:06
L  0:11  0:08
i  0:01 0:00
 0:00 0:00
Welfare equiv.  (pct of C) 0:792
Note: All reported statistics are relative
deviations from the non-stochastic steady
state.
from the shocks reveals the ndings reported in Table 3. As stressed by Dam and Linaa
(2005), labour supply shocks are the overall dominant source of uctuations. To verify
that this is indeed the main reason behind the increased volatility of the Taylor rule regime
compared with the peg, we ran both simulations under the assumption that %L = 0:82
which is the autocorrelation estimated for the technology process. In this case we obtained
a standard deviation of output equaling 1:81 pct in the peg regime dropping substantially
to 1:00 pct under the Taylor regime, thus re-establishing the ndings of Kollmann (2002).
In this scenario the welfare gain by leaving the peg and adopting a Taylor rule dropped
to 0:28 pct measured in units of consumption goods.
In Figure 3 we compare the unconditional utility as a function of the Taylor parameters 
; y

with that obtained under the peg. We see that a rather large set of parameters
of  and y ensures a level of utility that exceeds the level of utility under the peg.
6.2 Impulse-Response Functions
This section claries the important deviations between the economy in which monetary
policy is conducted according to a Taylor rule and one in which a constant nominal
exchange rate is the monetary policy target. In particular we seek to clarify why volatility
in consumption is higher under a Taylor rule than in the peg regime and why volatility
in labour is lower. We do so by studying the impulse-responses obtained from both
models. Inspecting the consequences of a technological shock, we see from Figure 4 that
under the peg output initially drops. This phenomenon was thoroughly analysed in Dam
and Linaa (2005); the initial drop in output is a consequence of the very rigid prices;
recall the Calvo parameter in the intermediary sector is estimated to be as high as 0.94.
Thus, even though the positive shock to technology shifts the supply curve of the rms
to the right, the price inertia causes the short-run supply curve to be almost horizontal,
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition
Variable Y C I L i 
Preferences Peg 0:33 0:90 0:16 0:29 0:02 0:05
Taylor 0:05 0:28 1:26 0:04 1:54 1:71
Labour supply Peg 61:17 78:41 42:35 31:79 0:10 75:49
Taylor 93:97 90:16 81:47 56:31 55:70 48:03
Technology Peg 2:41 1:33 2:37 39:05 0:00 11:51
Taylor 0:54 0:15 0:60 41:83 34:18 41:19
uip Peg 0:41 0:14 1:56 0:42 62:04 0:02
Taylor 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Monetary policy Peg 13:57 11:72 28:89 10:20 15:73 0:43
Taylor 1:57 1:21 2:82 0:98 1:97 2:10
Foreign interest rate Peg 5:29 3:63 12:85 4:54 21:31 1:97
Taylor 0:18 0:14 0:44 0:12 0:50 0:46
Foreign price Peg 2:95 1:12 2:41 2:39 0:15 0:73
Taylor 0:06 0:17 0:96 0:09 0:86 0:86
Foreign demand Peg 13:86 2:75 9:41 11:34 0:65 9:79
Taylor 3:63 7:88 12:46 0:63 5:24 6:65
Note: All shares are in pct.
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Figure 3: Unconditional utility under the peg and the Taylor rule, resp.
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and thus the direct supply-side e¤ect on output is small. Furthermore, a given level
of production can now be reached using fewer production resources due to the higher
level of productivity, causing employment as well as capital demand to decrease. In
turn, households wish to hold less capital stock and disinvest. Thus, total demand for
nal goods has fallen, and in equilibrium this e¤ect dominates the positive supply e¤ect,
implying a lower output equilibrium than before the shock. Over time, however, prices
do fall because of the persistent technology shock that has decreased marginal costs, and
as demand responds to the lower prices, capital is accumulated and investments rise. A
crucial di¤erence between the peg and the Taylor regime is the central banks reaction
to such a shock; under the peg the central bank keeps the interest rate virtually at the
pre-shock level because the exchange rate is nearly una¤ected by the shock. Over time,
however, domestic prices fall since fewer resources are required to produce a given amount
of goods; this drop in ination trickers the central bank under the Taylor regime to lower
interest rates. While the response of investments in the models is almost the same, we
see that under a Taylor rule consumption initially benets from the lower interest rates
(as the return of holding bonds has declined), thereby bringing total demand into the
positive region, ensuring a positive initial response in output.
In Figure 5 we inspect the consequences of an expansionary labour supply shock. The
shock represents a shift in the households relative valuation of consuming and enjoying
leisure. Again we observe that under the peg, output initially drops for the same reasons
as stated for the technology shock. Responses in consumption to a labour supply shock are
far more persistent than the responses following a technology shock are for two reasons;
rst, the labour supply shock in itself is more persistent than the technology shock is, and
second, the labour supply shock changes the relative valuation of consumption relative
to leisure. For the same reasons, we also see that persistence in labour responses increase
compared to those of a technological shock.
Summarising, we found that three shocks are of great importance for the volatility in
labour supply; technology, monetary policy and labour supply shocks. While the response
stemming from technological shocks are almost identical in the two models, we just saw
that labour supply shocks contribute to generating an aggregated level of volatility in
consumption and labour that is higher under a Taylor rule than in the peg regime.
This is reverted, however, when studying expansive shocks to monetary policy, cf.
Figure 6. Under the peg, this experiment corresponds technically to shocking pegt , thereby
devaluating et. Since this shock is autocorrelated, et will remain undervalued compared
to its parity for periods to follow. The lower level of interest rates stimulates consumption
as well as investments and output rises. Under the Taylor rule the experiment is slightly
di¤erent; TRt is negatively shocked, and initially this is expected to induce a fall in it.
However, when the central bank lowers interest rates households prefer to consume or hold
foreign bonds instead of domestic ones; the rst e¤ect causes output to increase while
the latter e¤ect puts pressure on the exchange rate and ination rises. The degree of
price stickiness is very high, and therefore the central bank immediately reacts by hiking
interest rates since also distant future periods is weighted heavily. Additionally, the
increase in output causes the central bank to contract monetary policy; this endogenous
response in interest rates is larger than the exogenous response stemming from the shocks
is, and therefore our experiment of performing an expansionary monetary policy shock
results in initially rising interest rates. For the same reason the responses in consumption
and investments, and hence output, are more muted than under the peg. In the short
term, however, the economy benets from the expansionary e¤ects stemming from a
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Figure 4: Responses to a technology shock (Peg: Solid lines, Taylor: Dashed lines)
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Figure 5: Responses to a labour supply shock. (Peg: Solid lines, Taylor: Dashed lines)
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devaluated exchange rate that is higher than under the peg. We nally note that volatility
in labour is higher under the peg than in the Taylor rule regime, thereby contributing to
the nding that labour is more volatile under the peg.
Finally, in Figure 7 we observe what happens following an exogenous shock to foreign
interest rates. Under the peg, the domestic central bank has to follow the direction of the
foreign interest rate movements in order to keep the exchange rate xed. In the Taylor
rule regime the central bank hardly reacts as ination as well as output is una¤ected
initially by the foreign interest rate shock. For the same reason, only minor movements
of all variables are observed in this case. Under the peg, however, the higher level of
interest rates dampens consumption as well as investments causing aggregate output to
fall. Again, we note that labour is more volatile under the peg, but movements in the
foreign interest rate are of less importance for movements in labour than are technology,
labour supply and monetary policy shocks.
7 Robustness and Alternative Scenarios
The previous section demonstrated that there are welfare gains from changing the mon-
etary policy from a xed exchange rate to a Taylor rule. Recall, that the values of mpeg
and mTR quantify the volatility of the policy errors under the two regimes. Considering
the nature and scope of the deregulated foreign-exchange market of today, one should
generally nd that the central banks task of assigning the interest rate level that keeps
the exchange rate exactly on target is nontrivial, and thus a certain amount of policy
errors seems unavoidable. Administering a Taylor rule with xed intervention dates and
infrequent observations of the ination and output gaps seems like a manageable task in
comparison. However, if it is possible for a central bank to obtain a credible peg on a
foreign currency, pressure on the exchange rate could plausibly fall to a level where the
peg can be maintained with a degree of precision comparable to that of a Taylor rule.
Indeed, the recent Danish experience has been one of a very stable exchange rate around
the xed parity, as is evident from Figure 8. It turns out that varying the volatility of
the policy shock in the range spanned by the Taylor rule estimate of Smets and Wouters
(2003) and that obtained for the Danish peg regime in Dam and Linaa (2005) is of critical
importance for the welfare results.
As described in Section 3 we are unable to estimate the volatility of TRt since this
regime has not been in e¤ect in Denmark. Instead we relied on the estimated volatility
obtained by Smets and Wouters (2003) as a proxy for what to expectif this monetary
policy regime was introduced in Denmark. In Figure 9 we show the welfare equivalences
 for varying values of mTR:. For a value of 
m
TR slightly above 0.005 we see that this
compensation becomes negative meaning that if policy errors under the Taylor rule lies
above this level, a regime shift in monetary policy would result in a welfare loss.
We also turned this experiment on its head; we estimated an ar(1) for the exchange
rate since 1999. As was seen from Figure 8, volatility in this period has been substantially
reduced compared to that of the full sample. This estimation resulted in an autocorre-
lation, %m, equal to 0:86, while mpeg was estimated to the value of 0:0008, equal to the
value of mTR. Working with this process decreased the benets of adopting the Taylor
rule, although it was still advisable, cf. Scenario i in Table 4.
We also carried out two additional simulations of alternative scenarios as is seen from
Table 4. Scenario ii has already been described in Section 6 and it took the form of
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Figure 6: Responses to a monetary policy shock. (Peg: Solid lines, Taylor: Dashed lines)
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assuming labour supply shocks were no more persistent than technology shocks. In this
case %L was attached a value of 0:82 (equal to %t) and this reduced the compensation in
consumption needed to put household utility under the peg equal to utility in the Taylor
rule regime to 0:27 pct.
Table 4: Welfare Analysis - Alternative Scenarios
Scenario 100 
i Lower exchange rate volatility
 
mpeg = 0:0008; %
m = 0:86

0:660
ii Less persistent labour supply shock
 
%L = 0:82

0:277
iii Less nominal rigidity (d = D = 0:75) 1:149
Note:  measures the compensating variation of consumption between the peg
and the optimal Taylor regime as dened in equation (??).
Scenario iii was assuming that prices were less rigid than they were estimated to be;
postulating both goods prices as well as wages can be reoptimised once a year increases
the compensation that equalises welfare between the two regimes to 1.15 pct. This is
the result of two opposing sources; on the one hand, when prices are extremely rigid,
an ination ghting central bank has only limited possibilities to control ination. This
tends to reduce the benets from leaving the peg and adopt the Taylor rule. On the
other hand, however, damages by not controlling ination are more severe, since they
last longer. In this case the rst source dominate.
The overall conclusion therefore seems to be that Denmark could potentially benet
from giving up the peg and begin conducting monetary policy according to a Taylor rule.
This change in the monetary policy regime seems to be benecial unless the policy error,
mTR, takes a substantially larger value, than Smets and Wouters (2003) estimated as the
value relevant for the euro-zone.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we analysed the consequences of Denmark replacing the peg with a Taylor
rule. For this purpose we used the model laid out and estimated in Dam and Linaa (2005)
in order to quantify the welfare implications in the two regimes. We then dropped the
assumption of the central bank following a peg and replaced it with an assumption of the
central bank conducting monetary policy according to a Taylor rule.
The models tell us that it is possible to increase the level of welfare by doing so;
in fact we nd that the benets can be summerised to 0.79 pct. measured in units of
consumption goods. Various alternative scenarios did not change this conclusion although
the magnitude of change in welfare, of course, was a¤ected by this. It turned out that
welfare under the peg would only exceed welfare in the Taylor regime if policy errors in
the Taylor regime are far larger than those estimated for the euro-zone by Smets and
Wouters (2003).
Contrary to the related study in Kollmann (2002) we nd that volatility of both
consumption and output increases when going from a peg to the Taylor rule; the main
explanation for this was the existence of a highly volatile and persistent labour supply
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shock. Reducing the persistence of this shock puts us back to Kollmanns scenario in
which volatility is lower in the Taylor regime.
There are, however, potentially important matters not included in the above men-
tioned framework. If Denmark decided to adopt a Taylor rule, risk aversion from foreign
investors might induce a reduction in direct investment ows into Denmark caused by an
increased uncertainty regarding the exchange rate. Furthermore, Danish exporters also
face uncertainty regarding the exchange rate and could need to engage in costly arrange-
ments with nancial intermediaries in order to eliminate this uncertainty when trading
with agents abroad. Finally, we ignore issues related to the potential budget discipline
being put on the Government in order to keep a peg credible.
Additionally, a number of obvious extensions of this work lies ahead: Firstly, we are
currently considering a more generalised form of the Taylor rule, examining the welfare
gains attainable when expanding the Taylor rule to include the exchange rate. We need
more work on this issue however, since we discovered a large range of spikes and ridges
in the welfare levels derived from di¤erent parameterisations of the Taylor rule equipped
with changes in the exchange rate. At this point we are unable to explain this, but
we will seek to get further insight into this area in our future research. Secondly, we
should examine the consequences of focusing on conditional moments rather than using
unconditional moments. This might be of great importance for the Danish case, since we
currently ignore the transition from from the peg regime to the Taylor rule regime.
This paper, however, contributes to the ongoing debate in Denmark whether to stick
with the peg, and it contributes to the literature in general by performing a welfare
analysis on an estimated small open economy dsge model with a number of nominal and
real rigidities.
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A The Non-linear Model
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where hats denote relative deviations from the steady state, and 0 < %j < 1, cf. Table
1. Since, however, the monetary policy shock under the Taylor regime is assumed to be
i:i:d:, we have %mTR = 0.
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Table 5: Variables and Parameters
Variables Exogenous Variables
Zt Final goods t Technology level in intermediary sector
Pt Price of Z bt Preference discount rate shock
Qit Intermediate goods 
l
t Labor supply shock
P it Price of Q
i t uip shock
pit; Intermediary price optimized in period  t Exchange-rate policy (peg) shock
P it Price dispersion measure Y t Foreign gdp
Yt gdp
 
Qd +Qx

P t Foreign price level
Rt Rental rate of capital it Foreign interest rate
MCt Marginal cost in intermediary sector
et Exchange rate
t; Discount factor between periods t and 
Rt; Foreign discount factor Parameters (time invariant)
Ct Final consumption  Net price markup (intermediaries)
Lt Aggregate labor supply  Net wage markup
wt; Wage level optimized in period  d Share of Qd in nal output
Wt Aggregate wage level  Capital share in intermediate goods
l t (s; j) Labor of type j supplied to rm s d Calvo parameter, intermediaries
Kt Capital stock  Utility discount factor
It Investment h Habit persistence
At Domestic bonds (0 in eqlm.)  1C Household ies
Bt Foreign bonds in foreign currency  1L Work e¤ort elasticity
it Domestic interest rate  Capital depreciation rate
ift Return on Bt to domestic agents  Capital adjustment cost

t Wedge between it and i
f
t  ss export in units of Z
t Compound variable in wage eqtn.  Debt premium on foreign bonds
UC;t Marginal utility of consumption D Calvo parameter, wages
UL;t Marginal disutility of labor  Export demand elasticity
N it Auxiliary variable (pit;t and wt;t)
Dit Auxiliary variable (pit;t and wt;t)
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Abstract
We estimate a dsge model of the British economy which incorporates open-
economy elements from the noem literature. Generally, we nd plausible estimates
for the structural parameters characterising the domestic economy. Furthermore,
according to our estimates the main source of real uctuations in the uk are shocks
to the technology process.
However, the estimation highlights two problematic features of the model frame-
work. First, the observed ination process in the uk is less persistent than elsewhere,
including the us, and the estimated model is not adequately accounting for the rapid
changes in ination. Secondly, the estimation insulates the domestic economy from
the foreign economy. This result corresponds to the ndings of other recent papers
and implies that the benchmark noem assumptions seem incapable of dealing with
the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle when confronted with real data.
Keywords: New open-economy macroeconomics, business cycles, Bayesian estima-
tion
JEL Classications: E3, E4, F4
The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reect those of the Bank of England.
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1 Introduction
Our paper seeks answers to the following question: What are the determinants of the
UK business cycle? For this purpose, we build a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium
(dsge) model with a sizeable number of structural and ad-hoc shocks and use Bayesian
techniques to estimate the structural parameters on quarterly data. This approach has
succesfully been applied to estimate closed-economy dsgemodels, with the work by Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007) on euro area and us data serving as an inspiring benchmark.
With the openness of the British economy in mind, we found it natural to incorporate
elements of the new open-economy macroeconomic (noem) paradigm in the model.
The estimation yielded three main insights. First, shocks to the level of technology
in the production sector seem to be the main source of output uctuations in the British
economy during the years 1982-2002. This result is in line with what Bergin (2003) found
for Australia, Canada, and the uk, but is in contrast to other related studies of the euro
area (Smets and Wouters, 2003) and Denmark (Dam and Linaa, 2005) which nd that
shocks to preferences and labour supply are more important than shocks to technology.
Secondly, the (detrended) ination series for the uk are remarkably less persistent
than those for the us and euro area. Given a large idiosyncratic element and very little
inertia in the observed series, we nd that the lagged indexation feature of the sticky-price
model of the recent medium-scale dsge literature has no role to play in the uk context.
Furthermore, the Calvo (1983) setup linking ination to current and future marginal costs
seems to be inadequate in accounting for the observed ination uctuations, as indicated
by a large estimated volatility of the measurement error component in the ination series.
Thirdly, the foreign economy has no impact on the uk economy whatsoever. At rst
sight, this is a surprising result, why we consider it in detail. Typically, the transmission
of foreign real shocks works through the terms-of-trade (tot) channel. Thus, standard
models of the international real business-cycle (irbc) literature have found that exogenous
changes in the tot account for about 50 percent of domestic output uctuations, cf.
Mendoza (1995).1 The terms of trade channel also plays a dominant theoretical role in
the noem literature (cf. Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001).
Ideally, then, the estimation of our structural model should be able to shed new light on
the relative importance of home or foreign disturbances as drivers of the uk business cycle,
including output and the real exchange rate. Recent attempts to estimate dsge models
of the noem variety with Bayesian methods suggest that external terms-of-trade shocks
have a very little e¤ect on domestic output. For instance, Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)
nd that exogenous terms of trade disturbances (as well as foreign monetary shocks)
explain very little of observed volatility in uk output, ination and exchange rate. Dam
and Linaa (2005) nd similar results for the Danish economy, as does Martínez-García
(2005) in the case of Spain. Obviously, these ndings are at odds with the ndings of the
earlier irbc literature mentioned above.
In a recent paper, Justiniano and Preston (2006) investigates this puzzling result in
a structural analysis of Canadian data. Their model is closely related to ours, although
they exclude capital in their setup. They nd that the current versions of noem models
su¤er from the exchange rate disconnect puzzle, that is, a volatile behaviour of the real
exchange rate that is unrelated to the delevopment of real aggregates (fundamentals) in
the respective economies (see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) for a good introduction to this
1Kose (2002) found totmovements explained as much as 90 percent of output volatility in a developing
economy.
74
puzzle). In other words, the noem models that have been estimated in this and other
papers fail to give an economic explanation of the volatile real exchange rate, and thus they
rely on ad-hoc shocks to disconnect the the modeled economy from the large movements
that we observe in the real exchange rate. Consequently, the estimated economy virtually
behaves as a closed economy.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we lay out the model, and in Section 3 we
present the data. Section 4 accounts for the methodology and results of our estimation,
while Section 5 considers the ability of the model to t the data. In Section 6 we consider
the sensitivity of the estimation to variations in the specic model assumptions, while
Section 7 analyses the dynamic properties of the benchmark model through impulse-
response functions and a variance decomposition. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
The model builds on the Swedish Riksbank dsge model laid out in Adolfson et al. (2005).
To this framework we introduce some marked changes to the assumptions underlying
household preferences; rst, we assume a cashless limiting economy (cf. Woodford, 2003,
ch. 2) and thus disregard money altogether; second, we nd the felicity function in
Adolfson et al. (2005) too restrictive and replace it with that of Smets and Wouters
(2003) which allows us to vary the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (ies) as well
as the Frisch labour elasticity. Furthermore, as Benigno and Thoenissen (2004) (but in
contrast to Adolfson et al., 2005) we follow the lead of McCallum and Nelson (1999,
2000) and assume that all trade takes place in intermediaries. Finally, we simplify the
assumptions regarding the labour market to that of perfect competition.
In the following, we present the di¤erent components of our model. The derivation of
rst-order conditions etc. are conned to Appendix A.
2.1 Domestic Households
We assume complete markets in the domestic economy. In accordance with their prefer-
ences, agents thus completely diversify their idisyncratic income risk in a security market.
Hence, any agent is fully representative of the economy and we do not use notation to dis-
tinguish between agents. The representative agent is assumed to maximise the following
utility function;2
Ut  Et
1X
=t
 tc
" 
C   h C 1
1 c
1  c
   l
H
1+l

1 + l
#
;
; h 2 [0; 1] ; c; l > 0;
where Ct is consumption, Ht is labour, 
c
t is a discount shock, and 
l
t is a preference shock
a¤ecting the disutility of labour; thus,  is a discount factor,  1c is the ies, 
 1
l is the
Frisch elasticity, and h captures habit formation. We specically assume external habit
formation, implying that the habit stock is formed from aggregate consumption Ct.
2As all agents face the same wage in the labour market, and we assume identical levels of wealth
in the initial period, there is no need to distinguish between individual households and the average
(representative) household.
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As households are assumed to own capital and rms in the home country exclusively,
the household budget constraint is as follows;
Bt 1 + StBt 1 +WtHt +R
k
tKt +t 
Bt
(1 +Rt)
+
StB

t

t(1 +Rt )
+ Pt (Ct + It) ; (2.1)
where Bt; Bt and Rt; R

t are domestic and foreign bond holdings and rates of return,
respectively, St is the nominal exchange rate, Wt is the wage rate, Rkt is the return to
capital Kt, t includes dividend from intermediary rms as well as payments from state-
contingent securities, It are investments, Pt is the price of nal goods, and 
t is a wedge
between the foreign interest rate and the return to domestic agents holding foreign bonds;

t = exp

 ! StB

t
PDY X
+ t

; ! > 0;
where t is an exogenous disturbance to the uip condition, and PDY X is the steady
state value of exports. Thus, the return on foreign bonds is falling in the foreign debt of
domestic agents (normalised with the long-run level of exports), a feature that ensures
stationarity of the economy, cf. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). It follows that we
assume incomplete international markets.
Households supply labour in a perfectly competitive labour market where the wage
level is trivially determined.
2.1.1 Capital Accumulation
The capital stock accumulates as follows;
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + it (1  S (It=It 1)) It;
where  is the depreciation rate and S is an investment adjustment cost function with the
following properties;
S (1) = S 0 (1) = 0; s  S 00 (1) > 0;
while it is an investment-specic technology shock. The investment adjustment cost
function is chosen in order to introduce the hump-shaped investment responses to changes
in the economic environment that have been found in numerous empirical studies; we refer
the reader to Christiano et al. (2001) for further discussion.
2.2 The Intermediate-Goods-Producing Firm
We assume that a continuum of rms supply intermediary goods to nal-goods sectors
at home as well as abroad in markets of monopolistic competition of the Dixit-Stiglitz
variety and set prices in staggered contracts of random duration as developed in Calvo
(1983).
Each rm in the intermediary sector has the following production technology;
Y Dt (f) = 
D
t Kt (f)
Ht (f)
1    ;
where Y Dt is rm fs production of intermediaries, 
D
t is a technology shock, and  is a
xed cost (which will ensure zero prots in the long run). Solving the cost-minimization
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problem of the individual rm f yields the optimal relationship between capital and labor;
Rkt
Wt
=

(1  )
Ht (f)
Kt (f)
() r
k
t
wt
=

(1  )
Ht (f)
kt (f)
;
where wt  Wt=Pt rkt  Rkt =Pt are real wages and rental rate expressed in units of the
nal good, respectively. It follows that marginal costs are constant across rms, why we
can drop the rm index when dening real (and nominal) marginal costs;
mct MCt=PDt =

pDt 
D
t 
 (1  )1  1w1 t  rkt  ;
where pDt  PDt =Pt expresses the relative product price in units of nal goods.
We now turn to the optimal pricing decision of tradable-good rms. Our monopolis-
tic competition assumption implies that each rm, f , in the tradable sector is facing a
downward sloping demand curve of the form
Y Dt (f) =

PDt (f)
PDt
  dt
dt 1
Y Dt ; (2.2)
where Y Dt (f) is total demand for the intermediate product produced by rm f , while
Y Dt  Y D;Dt + Y Xt is total demand for domestically produced tradable goods. Here, Y D;Dt
is the domestic demand for tradables, while foreign demand for tradable goods is
Y Xt =

PDt
StP t
 x
Y t ;  > 1:
As has become established in the literature, we assume that each rm only gets to
optimise its price in a given period with constant probability 1   d (where d 2 [0; 1]),
implying that price contracts are staggered and of stochastic durations. We follow Smets
and Wouters (2003) and expand the simple Calvo pricing model with partial past index-
ation in the sense that rms not reoptimising their price will adjust partially with the
ination of the previous period. Thus, letting ~PDt be the optimal price of any rm (as
the problem is symmetric, the optimal price is identical across rms), the price charged
by rm f at time t will be
PDt (f) =

~PDt w.p. (1  d) 
Dt 1
!d PDt 1 (f) w.p. d ;
where !d 2 (0; 1) captures the degree of indexation to past ination, and Dt is the gross
ination rate for domestric tradables.
The optimal price ~PDt is the price that maximizes the net present value of a rms
prots subject to its demand curve in equation (2.2);
max Et
1X
=t
(d)
 t D (f) ;
where Dt (f) 

~PDt (f) MCDt (f)

Y D (f) MCDt ;
and t = PtU
0
Ct
is the marginal utility of income in nominal terms (cf. Appendix A). The
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rst-order condition for this problem is
1X
=t
(d)
 tEt
"
p
D
 Y
D
 (f)
d   1
 
~PDt =P
D
t
PD =P
D
t

PD 1
PDt 1
!d
  dmc
!#
= 0:
It is relatively straightforward to show that agggregate sectoral price index evolve as
follows;
P dt =

d
 
dt 1
!d  t1 !d P dt 1 11 dt + (1  d) ~P dt  11 dt 1 dt : (2.3)
Log-linearising around a steady state with no net ination and combining these equations
yields the following ination equation;3
^Dt =
!d
1 + !d
^Dt 1 +

1 + !d
Et^
D
t+1 +
1  d
d
1  d
1 + !d

^dt + cmcDt  ;
where hats denote log deviations from the steady state; thus, ^Dt is the log ination in
the domestic intermediary sector.
2.3 Importing rms
We use the Monacelli (2005) approach to the modeling of import. That is, a continuum
of importers buy a homogenous intermediary good abroad at the world market price (so
that the law of one price applies at the border) and then brand them individually and sell
them in a market of monopolistic competition to the nal-good producers. As with the
sector of intermediary producers, we assume that the price contracts are staggered and of
stochastic durations; in this case, the Calvo parameter determining the average length of
contracts becomes a measure of the degree of exchange-rate pass-through in the import
prices.4 Hence, importers of foreign intermediaries face the following problem;
max Et
1X
=t
(d)
 t M (f) ;
where Mt (f) =

~PMt (f)  StP t

Y Mt (f)  StP t m;
Y Mt (f) =

PMt (f)
PMt
  mt
mt  1
Y Mt :
It follows that marginal costs for all importers are
MCMt  StP t ) mcMt  StP t =PMt = Qt=pMt :
Having introduced a specic variable for the marginal costs, the problem is analogous to
the one solved in Section 2.2 above, as is the denition of the aggregrate price level. Thus,
3We do not seek to account for either real or nominal trends in our estimation, and thus settle on the
steady state with  = 1 for convenience. Throughout, the term steady state refers to this specic case.
4Thus, the trade sector is a special case of the local currency pricing assumption advocated by, inter
alia, Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000).
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by log-linearisation we can obtain the following import ination equation;
^Mt =
!m
1 + !m
^Mt 1 +

1 + !m
Et^
M
t+1 +
1  m
m
1  m
1 + !m

^mt + cmcMt  ;
where cmcMt  q^t   p^Mt :
Note that as the Calvo stickiness parameter m approaches zero, the price charged by the
importers will uctuate one-for-one with changes in the world price, that is, we have full
exchange-rate pass-through.
2.4 Final-Good Composite
The nal consumption good Yt is a composite of intermediary goods produced domestically
and abroad, and it is used for consumption and investment in the capital stock;
Yt =

(1  ) 1

Y D;Dt
  1

+ 
1
Y Mt
 1

 
 1
;
Pt =
h
(1  )  PDt 1  +   PMt 1 i 11  ;
where  is the quasi share of imported goods. We assume it is traded in a market of
perfect competition.
2.5 Market Clearing and Net Foreign Assets
The model is closed by imposing market clearing conditions for the capital and labor
markets across all rms in the intermediary sector
Kt =
Z 1
0
(Kt (f)) df; Ht =
Z 1
0
(Ht (f)) df;
for the market for nal goods
Yt = Ct +Gt + It;
and for the markeds for intermediary goodsZ 1
0
Y Dt (f) df = Y
D;D
t + Y
X
t ;
Z 1
0
Y Mt (f) df = Y
M
t :
Straightforward manipulation of the household budget constraint (2.1) implies that the
holding of net foreign assets evolves as follows;
StB

t = 
t(1 +R

t )

StB

t 1 + P
D
t Y
X
t   StP t Y Mt

; (2.4)
that is, they depend on net exports and the foreign interest rate corrected for uip distur-
bances and the debt premium.
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2.6 The Monetary Authority
Finally we assume that the central bank conducts monetary policy through changes in
the nominal interest rate. The policy actions of the monetary authority can be described
by a feedback rule of the form
R^t = rR^t 1 + (1  r)
hbt +   ^t   bt+ yy^Dt + sS^ti+ mt ; (2.5)
where y^Dt is the log deviation of gdp from its steady-state level, and bt is the target
value of (log) ination. As we consider a model with zero steady-state ination, bt is an
exogenous mean-zero process. Thus, the central bank changes interest rates, it, when its
ination target bt changes, or when cpi ination, ^t, deviates from this target; when real
output di¤ers from the long-run growth path; or when the nominal exchange moves. As
is common in the literature, we allow for interest rate smoothing (r > 0). Finally, "
m
t is
a domestic monetary policy shock assumed to be i.i.d.
2.7 The Foreign Economy
The foreign economy is modeled as an exogenous structural var system for the set of
observed variables; gdp ination, output, and the interest rate (all of which have been
detrended as described the in the following section);
F0Xt = F (L)Xt + "
x
t ; "
x
t  N (0;x) ;
Xt =

^t; Y^

t ; R^

t
0
:
In accordance with the normal battery of tests we x the lag-length to two periods.
Furthermore, we identify the system by assuming that ination and output are each or-
thogonal to innovations to the other variables, that is, only the interest rate responds
to contemporary innovations to the other variables. This yields one over-identifying re-
striction which cannot be rejected at conventional levels of signicance, and the implied
impulse-response functions are broadly consistent with plausible economic models such as
the one presented here.
3 Data
We confront the model with eleven time series; the following seven characterise the uk
economy: real gdp, aggregate private consumption and investment; gdp and private con-
sumption ination rates; hours worked; the three-month nominal interest and a measure
of changes in the nominal exchange rate.5 We use the following time series for the foreign
economy: gdp ination, real output, and the nominal interest rate - all three of which (as
well as the exchange rate) are weighted averages of the us and the euro area economies.6
5The rst ve series are taken from the databank constructed by the Bank of England for their beqm
model, while we use the short term interest rate and exchange rates from the Economic Outlook databank
compiled by the oecd. The real aggregates, including hours worked, have been normalised by the British
working-age population from the beqm dataset.
6For the US series we use Economic Outlook data, while the euro area series were taken from the
socalled awm data set constructed by the ecb. The exchange rate of the dollar and the euro are both
from the Economic Outlook data base.
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We take the logarithm of all time series, and apply a Hodrick-Prescott lter with  = 1600
to all except the exchange rate changes. Thus, in terms of the model variables, we observe
the following subset; Y^ Dt ; C^t; I^t; ^
D
t ; ^t; H^t; R^t;S^t; ^

t ; y^

t ; R^

t :
Our sample consists of quarterly observations for the period 1982-2002. The year 1982
was picked as a starting point for a number of reasons: First, the economic policy of the
Thatcher government was rmly established by then. Second, we deliberately want to
avoid the turbulent crisis years following the 1979 oil crisis. Third, data constraints in
particular relating to the availability of artically constructed euro area data also made
us choose 1982 as the starting point. We chose 2002Q4 as our nal data point since more
recent data is subject to revisions. The properties of the data set are discussed in Section
5.1 below.
We are aware, however, that our sample period spans several monetary regimes in the
uk. From 1982 to 1990, uk monetary policy was targeting various monetary aggregates
while exchange rate targeting was implemented from 1990 to 1992. Following the erm
crisis in October 1992, monetary policy has been conducted within a formal ination
targeting framework.
4 Estimation
In this paper we make use of Bayesian methods to estimate our structural model.7 In
short, the Bayesian approach is an application of Bayesprinciple; letting  be the vector
of structural parameters, and X the set of observed variables, we can state the Bayesian
principle as
p (jX) = p (Xj) p () =p (X)
/ L (jX) p () ; (4.1)
where p () is the prior density, L (jX) is the likelihood function, and p (jX) is the pos-
terior density. The latter constitutes the information we can obtain on the distribution
of the structural parameters, given what knowledge we have on them a priori and the
information that the data gives us through our economic model; hence, it is our prime
object of interest. The prior density function is a very convenient tool, as it allows us
to integrate information from related macroeconomic studies as well as microeconometric
estimations that may be more informative on key structural parameters than the aggre-
gate data we make use of; on a more practical level, it also helps stabilise the nonlinear
minimization algorithm which we use for the estimation.
We apply the Dynare routines in order to estimate the posterior densities through a
Markov-chainMonte-Carlo simulation.8 ;9 Specically, we analytically derive a log-linearisation
of the model around the zero-ination steady state,10 which Dynare solves for all relevant
The indices for prices, gdp, and the exchange rate were geometrically weighted using their relative
volume in uk trade (75% for the euro area, and 25% for the us), while the interest rate series is an
arithmetic average using the same weights.
7A good introduction to the methodology and its application to macroeconomic dsge models is o¤ered
in An and Schorfheide (2005).
8The dynare program is an ongoing project at cepremap and can be downloaded at
www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/ where documentation is also available.
9Six quarters of data (1980Q3-1981Q4) were used as a training sample to initiate the Kalman lter
for each evaluation of the likelihood.
10The steady state is derived in Appendix B, and the log-linearised model is presented in Appendix C.
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parameter congurations using the pertubation methods of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004). The posterior mode is found with the csminwel minimisation, and the simulated
posterior densities are obtained from a Metropolis-Hastings mcmc chain of 600; 000 draws
of which we discard the rst half in order to ensure that we only sample from a part of
the chain that has converged.11
4.1 Parameterization and Prior Distributions
As part of our Bayesian analysis we have to transform information from prior studies as
well as model consistency requirements into assumptions regarding the prior distributions
of the structural parameters. For this part of the exercise, we build on the ndings for
the us, euro area, and Danish economies of the related estimations presented in Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007), Adolfson et al. (2005), and Dam and Linaa (2005).
First, we x a subset of the structural parameters which we deem to be empirically
weakly determined in our analysis, especially with its short-term emphasis in mind. In
line with the majority of the literature, we x the discount factor  at 0:99, implying a
long-run real rate of return of 4 percent annually. Futhermore, the capital share in home
production  is xed at 1=3, and the capital depreciation rate  is set to 0:025, implying
annual capital depreciations of 10 percent; both values are conventional in the literature.
The inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity, l, is xed at the value 5. Our motivation
for calibrating this parameter is that we have chosen the simplest possible model of the
labour market, i.e., perfect competition. As we do not expect such a simple model of the
uk labour market to be able to adequately explain the observed comovements in British
real wages and hours, we exclude real wages from the observed data set and x the labour
supply elasticity.12 The value of the Frisch labor supply elasticity has caused a great deal
of the debate in the literature. The rbc literature requires a very elastic labor supply to
be able to explain the observed variation in output and in particular hours worked.
For instance, King and Rebello (1999) used  1l = 4 and found that as 
 1
l dropped to 1,
the rbc model could not generate enough volatility in hours worked. On the other hand,
labor market economists point to micro-data survey evidence that suggests a very inelastic
labor supply schedule. In particular, those studies usually nd Frisch elasticities in the
range of 0.05 to 0.5. Given the range of estimates, we pick a labor supply elasticity in the
middle of the range,  1l = 0:2. This particular choice is consistent with the conclusion of
the survey in Card (1994).
Finally, we calibrate the consumption, investment and government spending shares of
nal domestic demand in accordance with sample averages for the uk. Thus, the C=Y
ratio is xed at 64 percent, I=Y at 14 percent, and G=Y at 22 percent.
We now turn to the parameters with non-degenerate prior distributions, which are
presented in Table 1. First we shall consider the group of the parameters that are restricted
to lie between zero and unity in order to ensure model consistency, all of which are assumed
to follow beta distributions. In accordance with the studies cited above, we pick a mean of
11Gelman et al. (2003, part III) o¤ers a good introduction to the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and
related methods.
12The literature has chosen to follow the lead of Erceg et al. (2000) and introduce sticky wages through
Calvo (1983) contracts in the labour market. As we consider this to be an inadequate description of the
British labour market, we have abstained from including this as an explanation of the wage mechanism.
We nd that a more promising approach would be to incorporate a search-and-match labour market in
the model. However, that is beyond the scope of the present paper; we refer the reader to Christo¤el
et al. (2006) for a recent study.
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0:6 for the habit formation parameter h, and a mean of 0:7 for the smoothness parameter
r of the monetary policy rule that captures the degree of inertia in the realised interest
rate. With regards to the parameters of the pricing models, we pick the mean and variance
of the prior distribution for the Calvo parameter d such that we assign 95 percent of the
probability mass to an average duration of price contracts between 21
2
and 5 quarters, a
range we believe to be consistent with the growing body of survey-based micro data.13
As already discussed, the Calvo parameter in the import sector captures the degree of
exchange-rate pass-through; since we do not want to take a rm stand on this a priori,
we choose a fairly loose prior with mean 0:5 and standard deviation 0:15. The same prior
is chosen for the share of rms in the intermediate and import sectors which index their
prices to lagged ination when they are not reoptimising. The observed import share in
nal domestic demand has moved from ca. 20 to 30 percent over the sample period we
consider, and thus we choose to estimate its long-run value, assigning the intermediate
value 0:25 as the mean of our prior. Finally, we pick a mean of 0:8 for the autocorrelation
parameters of all the potentially persistent structural processes.
13See Hall et al. (2000) for the uk and Álvarez et al. (2005) for the euro area.
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The next group of parameters consist of intratemporal elasticities of substitution and
the long-run gross mark-up levels which should all be larger than unity, and for all four
parameters we settle on an inverse gamma distribution with its lower bound shifted to one.
For the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported intermediaries, , and
the corresponding elasticity of substitution between exports and foreign goods abroad,
x, we pick a mode of 1:5, which is consistent with numerous macroeconomic studies,
including the seminal paper by Chari et al. (2002).14 As detailed in the next section,
however, the estimation calls for an implausibly high value of , and consequently we
prefer to x this parameter at the value 6. We assign a mode of 1:2 to the gross mark-up
parameters d and m, thus centering the prior probability mass around a long-run net
markup rate of 20 percent in both sectors.
Economic reasoning and model consistency requirements imply that the remaining
parameters should all be non-negative. Turning to the three parameters of the monetary
policy rule, we settled on a gamma distribution with mode 0:125 for the output coe¢ cient
y. Note that this corresponds to a coe¢ cient of 0:5 for an annualised ination rate,
in accordance with the original Taylor (1993) result. The response to exchange rate
uctuations was also assigned a gamma distribution with mode 0:2. Finally, the ination
response is assigned a normal distribution centered on 1:7 and leaving only a little less
than 10 percent of the mass under 1:5; we settled on this distribution in order to keep
problems with indeterminacy to a minimum for the high-dimensional and very non-linear
estimation algorithm.
The remaining coe¢ cent priors were assumed to follow inverse gamma distributions.
For the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution, c, we picked a mode of 1:5,
reecting the ndings in Dam and Linaa (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), but
kept the distribution wide enough not to exclude the benchmark value of one a priori.
In line with the literature, the investment adjustment cost parameter S was assigned a
mode of 5. The debt premium parameter was given a mode of 0:01 which is a common
value for the literature. The prior modes for the standard deviations of the ten structural
shock processes were set in accordance with the assumptions of Smets and Wouters (2003,
2007) and Adolfson et al. (2005), and we refer the reader to these papers for a discussion.
4.2 Posterior Distribution of Estimated Parameters
The posterior parameter distributions are illustrated in Figures 1-3. Generally, the pos-
terior densities have shifted or tightened relative to the prior densities, reecting a sig-
nicant extraction of information from the combination of the data with our economic
model. However, some parameters were virtually unidentied by the data and model,
including the import share , the debt premium !, and the autocorrelation of the labour
supply shock and the ination target process (%l and %).
We nd that the posterior mode for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution c equals 0:62, which is somewhat lower than rbc calibrations that traditionally
use values between 1 and 2. Thus, our estimate suggests that households are more willing
to substitute consumption over time than was traditionally assumed in the rbc litera-
ture. As we discuss in Section 5 below, uk aggregate consumption is relatively volatile
compared to other countries including the us. Hence, in order to match the relative
volatilities of British consumption and gdp we require consumers to be relatively more
14For all the gamma and inverse gamma distributions we prefer to report the mode rather than the
mean, as we nd this statistic more informative for these rather skewed distributions.
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willing to substitute consumption across time, resulting in the estimated ies of c. 1:6.
Less habit persistence would also ceterius paribus imply higher willingness to substitute
consumption across time; indeed, our estimates for the habit parameter, h, suggest a
value around 0:3 which is considerable lower than found elsewhere in the literature. For
instance, Smets and Wouters (2007) nd a value slightly higher than 0:6 for the us while
Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate 0:6 using euro area data. Also, uk investments are
quite volatile, which may contribute to our nding of a rather low investment adjustment
cost S with a posterior mode of 3:3, where estimates for the us and euro area lie in the
range of 6 to 9.
Turning now to our estimates of the price inertia parameters, our estimates of the Calvo
parameter for domestic prices is 0:4, implying an average duration of price contracts of 12
3
quarters (5 months) which is a considerably lower degree of nominal price rigidity than
found in the majority of other related studies; for instance, both Smets andWouters (2003)
and Adolfson et al. (2005) estimate the average duration of euro area prices to be around
10 quarters. However, we think that our results are more in line with microevidence
pointing to average contract duration of around 2 quarters, cf. Hall et al. (2000). The
degree of domestic price indexation !d equals 0:15 which is in line with the 0:17 found
by Adolfson et al. (2005) for the euro area, but lower than the estimates in Smets and
Wouters who nd 0:47 using both us and euro area estimates, and in stark contrast to
Christiano et al. (2001) who x the indexation at 1. Indeed, observed uk ination is
considerably less persistent than us ination, cf. Section 5 below, implying a little role
for the lagged indexation which has been introduced mainly to account for the high us
ination inertia.
For import prices, we estimate an import price indexation parameter !m of 0:44. Since
our estimate of the average duration of import price contracts is 10 months (m = 0:7), our
model implies a fair degree of exchange rate pass-through. Note also that the posterior
mean is markedly lower (m = 0:44, implying average contracts of about 5 months).
15
For comparison, the average duration of import price contracts in the beqm model is 20
months.
The uk interest rate rule is pretty much in line with previous estimates, including
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). We nd evidence of a fair degree of interest rate smoothing
(r = 0:69) while the ination targeting coe¢ cient  equals 1:9. We nd only little weight
on output gap targeting (y = 0:07) and exchange rate targeting (y = 0:1). The latter
results conform with the ndings of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), who use a posterior-
odds-based test to establish that the Bank of England did not systematically respond to
exchange rate movements over the last two decades.
Our estimates of the steady state markup coe¢ cients are pretty much in line with
the existing literature. We nd that the steady state markup in the uk domestic goods
sector, d, equals 1:19 while the corresponding steady state markup in the import sector,
m, equals 1:30.
Turning to the standard deviations of the structural shocks, the thing that stands
out is that m and  are both bimodal with one peak close to the prior mode, and
another at a larger value. This is a well-known outcome in Bayesian analysis, reecting
that the data are contradicting the model restrictions under the prior distribution, pulling
15We believe that this peculiarity stems from a weak identication of the price stickiness in the import
sector vis-à-vis the volatility of the import markup shock, m. This suggests that a more parsimonious
specication of the import sector could be preferable to the one analysed here. A similar problem with
a Canadian estimation is accounted for in Justiniano and Preston (2006),
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the posterior shock volatility up relative to the prior assumption. The reason why these
particular shocks are inated in our estimation is discussed in Section 7.2 below.
Finally, we allowed for a small amount of i.i.d. measurement error in the set of observed
domestic variables and the exchange rate. These are capturing measurement error in
the data as well as model misspecication, as we have made a number of simplifying
assumptions and thus cannot hope to fully capture the dynamic properties of the uk
economy perfectly. The volatility of each measurement error was estimated using a tight
gamma prior distribution with mass centered around 0:1, and the posterior modes of
the errors lie between 0:05 and 0:13 except for the two ination series; for cpi ination
we obtain a mode of 0:24 while the gdp ination posterior mode is as high as 0:45.
This indicates that the ination dynamics are not adequately described by our model.
Plausibly, as the pricing model of this literature was primarily constructed to account for
the persistency of us ination, it is not well suited for the big idiosyncratic element in
uk ination which we now turn to.
5 Assessing the Model Fit
In this section we evaluate how well our model is able to match key business cycle sta-
tistics of the uk variables that we introduced in Section 3. The top section of Table
2 contains empirical business cycle statistics for the variables of interest. The statistics
were generated from series that have been logged and run through a Hodrick-Prescott
lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600, cf. Figures 4 and 5. The only exception is the
nominal depreciation rate where we use the rst di¤erence of the original series.
5.1 Empirical Moments
The main features of uk data are as follows: uk gdp has a standard deviation of 1:07%
while uk consumption and investments are respectively 1.3 and 5.8 times more volatile
than uk gdp. Interestingly, both uk consumption and investment exhibit greater uc-
tuations relative to uk gdp than say us consumption and us investment. According to
Canzoneri et al. (2007), us consumption and us investment are only 0.8 and 3 times as
volatile as us output.16 Both uk investment and consumption is positively correlated
with uk gdp as well as uk output price ination. As in us data, all three uk series
exhibit a high degree of persistence with a 1 quarter autocorrelation of above 0.85.
The volatility of uk cpi and ppi ination relative to uk output volatility is 1/3 and
1
2
, respectively. Both ination series have a positive unconditional correlation with uk
gdp and both series exhibit very little persistence. In fact, the 1 quarter autocorrelation
is negative and close to zero. The seeming lack of ination inertia in the uk ltered
ination series distinguishes the uk ination dynamics from, e.g., the us where several
papers have highlighted the high degree of us ination persistence.17. We also note that
both uk ination measures are positively correlated with uk gdp. Likewise, there is
16Our measure of investment is Business Investment which excludes government investment. This is
consistent with our theoretical framework where the government does not undertake any investments.
However, we found that in the data, the total investment series exhibit lower volatility than the business
investment series. This would suggest that government investment is negatively correlated with business
investment.
17The corresponding 1 quarter autocorrelation in HP-ltered us cpi ination is 0:75.
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Table 2: Variable Moments
Variable Std. deviation Autocorr. Corr. w. Y^ Dt Corr. w. ^
D
t
Data, 1982-2002
Y^ Dt gdp 1.074 0.897 1.000 0.137
C^t Consumption 1.444 0.902 0.377 0.127
I^t Investment 6.277 0.872 0.613 0.307
^Dt ppi ination 0.670 -0.148 0.137 1.000
^t cpi ination 0.394 -0.040 0.120 0.449
R^t Interest rate 0.324 0.828 0.219 0.125
Q^t rer 4.413 0.740 0.024 0.166
S^t Depreciation 3.211 0.171 -0.107 -0.137
Model (evaluated at posterior mode)
Y^ Dt gdp 0.716 0.770 1.000 -0.097
C^t Consumption 1.364 0.751 0.374 -0.202
I^t Investment 5.088 0.822 0.339 0.220
^Dt ppi ination 0.444 -0.024 -0.097 1.000
^t cpi ination 0.420 0.005 -0.096 0.998
R^t Interest rate 0.264 0.553 -0.081 0.460
Q^t rer 4.415 0.764 0.071 -0.096
S^t Depreciation 3.013 -0.038 0.026 0.041
Model (evaluated at posterior mean)
Y^ Dt gdp 0.748 0.777 1.000 -0.132
C^t Consumption 1.365 0.782 0.362 -0.221
I^t Investment 5.465 0.832 0.350 0.193
^Dt ppi ination 0.467 0.036 -0.132 1.000
^t cpi ination 0.454 0.093 -0.124 0.990
R^t Interest rate 0.296 0.600 -0.109 0.483
Q^t rer 4.611 0.757 0.073 -0.121
S^t Depreciation 3.139 -0.037 0.017 -0.023
Note: Theoretical moments are based on the posterior distribution.
also a positive correlation between uk interest rates and ination rates. The positive
correlation between ination and gdp has also been found in us data as well as in euro
area data. (See Canzoneri et al. (2006) for references to empirical work).
Finally, note that the volatility of our measure of the e¤ective Sterling real exchange
rate is about 4.5 times as volatile as uk output. The high volatility of the £ real exchange
rate is in line with the stylized facts of real exchange rates documented in the international
real business cycle (irbc) literature. For instance, Chari et al. (2002) and Bergin and
Feenstra (2001) have documented that the us bilateral real exchange rates against 15
European Union countries are on average about 4-5 times more volatile than gdp.
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5.2 Theoretical Moments
How well can our model match key uk business cycle facts? The second part of Table
2 contains the theoretical moments of our model when we evaluate the model at the
posterior mode. The general message is that our model does a good job at matching the
key moments. In fact, we are able to match the volatility of uk gdp, consumption and
investment quite well. The model implies a uk gdp volatility of 0.72% while it is 1.1%
in the data. In terms of uk investment, the volatility is 5.1% compared to 6.3% in the
data. Our model generates a consumption series with a volatility of 1.36%, only slightly
lower than actual volatility of 1.44%. Turning now to persistence, we note that the model
generates too little output (0:77) and consumption persistence (0:75) compared to what
we observe in the data (0:90 for both). However, our model is capable of matching the
observed investment persistence.
Can our framework replicate the uk ination and interest dynamics? While the model
generates too little ppi ination and interest rate volatility (0.44 and 0.26% compared to
0.67 and 0.32% in the data), it generates a quite volatile cpi ination series (0.42% in the
model compared to 0.39% in the data). Given the low degree of ination persistence seen
in the data, it is not surprising that the theoretical ination series is as persistent as in
the data. On the other hand, our model generates too little persistence in interest rates
compared to the data.
Interestingly, our model implies a negative correlation between both uk ination series
and uk gdp. Likewise, the correlation betwen uk interest rates and gdp in the model is
also negative. Recall that the data implies a positive correlation between gdp and ination
and between gdp and interest rates. A positive correlation between gdp, ination, and
the interest rate would indicate that demand shocks are important drivers of cyclical
ination. The intuition is as follows: Think of a government spending shock that would
raise output. A temporary increase in output would via the Phillips curve eventually lead
to higher uk ination which would prompt the central bank to raise interest rates. One
interpretation of the countercyclical behavior of ination in our model is that despite the
addition of multiple demand shocks to our setup the nature of our estimated model is
quite close to the rbc and early New Keynesian literature in the sense that productivity
shocks are the dominant source of economic uctuations, and thus the model cannot
generate procyclical ination.
Finally, our model is capable of replicating both the high volatility (4.41%) and high
persistence of real exchange rates (0.76%). At rst glance, this seems like a remarkable
feature of our model in particular considering that earlier papers have been unable to
generate the observed real exchange rate dynamics using similar open-economy sticky-
price models. 18 However, as we discuss in Section 7.2, the ability of our model to match
the moments of the real exchange rate mainly relies on the assumption of a very volatile
and persistent exogenous shock process. Earlier papers, (e.g., Kollmann, 2002) have relied
on the exogenous uip shock predominantly driving real exchange movements. While our
model also features an exogenous uip shock, its role is overshadowed by another volatile
and persistent exogenous shock namely the import price markup shock. The variance
decomposition in Table 4 below illustrates this point.
18See for instance Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002)
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6 Model Robustness Analysis
We now explore the sensitivity of our estimation results to various features of the bench-
mark model. Table 3 contains estimates for four particular model variations. Column 2
and 3 explores the role of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution . Column 4 con-
siders the setup with perfect exchange rate pass-through. Finally, column 5 assumes that
markup shocks are not persistent.
Table 3: Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Low import ES Estim ated  PCP i.i.d markup Estim ated 
 = 3 m= m= 0 %m= %d = 0 Linear detrend ing
Param eter Posterior mode
Habit p ersistence 0.309 0.267 0.545 0.227 0.418 0.566
Household inverse ies 0.624 0.609 0.663 0.579 0.626 0.717
M ean import share 0.233 0.197 0.401 0.222 0.276 0.399
Import es 6 3 19.11 6 6 16.94
Export/foreign output es 1.367 1.369 1.388 1.490 1.376 1.385
Debt prem ium 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.157 0.008 0.009
Investm ent adjustm ent cost 3 .255 3.245 3.502 3.259 3.248 3.759
M ean markup, dom . goods 1.190 1.192 1.176 1.189 1.177 1.178
M ean markup, imp. goods 1.299 1.741 1.096 2.399 1.223 1.098
Price stick iness, dom . goods 0.391 0.394 0.416 0.402 0.367 0.449
Price stick iness, imp. goods 0.701 0.718 0.387 - 0 .925 0.401
Price indexation , dom . goods 0.152 0.157 0.121 0.157 0.127 0.122
Price indexation , imp. goods 0.440 0.496 0.386 - 0 .270 0.404
mp, sm ooth ing 0.687 0.667 0.720 0.632 0.740 0.700
mp, ination resp onse 1.861 1.879 1.855 1.934 1.879 1.830
mp, output resp onse 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.029
mp, exhange rate resp onse 0.087 0.083 0.095 0.053 0.121 0.099
Shock persistence
Preferences 0.777 0.783 0.754 0.800 0.782 0.790
Labour supply 0.855 0.855 0.861 0.856 0.901 0.865
Technology 0.968 0.970 0.957 0.979 0.960 0.978
Investm ent techn . 0 .381 0.391 0.376 0.404 0.388 0.458
Markup, dom . goods 0.884 0.884 0.899 0.969 - 0 .938
Markup, imp. goods 0.961 0.970 0.961 - - 0 .963
Govt. sp ending 0.919 0.927 0.946 0.936 0.933 0.972
uip sho ck 0.849 0.850 0.883 0.979 0.960 0.884
Ination target 0 .840 0.839 0.841 0.840 0.841 0.845
Shock volatility
Preferences 0.518 0.533 0.360 0.579 0.487 0.390
Labour supply 0.116 0.116 0.114 0.116 0.438 0.111
Technology 0.416 0.414 0.418 0.409 0.420 0.477
Investm ent techn . 1 .261 1.255 1.273 1.249 1.245 1.229
Markup, dom . goods 0.405 0.398 0.332 0.348 0.210 0.393
Markup, imp. goods 0.387 0.346 2.482 - 0 .793 2.274
Govt. sp ending 0.583 0.571 0.411 0.530 0.335 0.580
uip sho ck 0.059 0.058 0.178 0.793 0.310 0.153
Ination target 0 .022 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.023
Mon.p ol. sho ck 0.191 0.188 0.190 0.189 0.181 0.216
Log marginal likelihood -645.62 -654.30 -637.45 -671.51 -652.07 -786.23
First, we consider the role played by the intratemporal elasticity of substitution .
Recall that our model implies a tight connection between import price ination ^Mt , gdp
ination ^Dt , and cpi ination ^t, cf. equations (C.13)-(C.14) in Appendix C;
^Mt = (1 + {) ^t   {^Dt ;
where { is a constant whose value depends on the steady state import markup m as well
as the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across goods . We are trying to match
the volatility of both cpi ination as well as gdp ination where our analysis of the data
series revealed that gdp ination is almost twice as volatile as cpi ination, cf. Section
5. In the estimation, we are not matching the dynamics of import price ination. Rather,
the volatility of import price ination is determined by the volatility of real exchange
rates. Hence, the very volatile real exchange rate in the data implies volatile import
price ination. Given that the above equation imposes a tight link between movements in
import price as well as cpi and gdp ination, { has to adjust to ensure that our model can
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simultaneously match the dynamics of the observed cpi and gdp ination series as well
as generate very volatile import price ination. A key structural parameter determining
{ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution :
In our benchmark experiments, we decided to x the value of  at 6. While the
traditional irbc studies have chosen 1:5 as the appropriate value, a number of recent
papers have argued that traded goods are more substitutable than implied by the value
1:5. For instance, Tchakarov (2004) also chose  = 6 as the appropriate value.
Column 2 contains the estimation results from a experiment where we make traded
goods less substitutable. Hence, we set  to equal 3. The results are quite similar to our
benchmark results. We estimate a slightly lower import share  (0:20 versus benchmark
0:23), and our estimate for the steady state import markup is also higher (1:7 verus
benchmark value of 1:3). As these parameters are prime detertiminants of { along with
, it is hardly surprising that they are the ones to di¤er markedly from the benchmark
case. That is, to ensure that we can still match the dynamics of the two ination series
as well as the real exchange rate for a lower elasticity of substitution, { has to adjust
via changes in the steady state import markup as well as the import share. We note
that xing  at 3 rather than 6 produces markedly lower marginal likelihoods ( 654:30
compared to  645:62 in the benchmark).
Rather than xing the ies, could we not estimate it? Column 3 contains the results
for the setup where we allow the model to estimate . We nd that the ies is driven to
a very large number ( = 19). Likewise, the import share , is now estimated at 40%
while the steady-state import markup share is driven down to 1:1. At the same time,
the volatility of the import markup shock is now estimated to be 6 times higher (2:48)
than in the benchmark experiment (0:39). Unsurprisingly, this experiment produces a
higher marginal likelihood ( 637:45) than our benchmark experiment. Given the higher
marginal likelihood, why dont we allow  to be estimated as a free parameter in the rst
place? First of all, we do not regard  = 19 as a plausible estimate as this would imply a
degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods which is considerably higher
than what microeconometric studies have found (see Tchakarov (2004) for references).
Second, the estimated import share is far higher than we see in the data. Finally, we
interpret the results of this experiment as evidence that the workhorse one-sector model
has di¢ culty matching the observed real exchange rate volatility. In other words, if we
allow  to be freely estimated, the import markup shocks become even more volatile than
in the benchmark estimation, which in turn entails very volatile import prices. In order
to reconcile volatile import prices with the observed less volatile cpi and gdp ination
series, the model is generating implausible high estimates of  and import shares :
While our benchmark model allowed for imperfect exchange rate pass-through, we
now consider the case with complete exchange rate pass-through. We therefore estimate
a model where there is no import price stickiness and no import markup shocks that is,
a case of producer currency pricing (pcp). We nd that the persistence of the domestic
markup shock has increased considerably (0:97 versus the benchmark 0:88). Likewise,
the persistence of the uip shock has also increased (0:98 versus 0:85 in the benchmark).
Finally, the volatility of the uip shock have increased 10-fold to a standard deviation
of 0:79. We also note that pcp setup yields a considerably lower marginal likelihood
( 671:51) than the benchmark. How do we interpret these results? We know that match-
ing the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate is not an easy task. Our
benchmark model has a number of features which would help us match the real exchange
rate dynamics. First, highly volatile and persistent import markup shocks play a crucial
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role in generating both volatile and persistent real exchange rates. Second, as shown by
Betts and Devereux (2000), allowing for imperfect exchange rate pass-through would yield
more volatile real exchange rates. When we assume no import markup shocks and full
exchange-rate pass-through, the model would have to rely on other features in order to
be able to match the real exchange rate dynamics. Therefore, it is not surprising that our
estimates of the pcp model yield more persistent and more volatile uip shocks as well as
more persistent domestic markup shocks.
The discussion so far has highlighted that persistent markup shocks may play an
important role in terms of matching the volatility and persistence of the the real exchange
rate. We therefore undertake an experiment where we assume no persistence in the
exogenous markup shocks. Our model estimates now imply a higher degree of consumption
habit persistence (0:42 versus 0:31 in the benchmark), a higher degree of import price
stickiness (0:93 versus 0:70), and twice as volatile a import markup shock (a standard
deviation of 0:79 versus 0:39). Finally, we estimate a higher persistence of the uip shock
(0:98 versus 0:85). The results validate our intuitions from the previous experiments:
Without persistent markup shocks, the model can only match the dynamics of the real
exchange rate by relying more on the other channels that can generate persistent and
volatile real exchange rates. Thus, we note that the experiment with i.i.d. markup shocks
yield a lower marginal likelihood ( 652:07) than the benchmark experiment. Hence, a
setup with persistent markup shocks are preferred to a setup with only i.i.d. markup
shocks.
Finally, we want to assess the sensitivity of our result to the fact that we have es-
timated on data, which have been detrended using the hplter. Our nal experiment
therefore re-estimates the model using linear detrended data. We found that our estima-
tion algorithm could not converge when we x the intratemporal elasticity of substitution,
, to 6. We therefore allow the parameter, , to be freely estimated. What do we nd?
Our estimates are remarkably similar to the results in column 3, where we also estimate
 freely but using hp-ltered data. We nd slightly higher domestic goods price sticki-
ness (0:45 vs old value of 0:42) and slightly higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(0:72 versus old value of 0:66). But overall there are no real di¤erences between the two
experiments and we conclude that our results are independent of whether you estimate
on hp-ltered or linear detrended data.
7 Dynamic Properties of the Estimated Model
In this section we evaluate the properties of the estimated model, rst through a select
set of impulse-response functions, and then through a variance decomposition.
7.1 Impulse-Response Functions
Figure 6 illustrates the e¤ect of a positive domestic technology shock on the main variables
of interest. Generally, the e¤ects are fairly similar to those found in the closed-economy
literature: A positive domestic productivity shock - everything else equal - implies higher
domestic output, higher domestic consumption and higher domestic investment. The
e¤ect on all three variables is very persistent and we attribute this to the presence of habit
persistence in consumption as well as our assumption of investment growth adjustment
costs.
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A positive domestic productivity shock also implies a fall in domestic marginal costs
(in other words domestic producers can produce at a cheaper cost). Thus, we would
expect a fall in domestic prices and domestic output price deation. The irf for gdp
ination conrms that this is indeed the case.
In addition, the fall in domestic output prices has an external dimension as follows: We
would expect lower domestic prices to imply a terms of trade deterioration (domestic goods
are relatively cheaper than foreign goods) as well as a real exchange rate depreciation.
The impulse responses for the real exchange rate conrm this intuition. Part of the real
depreciation is achieved through a nominal depreciation and part is achieved through
lower domestic prices.
What is the e¤ect of our technology shock on import price ination? Recall that import
prices are determined in a staggered fashion a la Calvo (1983). Importers are assumed to
buy imports on the world markets which they then turnaround and sell on the domestic
market. The importers face the traditional downward sloping demand schedules where
the demand of imports depends on the price of imports relative to price of domestic
produced goods. The optimal import price will be a¤ected by two factors: A nominal
depreciation implies a higher world market price (measured in domestic currency) for
domestic importers and, hence, tends to imply higher domestic import prices. On the
other hand, lower prices for domestic produced goods would force the importer to lower
import prices as well in order to protect market shares on the domestic market.
Recall that the positive technology shock implies both a decline in the price of do-
mestic output as well as a nominal depreciation. We nd that import prices decline in
response which suggests that the e¤ect of a decline in domestic output prices outweigh
the inationary e¤ect stemming from a nominal depreciation. The net e¤ect of a positive
productivity shock on cpi ination is negative which is not surprising given that we both
have output price deation as well as import price deation.
We note that the technology shock generates very little ination persistence. One
explanation is that our model assumes a very simple labor market with no wage stick-
iness. Hence, a positive technology shock will lead to a rapid adjustment in nominal
wages which implies very little inertia in marginal cost and thus in output price ination.
In other words, with nominal wage contracts persistent technology shocks would imply
persistent deviations in marginal costs which would generate more persistence in output
price ination. Given the apparent lack of ination persistence in UK data during our
sample period, we would not attach too much weight to this issue.
We now consider the e¤ects of a positive white-noise shock to domestic interest rates
as illustrated in Figure 7.
We note the following: Domestic interest rates rise on impact because of the increase
in the i.i.d. monetary policy shock. We can interpret the shock as a negative domestic
demand shock which would have the traditional implication. First, higher interest rates
lead to a fall in domestic consumption, since higher interest rates encourage higher savings
today and less consumption. Lower demand also implies lower investment and hence lower
output. Because of our investment adjustment cost assumption, the monetary policy
shock implies a hump-shaped response on investment, as discussed in Christiano et al.
(2001).
The real exchange rate is appreciating and the terms of trade is improving (the terms-
of-trade irf is not shown here). There are two reasons: First, higher domestic interest
rates translates into a nominal appreciation of the domestic currency and hence a real
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appreciation when prices are sticky. Second, lower domestic output requires a rise in the
price of domestic output relative to foreign output. Hence, a terms of trade improvement
is required.
What is the net e¤ect on domestic cpi ination? Lower domestic output has a dea-
tionary e¤ect. The nominal appreciation also implies import price deation as seen on
the irf. Combining the two e¤ects, we observe cpi deation.
Finally, we consider the e¤ects of a positive one-period shock to foreign interest rates,
cf. Figure 8. The main international transmission mechanism of foreign shock is through
the real exchange rate. Higher foreign interest rates implies via the uip condition 
a nominal and real depreciation of the domestic currency, which in turn implies higher
domestic import prices.
However, the nominal depreciation also implies a domestic competitiveness gain which
would increase demand for domestic exports. The rise in domestic exports requires that
domestic output is redirected overseas and hence would necessitate a fall in the domes-
tic demand components consumption and investment. The irfs conrm that domestic
consumption and investment both fall but gdp rises. What is the net e¤ect on cpi ina-
tion and domestic interest rates? The rise in gdp would imply higher domestic output
ination and hence higher cpi ination. The higher import price ination also lifts cpi
ination. Hence, we would expect the domestic central bank to increase interest rates in
reponse to higher cpi ination. The irfs for domestic interest rates suggest that this is
in fact occurring.
7.2 A Variance Decomposition of the Estimated Model
In the following, we consider which of the structural shocks that matter for the overall
volatility of the estimated model. As documented in Table 4, the unconditional variance of
gdp is explained almost exclusively by the two technological shocks, i.e., by the production
technology (70%) and the investment adjustment technology (26%) processes.
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Figure 1: Prior and posterior (bold) densities. Dashed line is posterior mode.
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Figure 2: Prior and posterior (bold) densities. Dashed line is posterior mode.
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Figure 6: Median response to a technology shock of one standard deviation. Grey area
signies the 90 % hpd interval.
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Figure 7: Median response to a monetary policy shock of one standard deviation. Grey
area signies the 90 % hpd interval.
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Figure 8: Median response to a foreign interest rate shock of one standard deviation.
Grey area signies the 90 % hpd interval.
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Remarkably, neither the two shocks in the monetary policy function nor the three
foreign processes have any impact on gdp whatsoever. The latter result is quite surprising
at rst hand; however, two factors are at play. First, the foreign variables in our data
set are very smooth compared to those observed for the uk; consequently, the estimation
has little foreign volatility to feed into the volatile domestic variables. Secondly, and
more importantly, the estimation has essentially rendered the estimated model one of a
virtually closed economy.
In this sense, the problem reects the well-known exchange-rate disconnect puzzle in
international macroeconomics (discussed, e.g., in the seminal Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000)
contribution); that is, whereas the irbc-based literature predicts a tight link between
relative international prices and quantities, we observe that the real exchange rate ex-
periences large movements with no apparent links to the real economy. In terms of our
model, the tight link between the real exchange rate and the real domestic economy is
apparent once one combines the Euler condition for household consumption growth with
the uip condition, cf. equations (C.1)-(C.2) in Appendix C. Thus, confronted with the
restrictions of the model that ties the domestic economy to the foreign, and with the
very volatile exchange rate in the data, the estimation responds with inating the shock
processes that relax these model restrictions, namely, the import markup shock and the
uip shock.
Given the nature of the problem, this outcome is not specic to either the uk data
or the specic variant of the model analysed in this paper; in a detailed analysis on
Canadian data Justiniano and Preston (2006) document precisely how the two shocks
just mentioned are required in order to introduce the exchange disconnect that enables
a plausible estimation. As they also note, similar e¤ects are at play in the euro area
estimation in Adolfson et al. (2005), as they are in the Danish estimation in Dam and
Linaa (2005).
In our estimation, the markup shock to import ination is the key disconnecting
factor; it explains virtually all movement in the volatile real exchange rate. This led us to
calculate a variance decomposition for the model variant without a markup shock in the
import prices, cf. Table 5. The result is quite clearcut; the uip shock takes over as the
factor that moves the real exchange rate and thus retains the domestic economy insulated
from the rest of the world. This leaves the volatility contributions to the uk aggregates
unchanged from the benchmark model.
Turning to the domestic demand components, investments are - unsurprisingly - driven
predominantly by the technology shocks (87%). In the case of consumption, the tech-
nology shocks contribute with 70% of the overall volatility while government spending
accounts for 20%. Preference shifts, on the other hand, only make up 2% of consumption
volatility, and even less for output and investments; in this estimation, their role seem to
be dominated by the exogenous government spending process. As with gdp, the foreign
variables have no impact on the domestic demand components, while the import markup
shock has some impact (5%) on consumption.
The nominal variables are inuenced by a larger set of shocks. Again, the technology
shocks are important determinants, accounting for 42% of ination and 57% of interest
rate volatility. The preference shock, which played only a minor role for the real aggre-
gates, has a marked impact on the nominal variables (11 and 17% on ination and the
interest rate, respectively), while government spending and the uip shock also contribute
signicantly. Finally, the transitory monetary policy error accounts for almost a quarter
of the ination volatility while its contribution to the interest rate itself is miniscule.
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Lastly, we note that the domestic markup shock plays virtually no role the estimated
model which corresponds to the euro area ndings of Adolfson et al. (2005), but is in
stark contrast to the Dam and Linaa (2005) study on Danish data.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimated a dsge model of the uk economy on quarterly data. We
included a rich set of structural and ad-hoc shocks as well as a (reduced-form) foreign
economy in order to capture the key determinants of the uk business cycle. According to
our estimates, technology shocks were the main determinants of real uctuations in the
uk economy.
Overall, we found plausible estimates of the parameters characterising the domestic
economy. However, our estimation did point towards two areas where the current em-
pirical dsge literature needs to be reconsidered. The rst is specic to the uk economy
and regards the ination dynamics. As we describe above, these were rather poorly ac-
counted for by the model. This reects that the (detrended) time series for uk ination
in our data set are considerably less persistent than their us and euro area counterparts.
As much of the workhorse price model of the recent medium-scale dsge literature has
been constructed in a us context, where the main challenge was to account for the high
persistence of observed ination, it is not well suited as a model for uk ination. Further
research into the causes and determinants of the large idiosyncratic component in uk
ination is clearly called for.
Secondly, our estimation yields no role for the foreign economy amongst the determi-
nants of domestic volatility. This result is common with other recent noem estimations,
including Adolfson et al. (2005), Dam and Linaa (2005), and Justiniano and Preston
(2006). As the latter stress, the result reects that the incarnation of the noem models
that have been estimated so far do not endogenously account for the large swings in the
real exchange rate. This causes the estimation to introduce an exchange-rate disconnect
via the included ad-hoc shocks in the uip and the import price equations.
Consequently, future research into more fruitful ways of linking the dynamic behaviour
of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade to the movements of relative outputs
is necessary. A promising candidate is to introduce a distinction between traded and
nontraded goods. Thus, Benigno and Thoenissen (2004) claim to more or less account
for the observed real exchange-rate volatility when they calibrate such a setup. Likewise,
Corsetti et al. (2004) obtain remarkable results in a calibrated model where non-traded
goods are required for distributing traded goods. It remains to be seen whether such
features can reconnect the real exchange rate in a full estimation of an open-economy
dsge model.
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A Model Derivation
A.1 Lagrangian Function for Household Problem
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P
  b
(1 +R )
  b



 (1 +R )
  C   I

+ t

(1  )K + i (1  S (I=I 1)) I  K+1

;
  ~P ; bt  Bt=Pt; bt  StBt =Pt:
A.2 Household First-Order Conditions:
t = 
c
t (C   hC 1) c ; (A.1)
t =  (1 +Rt)Et [t+1=t+1] ; (A.2)
t = Et
St+1
St

t(1 +R

t )
t+1
t+1
; (A.3)
twt = 
c

l
H
l
t ; (A.4)
t = Et

t+1
t
 
(1  )t+1 + rkt+1

; (A.5)
1 = t
i
t

1  S

It
It 1

  S 0

It
It 1

It
It 1

(A.6)
+Et
"
t+1
t
t+1
i
t+1S
0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2#
:
A.3 Aggregates and Relative Demand Functions
The nal-good aggregate, import and export;
Y D;Dt = (1  )
 
PDt =Pt
 
Yt;
Y Mt = 
 
PMt =Pt
 
Yt;
P 1 t = (1  )
 
PDt
1 
+ 
 
PMt
1 
;
Y Xt =

PDt
StP t
 x
Y t
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A.4 Intermediate Firms
The prot maximization problem is
max
~PDt
Et
1X
=t
(d)
 t D (f) ;
where Dt (f) =

~PDt (f) MCt (f)

Y D (f) MCt:
Since the optimal price is identical across rms, we style the optimal price ~PDt without
the subscript f , so the problem becomes
max
~PDt
1X
=t
(d)
 tEt



~PDt

PD 1
PDt 1
!d
 MC

Y D (f) MC

: (A.7)
Now, consider the demand facing rm f in period   t when the rm last reoptimised
in period t;
Y D (f) =

PD (f)
PD
  d
d 1
Y D =
 
~PDt
PD

PD 1
PDt 1
!d!  dd 1
Y D )
@Y D (f)
@ ~PDt
=   
d
t
dt   1
Y D (f)
~PDt
:
It follows that the foc for the prot maximisation problem (A.7) is
1X
=t
(d)
 tEt
"
~Y
D
 (f)
d   1

PD 1
PDt 1
!d
~PDt   dMC
#
= 0 ()
1X
=t
(d)
 tEt
"
pD Y
D
 (f)
d   1
  
PD 1=P
D
t 1
!d
PD =P
D
t
~pDt   dmc
!#
= 0; (A.8)
where
 = ~Pt; ~p
D
t  ~PDt =PDt ; mct MCt=PDt :
Log-linearisation of the foc (A.8) yields
1X
=t
(d)
 tEt
hb~pDt + !d P^D 1   P^Dt 1  P^D   P^Dt    ^d + cmci = 0)
b~pDt = (1  d) 1X
=t
(d)
 tEt
h
P^D   P^Dt

  !d

P^D 1   P^Dt 1

+
 
^d + cmci ;(A.9)
Equation (2.3) implies
1 = d
  
Dt 1
!d =Dt  11 dt + (1  d)  ~pDt  11 dt :
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Log-linearize this and combine with (A.9) to obtain
^Dt   !d^Dt 1 =
1  d
d
b~pDt
=
1  d
d
(1  d)
1X
=t
(d)
 tEt
h
P^D   P^Dt

  !d

P^D 1   P^Dt 1

+
 
^d + cmci
=
1  d
d

(1  d)
h
!d
 
^Dt
  Et^Dt+1 + ^dt + cmcDt i+ Et^Dt+1   !d^Dt + dEt ^Dt+1   !d^Dt  ;
and thus
^Dt = !d^
D
t 1 + Et^
D
t+1   !d^Dt +
1  d
d
(1  d)
 
^dt + cmct
=
!d
1 + !d
^Dt 1 +

1 + !d
Et^
D
t+1 +
1  d
d
1  d
1 + !d
 
^dt + cmct :
The problem and equations of the importing rms is analogous to the case of the
domestic rms just presented, why we exclude it here.
A.5 Summary of Stochastic Shock Processes
Preference shocks;
^
c
t = %c
c
t 1 + "
c
t ;
^
l
t = %l^
l
t 1 + "
l
t:
Technology shocks;
^
D
t = %d^
D
t 1 + "
d
t ;
^
i
t = %d^
i
t 1 + "
i
t:
Mark-up shocks;
dt = %d
d
t 1 +
 
1  %d

d + "
d
t ;
mt = %d
m
t 1 +
 
1  %d

m + "
m
t :
UIP shock
^t = %^t 1 + "

t :
Policy and expenditure shocks;
gt  Gt=At = %ggt 1 +
 
1  %g

g + "gt ;
t = % t 1 + (1  %)  + "t ;
and an i.i.d. monetary policy error "mt : Thus, the vector of innovations is
"t =

"ct ; "
l
t; "
at
t ; "
d
t ; "
n
t ; "
i
t; "
d
t ; "
m
t ; "
n
t ; "
g
t ; "

t ; "

t ; "
m
t
0
:
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B Deriving the Steady State
First note that import prices in the steady state is given as a markup over marginal cost
pM = mQ
Now use the denition of the aggregate price index:
1 = (1  )  pD1 m +   pM1 m )
1
pD

=
 
(1  ) + 

pM
pD
1 m! 11 m
We can also follow Adolfson et al. (2005) and dene

1
pM
1 m
= (1  )

pD
pM
1 m
+  )

1
pM

=
 
(1  )

pD
pM
1 m
+ 
! 1
1 m
:
These can be rewritten using the fact that pM = mQ;

1
pM

=
 
(1  )

pD
mQ
1 m
+ 
! 1
1 m
=
 
(1  ) (m)m 1

pD
Q
1 m
+ 
! 1
1 m
We can also rewrite the expression for 1=pD using the fact that pM = mQ;
1
pD
=
 
(1  ) + 

pM
pD
1 m! 11 m
=
 
(1  ) + 

mQ
pD
1 m! 11 m
=
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m

Q
pD
1 m! 11 m
:
We assume that domestic output ination and foreign ination grow at the same rate;
D = : Following similar arguments as in Adolfson et al. (2005) it must be that
S = 1 and initial prices are equal at home and abroad. Then we have that pD=Q = 1:
Using this result, we get
1
PD
(1 m)
=
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m

;
1
PM
(1 m)
=
 
(1  ) (m)m 1 + 

:
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Combine the two above equations and get:

PM
PD
(1 m)
=
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
 
(1  ) (m)m 1 + 
 ) reduce to get
PM
PD
(1 m)
=
(m)
1 m  (1  ) (m)m 1 +  
(1  ) (m)m 1 + 
 = (m)1 m
pM
pD

= m
Now, use the denition of the aggregate price index for tradables;
1 = (1  )  pD1 m +   pM1 m )
1
pD

=
 
(1  ) + 

pM
pD
1 m! 11 m
)
pD =
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
  1
1 m
Consider next the marginal cost condition;
1 = Dmc
D
t )
D

pD (1  )1  1w1   rk = 1:
Use the consumer focs
1

= (1  ) + rk )
rk =
1

  (1  ) = 1   (1  )

Combine the equations for rk and pD to solve for wages w:
D

pD (1  )1  1w1   rk = 1
w =
 
(D)
 1
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
  1
1 m  (1  )1 

1   (1  )

 ! 11 
We have the result that trade is balanced in the steady state:
pDyX  QyM = 0 )
pDyX = QyM
yX
yM
=
Q
pD
= 1)
yX = yM = y
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Go back to the bundlers demand functions and consider the following
yD;D
yM
=
1  


pD
pM
 m 1  

(m)
m
yD;D =
1  

(m)
m yM =
1  

(m)
m y
Use the goods market equilibrium:
yD = yD;D + yX =
1  

(m)
m y + y
=

1  

(m)
m + 1

y:
Hence,
yD;D
yD
=

1  

(m)
m + 1
 1
:
Having solved for w and rk, we can calculate the capital labor ratio using the following
equation:
k
H
=

(1  )
w
rk
=

(1  )
 
(D)
 1
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
  1
1 m  (1  )1 

1   (1  )

 1! 11 
= 
1
1 
 
(D)
 1
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
  1
1 m

1   (1  )

 1! 11 
:
Now use the denition of the production function;
yD =

k
H

H   D:
The xed costs in the tradable sector, D, are given as
D = (d   1) yD = (d   1)

k
H

H   D

=
(d   1)
d

k
H

H:
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The production function can therefore be written as
yD =

k
H

H   D = 1
d

k
H

H
= 

1 
 
(D)
 1
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
  1
1 m

1   (1  )

 1! 1 
H:
Recall that we have already solved for yD. Therefore we can solve for H as a function of
exogenous parameters including y;
1  

(m)
m + 1

y = 

1 
 
(D)
 1
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
  1
1 m

1   (1  )

 1! 1 
H )
H =
24   1  (D) 1  (1  ) +  (m)1 m  11 m 1 (1 )  1  1 
  1 

(m)
m + 1

y
35 :
Having solved for H, the rest is trivial. We can solve for k as follows:
k
H
= 
1
1 
 
(D)
 1
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
  1
1 m

1   (1  )

 1! 11 
)
k = 
1
1 
 
(D)
 1
 
(1  ) +  (m)1 m
  1
1 m

1   (1  )

 1! 11 
H
=
24 (D) 1  (1  ) +  (m)1 m  11 m 1 (1 )  1
  1 

(m)
m + 1

y
35 :
Use the following to solve for i;
i
k
=  ) i = 
24 (D) 1  (1  ) +  (m)1 m  11 m 1 (1 )  1
  1 

(m)
m + 1

y
35 :
We can use the following two equations to solve for  and c;
c (1  h) c = ;
w = Hl=:
Finally, we can solve for y using the following equation:
y = c+ g + i:
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C Log-linearised model
Throughout, hats will signify log devations from the stationarised steady state, while
tildes signify structural shocks that have been rescaled for interpretative reasons as in
Smets and Wouters (2003) and Adolfson et al. (2005).
Log-linearising the households rst-order conditions (A.1)-(A.6) and elimination of t
and 
t yields
C^t =
h
1 + h
C^t 1 +
1
1 + h
Et   1  h
(1 + h) c
Et
h
R^t   ^t+1 + ^ct+1   ^
c
t
i
=
h
1 + h
C^t 1 +
1
1 + h
EtC^t+1   1  h
(1 + h) c
Et
h
R^t   ^t+1
i
 

Et
g^

c
t+1   e^ct ;(C.1)
R^t   R^t = EtSt+1   !b^t + t; (C.2)
w^t = ^
l
t + lH^t +
c
   h

C^t   hC^t 1

; (C.3)
^t = Et


1  

^t+1 +
1   (1  )
1
r^kt+1  

R^t   ^t+1

; (C.4)
{^t =
^t + ^
i
t
(1 + )S 00 (1)
+
{^t 1
1 + 
+

1 + 
Et{^t+1
=
^t
(1 + )S 00 (1)
+
{^t 1
1 + 
+

1 + 
Et{^t+1 +
e^

i
t: (C.5)
Capital accumulation
K^t+1 = (1  ) K^t + 

I^t + ^
i
t

= (1  ) K^t + 

I^t + (1 + )S
00 (1)
e^

i
t

: (C.6)
Domestic intermediary sector;
Y^ Dt = d

^
D
t + K^t + (1  ) H^t

; (C.7)
r^kt = w^t + H^t   K^t; (C.8)
^Dt   bt = 1 + !d  Et^Dt+1   %bt+ !d1 + !d  ^Dt 1   bt  !d (1  %)1 + !d bt
+
1  d
d
1  d
1 + !d

^dt + (1  ) w^t + r^kt   p^Dt   ^
D
t

=

1 + !d
 
Et^
D
t+1   %bt+ !d1 + !d  ^Dt 1   bt  !d (1  %)1 + !d bt(C.9)
+
1  d
d
1  d
1 + !d

(1  ) w^t + r^kt   p^Dt   ^
D
t

+ e^dt :
Intermediary volumes and the relative price of imports to be eliminated in the following;
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Y^ D;Dt = Y^t   p^Dt
p^Mt =  
1  

 
pD=pM
1 
p^Dt ;
Y^ Mt = Y^t   p^Mt = Y^t + 
1  

 
pD=pM
1 
p^Dt ;
Y^ Xt = Y^

t   x

p^Dt   Q^t

:
Import prices;
^Mt   bt = 1 + !m  Et^Mt+1   %bt+ !m1 + !m  ^Mt 1   bt
 !m (1  %)
1 + !m
bt + 1  m
m
1  m
1 + !m

^mt + Q^t +
1  

 
pD=pM
1 
p^Dt

=

1 + !m
 
Et^
M
t+1   %bt+ !m1 + !m  ^Mt 1   bt (C.10)
 !m (1  %)
1 + !m
bt + 1  m
m
1  m
1 + !m

Q^t +
1  

 1m p^
D
t

+ f^mt ;
Net foreign assets and the real exchange rate;
b^t = (1 +R
)

b^t 1 + p^
D
t + Y^
X
t   Q^t   Y^ Mt

= (1 +R)

b^t 1 + p^
D
t + Y^

t + ^

t   x

p^Dt   Q^t

  Q^t   Y^t   1  

 
pD=pM
1 
p^Dt

= (1 +R)

b^t 1 + Y^

t + (1  x)

p^Dt   Q^t

  Y^t   1  

 1m p^
D
t

; (C.11)
Q^t = Q^t 1 +S^t + ^

t   ^t: (C.12)
Relative prices;
p^Dt = p^
D
t 1 + ^
D
t   ^t; (C.13)
p^Mt = p^
M
t 1 + ^
M
t   ^t () ^Mt = ^t +p^Mt ()
^Mt = ^t  
1  

 1m
 
p^Dt   p^Dt 1

(C.14)
Market equilibria;
Y^ Dt =
Y D;D
Y D
Y^ D;Dt +
Y X
Y D
Y^ Xt
=
Y D;D
Y D

y^t   p^Dt

+
Y X
Y D
h
Y^ t + ^

t   x

p^Dt   Q^t
i
(C.15)
Y^t =
C
Y
C^t +
G
Y
G^t +
I
Y
I^t =
C
Y
C^t +
I
Y
I^t +
f^
Gt (C.16)
Monetary policy rule;
R^t = rR^t 1 + (1  r)
hbt +   ^t   bt+ yY^t + sS^ti+ mt : (C.17)
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The domestic exogenous processes can be summarized in the following table as follows:
^
c
t = %c^
c
t 1 + "
c
t ; (C.18)
^
l
t = %l^
l
t 1 + "
l
t; (C.19)
^
D
t = %d^
D
t 1 + "
d
t ; (C.20)
^
i
t = %i^
i
t 1 + "
i
t; (C.21)
^dt = %d^
d
t 1 + "
d
t ; (C.22)
^mt = %m^
m
t 1 + "
m
t ; (C.23)
g^t = %gg^t 1 + "
g
t ; (C.24)bt = %bt 1 + "t ; (C.25)
^t = %^t 1 + "

t ; (C.26)
In addition, we also have the exogenous i.i.d interest rate shock mt as well as the three
foreign exogenous variables, which are modelled exogenously as a var;
F0Xt = F (L)Xt + "
x
t ; "
x
t  N (0;x) ; (C.27)
Xt =

y^t ; ^

t ; R^

t
0
:
C.1 Summary of Variables
The system has 17 endogenous variables and 13 (10 domestic and 3 foreign) exogenous
variables. The endogenous variables are:
Y^t; Y^
D
t ; C^t; I^t; K^t; H^t; ^t; ^
D
t ; ^
M
t ; p^
D
t ; r^
k
t ; ^t; w^t; R^t;S^t; Q^t; b^

t ;
and the exogenous variables are:
^
c
t ; ^
l
t; ^
D
t ; ^
i
t; ^
d
t ; ^
m
t ; G^t; bt; ^mt ; ^t; and y^t ; ^t ; R^t :
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Chapter 4
Heterogeneous Price Stickiness in Estimated
Semi-structural Models of the U.S. Economy
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Abstract
We estimate sticky-price models for the U.S. economy in which the degree of
price stickiness is allowed to vary across sectors. We employ a Bayesian approach to
combine time series data on aggregate ination and output with information derived
from microeconomic data on the cross-sectional distribution of the frequency of
price changes in the U.S. economy. Our results show that heterogeneity in price
stickiness is of critical importance for understanding the joint dynamics of ination
and output. Moreover, allowing for enough heterogeneity - in particular for prices
in some sectors to last beyond one year - is crucial to avoid producing estimates
that imply too littleaverage nominal rigidity at the expense of too muchreal
rigidity.
Keywords: heterogeneity, price stickiness, micro data, macro data, Bayesian esti-
mation
JEL classication codes: E1, E3
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect the position
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1 Introduction
The recent empirical literature on price setting that analyzes the datasets underlying
the construction of consumer price indices documents a large amount of heterogeneity in
the frequency of price changes across di¤erent economic sectors. Starting with Bils and
Klenow (2004), who use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the U.S. economy,
shortly thereafter a large number of papers helped establish the fact that such type of
heterogeneity is pervasive in modern industrial economies (e.g. Dhyne et al., 2006, and
references cited therein document similar facts for the Euro area; Gagnon, 2007 details
the evidence for Mexico). Inasmuch as heterogeneity in price stickiness is concerned, this
recent literature corroborates and provides better measures supporting the ndings of
previous work on price setting behavior (e.g. Blinder et al., 1998).
The evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness across sec-
tors stands in sharp contrast with the assumption, common to the vast majority of papers
on sticky prices, that all rms in the economy change prices with the same frequency.
Apart from analytical convenience, the only reason to resort to this assumption and not
take heterogeneity explicitly into account in macroeconomic models would be if it did not
matter qualitatively in aggregate terms, or at least not quantitatively. However, recent
work undermines these arguments. Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004) show that hetero-
geneity in price stickiness a¤ects the nature of optimal monetary policy, and Carvalho
(2006) shows that it has dramatic implications for the dynamic response of economies to
monetary disturbances.1 In particular, the real e¤ects of such shocks tend to be larger
and more persistent than in otherwise identical one-sectoreconomies in which all rms
face the same degree of price stickiness, and moreover the speed of adjustment to the
shock varies during the transition process, as the dynamics are dominated by di¤erent
sectors at di¤erent stages of the process.
The microeconomic evidence on heterogeneity in price stickiness and the theoretical
results about its importance for aggregate dynamics jointly underscore the goal of this
paper. We combine recently available information about the cross-sectional distribution
of the frequency of price changes derived from the microdata with time series of aggregate
ination and output to estimate a series of small semi-structuralmulti-sector models for
the U.S. economy. We derive the structure of the supply side of the models from a multi-
sector economy with Taylor (1979, 1980) staggered price setting, in which the extent
of price rigidity varies across di¤erent sectors. Instead of postulating a fully specied
economy to obtain the remaining equations to be used in the estimation (the demand
side, if you will), we assume exogenous stochastic processes for nominal output and for
an unobservable natural rate of output. Thus the semi-structuralclassication. Given
that our focus is on estimation of parameters that characterize price setting behavior in
the economy in the presence of heterogeneity, our goal in specifying such exogenous time
series processes is to close the model with a set of equations that can provide it with some
exibility relative to a fully structural model. This approach allows us to avoid having to
1The literature that focuses on the implications of this and related forms of heterogeneity continues
to grow. Dixon and Kara (2005) study sectoral heterogeneity in wage setting. Carlstrom et al. (2006a,b)
analyze the e¤ects of heterogeneity on equilibrium determinacy and aggregate dynamics in two-sector
models. Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a) study a multi-sector menu cost model. Sheedy (2007) focuses
on how heterogeneity in price stickiness a¤ects ination persistence. Imbs et al. (2007) study the
aggregation of sectoral Phillips curves, and the biases that can arise from not accounting for heterogeneity.
Carvalho and Schwartzman (2007) show how heterogeneity in price setting behavior a¤ects aggregate
dynamics in a large class of sticky-price and sticky-information models.
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nd a demand side specication that performs well empirically, which typically requires
the introduction of structuralfeatures which are not the focus of our paper.2
We use our sources of data in two complementary ways, making use of a full-information
Bayesian approach. In one direction, we estimate the cross-sectional distribution of price
stickiness using only time series data on aggregate ination and output. We then as-
sess the extent to which the macro data contains information about such cross-sectional
distribution, and how the results compare with the recent microeconomic evidence. In
particular, we compare the results with empirical cross-sectional distributions of the fre-
quency of price changes derived from Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson
(2007b). Alternatively, we incorporate the information from the micro data analyzed by
these papers through our prior on the cross-sectional distribution of the frequency of
price changes, which in turn a¤ects aggregate dynamics, and estimate the model using
aggregate ination and output as observables. The fact that di¤erent cross-sectional dis-
tributions of price stickiness imply di¤erent aggregate dynamics, as highlighted recently
by Carvalho (2006) and Coenen et al. (2007), in principle allows inference about such
distribution based solely on time series of macroeconomic variables. However, we had an-
ticipated, and conrmed with our results, that identication of this distribution is likely
to be weak in this context. Thus the additional value of an approach that makes use of
the micro data.3
Our results strongly support the versions of model with heterogeneity in price sticki-
ness. When we restrict the models by imposing the same degree of price stickiness across
sectors, we obtain results that are signicantly worse from a statistical perspective than
in the general case with heterogeneity, and that moreover are economically nonsensical.
In specications in which the prior distributions imply small di¤erences in price stickiness
across sectors, posterior distributions display more heterogeneity.
Despite very di¤erent empirical methodologies, our results are in line with those ob-
tained by Coenen et al. (2007), who estimate a model with Taylor staggered price setting
and heterogeneous contract lengths of up to four quarters. Our estimation results, how-
ever, suggest that it is important to allow for sectors in which prices last longer than
one year. Neglecting to do so generates too little nominal rigidity relative to the micro-
evidence on the one hand, and on the other hand increases the estimated degree of real
rigidity way beyond what is found when more heterogeneity is allowed for. Thus, Coenen
et al. (2007) nd an incredible amount of real rigidity. Moreover, for our semi-structural
setup, the restriction of at most one year duration price spells comes at signicant costs
for the empirical validity of the model: across all pairwise comparisons between models
with at most one year price contracts, and models in which some prices can last beyond
one year, the lowest posterior odds ratio in favor of the latter models is around 24 : 1.
Allowing prices in some sectors to last one and a half or two years decreases the esti-
mated degree of real rigidity to levels that have been deemed plausible in recent literature
(e.g. Woodford 2003), while still leading to an extent of average nominal rigidity that is
somewhat in line with the recent evidence based on micro-data for the U.S.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the semi-structural model. Section 3
presents our empirical methodology. We detail the aggregate data used in the estimation,
2Several earlier papers combine structural equations with reduced-form, empirical specications for
other parts of the model. Sbordone (2002), Guerrieri (2006) and Coenen et al (2007) are recent examples.
3Another promising approach, which we do not explore in this paper, involves using sectoral data as
well. The natural way to do it is to introduce sectoral shocks and include time-series of sectoral variables
as observables. Lee (2007) takes a promising step in that direction.
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as well as our method for incorporating the information on price setting behavior at the
microeconomic level from recent empirical studies. This section also details our prior
assumptions, and our particular estimation algorithm. We follow with the analysis of our
results in Section 4, and conclude in the last section.
2 The semi-structural model
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms divided into K sectors that
di¤er in the frequency of price changes. Firms are indexed by their sector, k 2 f1; :::; Kg,
and by j 2 [0; 1]. The distribution of rms across sectors is summarized by a vector
(! (1) ; :::; ! (K)) with ! (k) > 0;
PK
k=1 ! (k) = 1, where ! (k) gives the mass of rms
in sector k. Each rm produces a unique variety of a consumption good, and faces a
demand that depends negatively on its relative price.
In any given period, prots of rm j from sector k (henceforth referred to as rm
kj) are given by:
t (k; j) = Pt (k; j)Yt (k; j)  C (Yt (k; j) ; Yt; t) ;
where Pt (k; j) is the price charged by the rm, Yt (k; j) is the quantity that it sells at
the posted price (determined by demand), and C (Yt (k; j) ; Yt; t) is the total cost of
producing such quantity, which may also depend on aggregate output Yt, and is subject
to shocks (t). We assume that the demand faced by the rm depends on its relative price
Pt(k;j)
Pt
, where Pt is the aggregate price level in the economy, and on aggregate output.
Thus, we write rm kjs prot as:
t (k; j) =  (Pt (k; j) ; Pt; Yt; t) ;
and make the usual assumption that  is homogeneous of degree one in the rst two
arguments, and single peaked at a strictly positive level of Pt (k; j) for any level of the
other arguments.4
The aggregate price index combines sectoral price indices, Pt (k)s, according to the
sectoral weights, ! (k)s:
Pt =  

fPt (k) ; ! (k)gk=1;:::;K

;
where   is an aggregator that is homogeneous of degree one in the Pt (k)s. In turn, the
sectoral price indices are obtained by applying a symmetric, homogeneous of degree one
aggregator  to prices charged by all rms in each sector:
Pt (k) = 

fPt (k; j)gj2[0;1]

:
We assume the specication of staggered price setting inspired by Taylor (1979, 1980).
Firms set prices that remain in place for a xed number of periods, referred to as the
contract length.The latter is sector-specic, and we save on notation by assuming that
rms in sector k set k-period contracts. Firms meet all demand for their products at
the posted prices. Finally, across all sectors, adjustments are uniformly distributed over
4This is analogous to Assumption 3.1 in Woodford (2003).
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time.
When setting its price Xt (k; j) at time t, given that it sets prices for k periods, rm
kj solves:
maxEt
k 1X
i=0
Qt;t+i
 
Xt (k; j) ; Pt+i; Yt+i; t+i

;
where Qt;t+i is a (possibly stochastic) nominal discount factor. In this context, the rst
order condition for the rms problem can be written as:
Et
k 1X
i=0
Qt;t+i
@
 
Xt (k; j) ; Pt+i; Yt+i; t+i

@Xt (k; j)
= 0: (1)
Note that all rms from sector k that adjust prices at the same time choose a common
price, which we denote Xt (k). Thus, for a rm kj that adjusts at time t and sets Xt (k),
the prices charged from t to t+ k   1 satisfy:
Pt+k 1 (k; j) = Pt+k 2 (k; j) = ::: = Pt (k; j) = Xt (k) :
Given the assumptions on price setting, and uniform staggering of price adjustments,
with an abuse of notation sectoral prices can be expressed as:
Pt (k) = 

fXt i (k)gi=0;:::;k 1

:
We close the model by specifying a stochastic process for the shock t, and by positing
that nominal output Mt  PtYt also evolves in an exogenous fashion. This is a standard
assumption in theoretical work on price setting (e.g. Mankiw and Reis 2002, Woodford
2003, chapter 3). It allows one to focus on the implications of the particular model postu-
lated for pricing behavior for the decomposition of changes in nominal output into purely
real and purely nominal e¤ects, without having to specify a full model of the economy.
We make use of this assumption in our empirical implementation because it allows us
to assess the performance of our heterogeneous price setting model in explaining the dy-
namics of output and ination without having to specify the details of the transmission
mechanism.
2.1 A loglinear approximation
We assume that the economy has a deterministic zero ination steady state characterized
by t+i = 0; Yt+i = Y ;Qt;t+i = ; and for all (k; j) ; Xt (k; j) = Pt = P , and loglinearize
(1) around it to obtain:5
xt (k) =
1  
1  kEt
k 1X
i=0
i
 
pt+i + 
 
yt+i   ynt+i

; (2)
where lowercase variables denote log-deviations of the respective uppercase variables from
the steady-state. The parameter  > 0 is the (inverse) Ball and Romer (1990) index of
real rigidities. The new variable Y nt is the level of output that would prevail in a exible
price economy. It is referred to as the natural level of output, and is dened implicitly as
5We write all such expressions as equalities, ignoring higher order terms.
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a function of t by:
@(Xt (k; j) ; Pt; Y
n
t ; t)
@Xt (k; j)

Xt(k;j)=Pt
= 0:
In the loglinear approximation, the natural output level moves pari passu with log (t):
ynt =  log (t).
The denition of nominal output yields:
mt = pt + yt: (3)
Finally, we postulate that the aggregators that dene the overall level of prices Pt and
the sectoral price indices give rise to the following loglinear approximations:
pt =
KX
k=1
! (k) pt (k) ; (4)
pt (k) =
Z 1
0
pt (k; j) dj (5)
=
1
k
k 1X
j=0
xt j (k) :
Large real rigidities (small ) reduce the sensitivity of prices to aggregate demand
conditions, and thus magnify the non-neutralities generated by nominal price rigidity.
In fully specied models, the extent of real rigidities depends on primitive parameters
such as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the elasticity of substitution between
varieties of the consumption good, the labor supply elasticity. It also depends on whether
the economy features economy-wide or segmented factor markets, whether there is an
explicit input-output structure etc.6
In the context of our model, the index itself can be regarded as a primitive parameter.
We refer to economies with  < 1 as ones displaying strategic complementarities in price
setting. To clarify the meaning of this expression, replace (3) in (2) to obtain:
xt (k) =
1  
1  kEt
k 1X
i=0
i
 

 
mt+i   ynt+i

+ (1  ) pt+i

:
That is, new prices are set as a discounted weighted average of current and expected
future driving variables
 
mt+i   ynt+i

and prices pt+i.  < 1 implies that rms choose to
set higher prices if the overall level of current and expected future prices is higher, ceteris
paribus. On the other hand,  > 1 means that prices are strategic substitutes, in that
under those same circumstances, adjusting rms choose relatively lower prices.
2.2 Nominal output mt and natural output level ynt
We postulate an AR(p1) process for nominal output, mt:
mt = 0 + 1mt 1 + :::+ p1mt p1 + "
m
t ; (6)
6For a detailed discussion of sources of real rigidities see Woodford (2003, chapter 3).
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and an AR(p2) process for the natural output level, ynt :
ynt = 0 + 1y
n
t 1 + :::+ p2y
n
t p2 + "
n
t ; (7)
where "t = ("mt ; "
n
t ) is iid N (012;
2), with 2 =

2m 0
0 2n

:
2.3 State-space representation
The semi-structural model then consists of equations (2) through (7). We write it in
state-space form in the notation of Sims (2002):
 0Zt =  1Zt 1 + C +	"t + t;
where Zt is a vector collecting all variables and additional dummyvariables created to
account for leads and lags, C is a vector of constants, "t is as dened before, and t is
a vector of one period ahead expectational errors.  0,  1, 	, and  are the appropriate
matrices, which are functions of the primitive parameters of the model, collected for
notational simplicity in a vector:
 =
 
K p1 p2   
2
m 
2
n !(1)    ! (K) 0    p1 0    p2

:
We solve the model with Gensys (Sims, 2002), to obtain:
Zt = C () +G1 ()Zt 1 +B () "t: (8)
3 Empirical Methodology
As already mentioned, the main objective of this paper is an empirical assessment of
the implications of price setting of rms with di¤erent contract lengths for the dynam-
ics of aggregate output and ination. With the challenges involved in bridging the gap
between micro-based information on individual prices and the National Account time
series on U.S. real GDP (output) and GDP ination (ination), the choice of em-
pirical methodology is of critical importance. We employ a Bayesian approach as this
allows us to integrate the microeconomic information in the BLS price data with the
macroeconomic time series.7
The Bayesian principle can be shortly stated as:
f (jZ) = f (Zj) f () =f (Z)
/ L (jZ) f () ;
where f denotes density functions and Z is the vector of observed time series, L (jZ) is
the likelihood function and f () is the joint prior density, while  is the vector of primitive
parameters dened above. The likelihood function is constructed through application of
the Kalman lter to the solved log-linear model (8), given that our state vector Zt includes
7The fact that we consider the fundamental axioms and assumptions of Bayesian econometrics better
suited to the empirical analysis of aggregate time series than frequentist econometrics is, obviously,
comforting. We refer the reader to Lancaster (2004) for a discussion of Bayesian versus frequentist
econometrics.
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many unobserved variables, such as the natural output level and sectoral prices. Letting
H denote the matrix that singles out the observed subspace Zt of the state vector Zt
(i.e., Zt = HZt), our distributional assumptions can be summarized as:
8
ZtjZt 1  N
 
C () +G1 ()Zt 1; B () B ()
0)
Zt j fZ gt 1=1  N (M () ; V ()) ; (9)
where M ()  HC () +HG1 () Z^tjt 1; V ()  HB () ^tjt 1B ()0H 0:
We use our sources of data in two complementary ways. In one direction, we estimate
the cross-sectional distribution of price stickiness using only time series data on aggregate
ination and output. Theoretically, this estimation should be possible due to the marked
impact of the cross-sectional distribution on aggregated dynamics as analyzed in Carvalho
(2006). We then assess the extent to which the macro data in fact contains information
about such cross-sectional distribution, and how the results compare with the recent
microeconomic evidence.
Alternatively, we incorporate the information from the micro data analyzed in Bils
and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b) through our prior on the cross-
sectional distribution of the frequency of price changes, which in turn a¤ects aggregate
dynamics, and estimate the model using aggregate ination and output as observables.
The use of the microeconomic ndings from these papers are discussed in Section 3.2
below. While one could have opted to integrate the results of the two papers into one set
of priors, we have chosen to utilize them in separate estimations. With this approach,
we can investigate how the prole of the cross-sectional distribution a¤ects the estimated
aggregate dynamics and thus gain information on which of the two distributions seems
more in line with the observed behavior of aggregate output and ination, and whether
they improve on the estimation obtained without using microeconomic evidence in the
priors.
When estimating the model, whether using priors based on the micro data or not, we
estimate several specications of the model for di¤erent values of K, treating it as xed
in each estimation. We chose this approach over the alternative of specifying a prior over
this parameter as well and estimating its distribution due to computational constraints.
In the next subsection we provide details on the macroeconomic time series that
constitute the observables in our Bayesian estimation. We then explain how we use the
statistics reported by Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b) to
construct empirical cross-sectional distributions of price stickiness. This is followed by
a specication of our prior assumptions, with particular emphasis on how we use the
cross-sectional information from the micro-data analyzed by these two papers. Finally,
we detail the algorithm that we use to simulate the joint posterior distribution of the
parameters.
3.1 Macroeconomic time series
The model laid out is tested against the development of quarterly output and ination.
Whereas the assumptions underlying the model include one of an unchanged economic
environment, the U.S. economy has undergone profound changes in the recent decades,
8Here, we use the notation of Hamilton (1994, ch. 13). Hence, e.g., Z^tjt 1 is the estimate of the
endogenous vector given the sequence from period 1 to t   1 of the observed variables Zt = HZt. We
refer the reader to Hamilton (1994, ch. 13) for a thorough introduction to the Kalman lter.
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including phenomena such as the so-called “Great Moderation” and the Volcker Disinfla-
tion. As a consequence, we do not attempt to confront the model with the full sample
of post-war output and inflation. More specifically, we exclude entirely the economically
volatile period prior to 1960. We use the period from 1960 to 1982 only as a pre-sample,
and thus we also exclude the monetary regimes up to and including the Federal Reserve
money-supply targeting policy of 1979-1982 from the developments assessed by the like-
lihood criterion. That is, ultimately we evaluate the model according to its ability to
match business cycle developments in output and inflation under the Fed Funds target
regime post 1982.
We make use of the pre-sample 1960-1982 by initializing the Kalman filter in the
estimation stage with the estimate of Zt obtained from running a Kalman filter in the
pre-sample, and a covariance matrix that is a scaled-up version of the covariance matrix
obtained at the end of the pre-sample. In running the Kalman filter for this period, we fix
the parameter values as follows. We set β = 0.99, and ζ = 1. We fix p1 = p2 = 2, and set
the parameters ρ0,...,ρ2 to the point estimates of an AR(2) estimated on nominal output,
and δ0,...,δ2 to the point estimates of an AR(2) estimated on actual output. Finally, the
sectoral masses are set at 1/K.
Although in principle our empirical specifications can account for trends in the data,
they are not suitable to handling changes in trends, which might have occurred despite
our choice of sample period. Thus, we remove the trend component in both aggregates
in a preliminary step, applying a low-pass filter of the Baxter-King (1999) variant that
eliminates fluctuations in the time series with periodicities in excess of eight years. The
filter eliminates 12 quarters of data in each end of the sample that we do not seek to
replace. Hence, our eﬀective estimation sample is 1983-2003. The time series are depicted
in Figures 1 and 2.
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
10.0
9.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5
7.0
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
log., 2000-$ %
Pre-sample
Lost to
filtering
Estimation sample
Output
Do., low-freq. component
Do., high-freq. component, right scale
Figure 1: Output
126
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
% %
Pre-sample Lost to
filtering
Estimation sample
Inflation
Do., low-freq. component
Do., high-freq. component
Figure 2: Inflation
3.2 Empirical cross-sectional distributions of price stickiness
We extract our information about the cross-sectional distribution of price stickiness from
two recent papers that analyze the frequency of price changes in the U.S. economy using
quite disaggregated datasets from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which underlie the
construction of the Consumer Price Index. The first study is Bils and Klenow (2004,
henceforth BK), who pioneered the use of such data to analyze the frequency of price
changes and other aspects of price setting. The other is Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b,
henceforth NS).
The main diﬀerence between these two papers is that BK analyze the BLS data at an
intermediate level of disaggregation,9 whereas NS use the data at its most disaggregated
level.10 Moreover, NS provide statistics with diﬀerent treatments of sales price obser-
vations and product substitutions. When they apply treatments for these events that
make their sample close to being a more disaggregated version of the data analyzed by
BK, the two papers produce very similar results on the cross-sectional distribution of the
frequency of price changes. In contrast, when NS use the observations on what they refer
to as regular price changes, they find more nominal price rigidity and more dispersion in
the frequency of price changes across diﬀerent goods.11
We work with the statistics on the frequency of price changes for the 350 categories
of goods and services (“entry level items”) analyzed by BK, and with the 272 entry level
items covered by NS (using the statistics for regular prices). Our goal is to map those
statistics into an empirical distribution of sectoral masses over diﬀerent contract lengths.
We work at a quarterly frequency, and consider economies with at most 8 quarters of
price stickiness. Thus, we consider contract lengths which are multiples of one quarter,
9They used data on so called “entry level items,” from the Commodities and Services Substitution
Rate Tables for the period 1995-1997.
10Their data comes from the CPI Research Database, and covers the period 1988-2005.
11We refer the reader to the two papers for a detailed description of their methodologies.
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and for each of the BK and NS data, we aggregate the goods and services categories
so that the ones which have an average duration of price spells between zero and one
quarter (inclusive) are assigned to the rst sector (i.e., the one quarter contract length
sector); the ones with an expected duration of price spells between one (exclusive) and
two quarters (inclusive) are assigned to the second sector, and so on. The sectoral weights
are aggregated accordingly by adding up the corresponding CPI expenditure weights. We
proceed in this fashion until the sector with contract lengths of 7 quarters. Finally, we
aggregate all the remaining categories, which have mean durations of price rigidity of 8
quarters and beyond, into a sector with 2-year contracts. This gives rise to the empirical
cross-sectional distributions of price stickiness that we use in our estimation. We denote
the sectoral weight for sector k obtained from this procedure by b!k. For each of the BK
and NS distributions, we also compute the average contract length, bk = PKk=1 b!kk;and
the standard deviation of contract lengths, bk=rPKk=1 b!k k   bk2.
Table 1: Cross-sectional distributions of price stickiness
Parameter BK NSb!1 0.40 0.27b!2 0.24 0.07b!3 0.12 0.10b!4 0.12 0.11b!5 0.04 0.06b!6 0.03 0.13b!7 0.03 0.06b!8 0.03 0.20bk() 2.54 4.23b()k 1.86 2.66
(*) In quarters.
Pb!k might di¤er from unity due to rounding.
3.3 Assumptions on the prior distributions
The model parameters to be estimated essentially fall in four categories that are dealt
with in turn. The rst set comprises the s and s, parameterizing the exogenous
AR processes for nominal and natural output, respectively. These are assigned loose
Gaussian priors with mean zero. We choose to x the lag length at 2 for both processes,
i.e. p1 = p2 = 2. The choice of lag lengths was based on LR tests and the Schwarz and
Akaike information criteria from univariate estimations (for this purpose, we use actual
output in volumes as a proxy for the unobserved natural output process).12 The second set
of parameters consists of the standard deviations of the exogenous processes for nominal
output (m) and natural output (n); again, these are strictly positive parameters, and
we assign them loose gamma priors with modes of 0:1, in part based on simple univariate
estimations of the pre-sample time series.
12In principle we could have specied priors over p1; p2 and estimated their posterior distribution as
well. However, the computational challenge of the set of model congurations analyzed in this paper
is already tremendous given our implementation of the estimation algorithm. Therefore, we restrict
ourselves to this specication.
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The third block of parameters includes only the output gap elasticity of price setting
, which should be non-negative. This is captured with a loose gamma prior distribution
with mode at unity; hence, any signicant degree of strategic complementarity or sub-
stitutability in the price setting should be a feature of the estimation rather than of our
prior assumptions.
The fourth and nal set of parameters are the sectoral masses ! = (! (1) ; :::! (K)).
The combined restrictions of non-negativity and summation to unity of the !s are cap-
tured through a Dirichlet distribution, which is a multivariate generalization of the beta
distribution. Notationally, !  D () with density function:
f! (!j) = Dirichlet (!j) /
KY
k=1
! (k)k 1 ; 8k > 0; 8! (k)  0;
KX
k=1
! (k) = 1:
The Dirichlet distribution is well known in Bayesian econometrics as the conjugate prior
for the multinomial distribution, and the hyperparameters 1; :::k are most easily under-
stood in this context, where they can be interpreted as the number of occurrences for each
of the K possible outcomes that the econometrician assigns to the prior information.13
It follows that for a given K; 0 
P
k k captures the overall level of information in
the prior distribution. Thus, we control the tightness of our sectoral mass priors through
0=K, where the normalization by K makes this measure comparable across models with
di¤erent number of sectors.
For a given level of information in the prior distribution of sectoral masses, the infor-
mation about the cross-sectional distribution of price stickiness comes from the relative
sizes of the ks. The latter also determine the marginal distributions for the ! (k)s.
For example, the expected value of ! (k) is simply k=0. We use the empirical cross-
sectional distributions derived from BK and NS described in the previous subsection to
assign values for these hyperparameters. For specications with K = 8, we simply set
k = b!k. For any specication with K < 8, we set k = b!k for all k  K   1, and
K =
P8
j=K b!j. The b!ks being taken from the empirical distribution derived from BK
gives rise to what we refer to as a Bils-Klenow prior, whereas taking the b!ks from the
corresponding distribution based on NS yields a Nakamura-Steinsson prior.
In addition to using the BK and NS priors, we also estimated versions of the model
with symmetric priors, in which all sectors are assigned identical priors, and k = 1=K.
For these symmetric priors, the case 0 = K is noninformative in the sense that equal
prior density is assigned to all ! vectors in the K-dimensional unit simplex. These
noninformative priors allow us to assess the information that the aggregate data contains
about the cross-sectional distribution of price stickiness.
Generally, we shall refer to cases with 0 = K as loose priors. As we anticipated weak
identication of the sectoral masses without use of prior information on the cross-section,
we also use a tighter set of priors. For each conguration of the model (i.e. the number
of sectors K, and whether the prior is BK, NS or symmetric) the tight priors are dened
by setting 0 = 5K. The di¤erence between the loose and the tight priors are illustrated
in Figure 3 for the case of symmetric priors, while the tight priors of the BK and NS
variants are compared for the case of four sectors in Figure 4 (i.e., K = 4 and 0 = 20).
13Gelman et al. (2003) o¤ers a good introduction to the use of Dirichlet distribution as a prior
distribution for the multinomial model.
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3.4 Simulating the posterior distribution
The joint posterior distribution of the model parameters is obtained through application
of a Markov-chain Metropolis algorithm. The algorithm produces a simulation sample
of the parameter set that converges to the joint posterior parameter distribution under
certain conditions.14 The numerous restrictions and sizeable dimension of the parameter
set, especially in relation to our data set consisting of only two aggregate time series, place
high demands on the exact implementation of the algorithm in order to obtain e¢ ciency
and convergence of the Markov-chain within a manageable number of iterations.
Our specic estimation strategy for each conguration of the model is as follows. We
run two numerical optimization routines sequentially in order to determine the starting
point of the Markov chain and gain a rst crude estimate of the covariance matrix for
our Independence Metropolis-Hastings Gaussian jumping distribution.15 Before running
the Markov chains we transform all parameters to have full support on the real line. We
use logarithmic transformation of each of (; m; n) while ! (1) ; :::! (K) are transformed
using a multivariate logistic function, cf. Appendix A. Then we run a so-called adaptive
phase of the Markov chain, with three sub-phases of 40, 80, and 120 thousand iterations,
respectively. At the end of each sub-phase we (potentially) update the estimate of the
posterior mode, and compute a sample covariance matrix based on the latter half of
the draws, to be used in the jumping distribution in the next sub-phase. Finally, in
each sub-phase we rescale the covariance matrix inherited from the previous sub-phase in
order to get a ne-tuned covariance matrix that yields rejection rates as close as possible
to 0.77.16 Next we run a so-called xed phase. We take the estimate of the posterior
mode and sample covariance matrix from the adaptive phase, and run 5 parallel chains
of 300,000 iterations each. Again, before making the draws that will form the sample
we rescale such covariance matrix in order to get rejection rates as close as possible to
0.77. To initialize each chain we draw from a candidate normal distribution centered
on the posterior mode estimate, with covariance matrix given by 9 times the ne-tuned
covariance matrix. We check for convergence for the latter 2/3s of the draws of all 5
chains by calculating the potential scale reduction17 (psr) factors for each parameter
and inspecting the histograms across the parallel chains. Upon convergence, the latter
2/3s of the draws of all 5 chains are combined to form a posterior sample of 1 million
draws.
Having obtained a sample of the posterior distribution, we can also estimate the
marginal density of the data given a model (henceforth md) as:
md = f (ZjMj) =
Z
L (jZ;Mj) f (jMj) d;
where Mj refers to a specic conguration of the model and prior distribution, and
14These conditions are discussed in Gelman et al. (2003, part III).
15The rst optimization routine is csminwel by Chris Sims, while the second is fsminsearch from
Matlabs optimization toolbox.
16This is the optimal rejection rate under some conditions. See Gelman et al. (2003, p. 306).
17For each parameter, the psr factor is the ratio of (square root of) an estimate of the marginal
posterior variance to the average variance within each chain. This factor expresses the potential reduction
in the scaling of the estimated marginal posterior variance relative to the true distribution by increasing
the number of iterations in the Markov-chain algorithm. Hence, as the psr factor approaches unity, it is
a sign of convergence of the Markov-chain for the estimated parameter. See Gelman et al (2003, p. 294
¤) for more information.
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f (jMj) denotes the corresponding joint prior distribution. Specically, we approximate
the log md for each model using Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean. We use
this to evaluate the empirical t of the models relative to one another; the md ratio of
two models constitutes the Bayes factor, and when neither conguration is a priori
considered more likely the posterior odds. It indicates how likely the two models are
relative to one another given the observed data Z.
4 Results
The results of the estimations are presented in Tables 3-8 and in Figures 6-23 in terms
of marginal distributions for the parameters.18 A general trend across the estimations
is that as we allow for sectors with contracts longer than four quarters, these sectors
are assigned signicant mass, and usually more than in the prior.19 By implication, the
posterior estimate of the average contract length, k, is pulled up relative to its prior level,
increasing the average degree of nominal rigidity in the model. Higher estimates of k are
associated with higher estimates of , i.e., a lower degree of strategic complementarity
in price setting. That is, the results push towards a higher degree of nominal rigidity
compensated through lowering the degree of real rigidity. Across di¤erent specications,
as  increases the variance of the innovations to the natural output process, 2n, decreases.
The connection between these key parameters is summarized in Table 2. As prices respond
more to movements in the output gap, the estimation requires less volatility in the latter
to match the observed dynamics of ination and output. The estimated AR process (6)
for nominal output is quite similar across the congurations of the model. This is not
very surprising as both output and ination were included in the observed data set.
Another key common feature across specications with heterogeneous rms is that
the estimation pushes towards an increased degree of heterogeneity as captured by the
standard deviation of contract lengths, k, cf. also Table 2. This is certainly true in the
case of the symmetric and Bils-Klenow priors. The Nakamura-Steinsson priors, on the
other hand, imply a relatively high level of heterogeneity a priori, once we take account
of contracts lasting six quarters or more. In this case, the posterior distribution of k is
little changed relative to the prior.
While the di¤erent priors appear to have a relatively small inuence on the overall
t, allowing for more than four quarters of nominal rigidity seems critical. For all speci-
cations with K = 4, the posterior distribution for k indicates less nominal rigidity and
only slightly more heterogeneity than in the priors. In particular, in all cases the poste-
rior median for k is between 2 and 2.5 quarters, and therefore in line with the estimates
for average nominal price rigidity obtained by Bils and Klenow (2004). However, these
results are at odds with specications with K > 4; which clearly indicate the presence of
both more nominal rigidity and heterogeneity.
These discrepancies between specications withK = 4 andK > 4manifest themselves
along two di¤erent dimensions. First, specications with K = 4 lead to a large degree of
real rigidity that is harder to square with models in which such rigidity can be traced back
18We use a Gaussian kernel density estimation to graph the posterior marginal density for each
parameter. The priors on k and k are based on 100,000 draws from the prior Dirichlet distribution.
19In the discussion of estimation results we refer to the marginal posterior medians when nothing else
is stated. Note that since the marginal distributions of the !s are skewed, the medians will not sum
to one; obviously, the summation restriction still holds for each parameter vector in the simulated joint
posterior distribution.
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to structural features of the economy. For such specications, the posterior median for 
is between 0:03 and 0:04, while for specications withK > 4 the medians for  range from
0:06 to 0:17.20 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the t of specications withK = 4
is clearly worse relative to models withK > 4, as the posterior odds overwhelmingly favor
the latter. Across all pairwise comparisons between models with K = 4 and models with
K > 4, the lowest posterior odds ratio in favor of models with K > 4 is around 24 : 1:
From these results we conclude that the evidence favors specications with more aver-
age nominal rigidity and more heterogeneity in price stickiness than can be accommodated
in a model with K = 4. As a result, estimations with such a specication produce too
muchreal rigidity in an attempt to generate su¢ ciently sluggish dynamics. In specica-
tions with K > 4 real rigidity is traded-o¤against longer average contracts and more
heterogeneity to yield a better t.
Despite the very di¤erent empirical methodology, our results with K = 4 are quite
similar to those obtained by Coenen et al. (2007), who also estimate a model with Taylor
staggered price setting and heterogeneous contract lengths of up to four quarters. They
nd an average contract length that is in line with the evidence in Bils and Klenow (2004),
but at the same time nd an incredible amount of real rigidity. Our ndings suggest that
specications that allow for more heterogeneity can produce signicantly di¤erent results,
in particular in terms of the amount of nominal and real rigidities. Thus, results based
on these specications may be more informative for the purpose of identifying the roles
of such rigidities in generating monetary non-neutrality.
In the comparison between models with K > 4, it seems that the gains from allowing
contracts of seven and eight quarters rather than just up to six quarters are limited.
Looking closer at the di¤erent priors for the sectoral masses, the Nakamura-Steinsson
priors have the best t for K = 6, a result that holds true when we tighten the priors
around the empirical NS cross-sectional distribution. Turning to K = 8, the estimation
based on the NS priors still performs better than the Bils-Klenow priors, yet now the
symmetric priors yield results on par with the NS priors. The reason is clear from the
rst and second moments of the distribution of contract lengths, k and k: while the BK
priors are markedly o¤ the posterior estimates, the symmetric priors happen to produce
values for k and k that accord well with those generated by the tight NS priors.
In some cases the estimation results for individual sectoral masses seem to su¤er from
weak identication. This is particularly the case for some sectoral masses, such as !2 and
!3. It should come as no surprise that the signs of weak identication increase along with
the number of included sectors, K. When we only allow contracts of up to four quarters,
the estimation pushes mass towards the extremes, namely one-quarter and four-quarter
contracts. Note, in particular the NS prior case for K = 4 which a priori assigns a lot
of mass to four-quarter contracts, which is moved to one-quarter contracts. This reects
the move towards increased heterogeneity that has already been discussed. Once we
allow for contracts longer than one year, the mass on four-quarter contracts is markedly
reduced. This result is in part driven by the preference for increased heterogeneity as
it is found uniformly across the di¤erent priors. However, in the case of K = 8 the
estimation moves mass from four-quarter to ve-quarter contracts, even though neither
are near end-points of the contract-length distribution and thus important for the overall
dispersion in contract lengths. This is particularly clear for the BK priors which a priori
assigns some mass to four-quarter contracts while ve-quarter contracts are virtually
20Woodford (2003) argues forcefully that degrees of real rigidity between 0.10 and 0.15 are consistent
with reasonably parameterized models. An index of real rigidity of 0.03 is relatively harder to rationalize.
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negligible, a result that is negated after confrontation with the model and the aggregate
time series. We should stress that our results do not suggest any particularly important
role for ve-quarter contracts. Rather, the estimation results may be seen as conrming
the conclusions from the studies based on BLS micro-data, namely that four-quarter
contracts seem to be of no particular empirical relevance. This contrasts with the view
based on the earlier empirical literature on price setting, that the typical rm in the U.S.
tends to change prices once a year, which was often used to calibrate one sector models
with one-year of price rigidity.
Finally, we also estimated models imposing the strong restriction of homogeneous
rms, with contracts ranging from two to eight quarters. We kept the same prior dis-
tributions for all parameters besides the sectoral masses, and thus each such model with
contracts of length k, say, can be seen as a restriction of the more general heterogeneous
model, with a prior over the distribution of sectoral masses that puts probability one on
!k = 1. The results are presented in Table 9 and in Figures 24-28. All such models pro-
duce a very poor t relative to the models with heterogeneity. As an example, picking the
worst heterogeneous model and the best homogeneous model, the posterior odds in favor
of the heterogeneous model is of the order of 735 : 1. For purely illustrative purposes,
Figure 5 shows the di¤erences in performance in terms of the one-step ahead forecasts for
the best homogeneous model and one of the best heterogeneous models, where in each
case we set the parameter values at the point corresponding to the posterior mode.21
The homogenous models also produce estimates for some parameter values that are
incredible. In particular, they tend to generate large values of  coupled with very large
variances of the natural output process, 2n. In our view, these results arise because of the
attempt of such models with Taylor pricing and homogeneous contract lengths to generate
relatively smooth dynamics. With  = 1, such models generate very unrealistic dynamics,
with impulse response functions that tend to display sharp kinks at the time when all
prices have been reset after the shock hit. Such kinks can be smoothed by moving 
signicantly away from unity, but that has implications for how the economy responds to
di¤erent types of shocks.22 Overall, we conclude that in the context of our semi-structural
specications, homogeneous models produce very poor t, and economically nonsensical
results.
5 Conclusion
Our estimation results suggest that heterogeneity of contract lengths is of critical im-
portance for understanding the joint dynamics of ination and output. In our setup,
when the prior distributions imply a relatively low dispersion of contract lengths, this
is consistently increased in the estimation process. Also, when we restrict the models
by imposing homogeneous contract lengths, results are signicantly worse than in the
general case with heterogeneity in price stickiness.
Furthermore, our estimation results suggest that it is important to allow for prices
in some sectors of the economy to last beyond one year. Neglecting to do so will imply
too little nominal rigidity, and increase the estimated degree of real rigidity way beyond
21This is only illustrative because our measure of t - the marginal density of the data given model
- is not evaluated at any single value of the parameter vector . Instead, it depends on the whole joint
posterior distribution , since  is integrated out.
22Heterogeneous models, on the other hand, naturally tend to display smoother dynamics, and so
preclude the need for such large shifts in .
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Figure 5: Observed time series and one-step ahead forecast, homogenous vs. heteroge-
neous models
what is found when more heterogeneity is allowed for. For our semi-structural setup,
the restriction of at most one-year-duration price contracts comes at signicant costs for
the empirical validity of the model. In turn, allowing for contract lengths of one and
a half or two years decreased the estimated degree of real rigidity to levels that have
been deemed plausible in recent literature (e.g. Woodford 2003), while still leading to
an extent of average nominal rigidity that is somewhat in line with the recent evidence
based on micro-data for the U.S.
The results generally conform with the cross-sectional distribution of price contracts
that we derive from the work of Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b), based on their sta-
tistics on the frequency of regular price changes. However, the empirical t seems on
par with that obtained from symmetric priors when contracts of up to two years are
considered. This suggests that once one has the average contract length and the extent
of heterogeneity in price stickiness right, the specic sectoral masses are not of great
importance.
We nd the results su¢ ciently compelling to warrant further work. In particular, it
would be interesting to evaluate the consequences of allowing for heterogenous pricing
behavior when estimating models of fully structured DSGE economies. The experience
with our semi-structural model suggests that combining micro- and macro-data within a
Bayesian framework can help us integrate our views on price setting at the microeconomic
level, and its implications for aggregate dynamics. In addition, making use of sectoral
data as well, along the lines of Lee (2007), can further enhance our understanding of how
actual monetary economies work.
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Appendix
A Transformation of the sectoral masses
We transform vectors ! = (! (1) ; :::; ! (K)) in the K-dimensional unit simplex into vec-
tors v = (v (1) ; :::; v (K)) in RK using the inverse of a restricted multivariate logistic
transformation. We want to be able to draw vs and then use a transformation that
guarantees that ! = h 1 (v) is in the K-dimensional unit simplex. For that purpose, we
start with:
! (k) =
ev(k)PK
k=1 e
v(k)
; k = 1; :::; K:
The application of exponentials in this way guarantees the non-negativity and sum-
mation to unity constraints. However, without additional restrictions on h 1, the map-
ping is not one-to-one. The reason is that all vectors v along the same ray give rise to
the same !. Therefore, we adopt the restriction v (K) = 0 and in e¤ect draw vectorsev = (v (1) ; :::; v (K   1)) in RK 1. Thus, the transformation becomes e! = eh 1 (ev), withe! = (! (1) ; :::; ! (K   1)) and:
! (k) =
ev(k)
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
; k = 1; :::; K   1
! (K) =
1
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
:
If the density f! (!j) is that of the Dirichlet distribution with (vector) parameter ,
the density of ev is given by:
fev (evj) = jJ jf! ev(1)
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
; :::;
1
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
j
!
;
where jJ j is the determinant of the Jacobian Matrix
h
@eh 1(ev)
@ev
i
ij
given by:
266664
@!(1)
@v(1)
@!(1)
@v(2)
::: @!(1)
@v(K 1)
@!(2)
@v(1)
@!(2)
@v(2)
::: @!(2)
@v(K 1)
...
...
. . .
...
@!(K 1)
@v(1)
@!(K 1)
@v(2)
::: @!(K 1)
@v(K 1)
377775 ;
with:
@! (k)
@v (k)
=
ev(k)

1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)

  ev(k)ev(k)
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
2
=
ev(k)
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
  e
v(k)ev(k)
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
2 :
136
So:
J =  
2664
ev(1)
1+
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
...
ev(K 1)
1+
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
3775
"
ev(1)
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
; :::;
ev(K 1)
1 +
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
#
+
2666664
ev(1)
1+
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
0 ::: 0
0
. . . 0
...
... 0
. . . 0
0 ::: 0 e
v(K 1)
1+
PK 1
k=1 e
v(k)
3777775 :
To recover the v (k)s from ! simply set:
v (k) = ln (! (k))  ln (! (K)) :
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Table 2: Selected Parameter Estimates
K = 4 K = 6 K = 8
Symmetric priors
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:039
(0:020;0:077)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:103
(0:054;0:197)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:168
(0:093;0:305)
k 2:497
(1:664;3:333)
2:389
(1:998;2:775)
3:498
(2:433;4:559)
3:594
(3:129;4:049)
4:502
(3:239;5:763)
4:577
(4:119;5:030)
k 0:981
(0:620;1:317)
1:158
(0:993;1:294)
1:558
(1:094;2:009)
1:756
(1:579;1:925)
2:136
(1:580;2:679)
2:296
(2:101;2:487)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:047
(0:026;0:079)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:037
(0:021;0:064)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:033
(0:019;0:056)
log md  706:128  711:854  713:388
Loose NS priors
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:038
(0:015;0:086)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:130
(0:053;0:289)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:171
(0:069;0:395)
k 3:009
(1:873;3:786)
2:395
(1:757;2:993)
3:796
(2:435;5:043)
4:159
(3:074;4:968)
4:224
(2:790;5:716)
4:816
(3:550;5:936)
k 1:195
(0:629;1:466)
1:348
(1:095;1:479)
1:955
(1:403;2:336)
1:998
(1:607;2:290)
2:501
(1:888;3:021)
2:430
(1:947;2:878)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:035
(0:020;0:065)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:029
(0:016;0:055)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:027
(0:016;0:050)
log md  706:038  712:613  712:648
Tight NS priors
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:051
(0:026;0:099)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:110
(0:056;0:214)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:130
(0:067;0:241)
k 2:952
(2:447;3:390)
2:702
(2:285;3:078)
3:780
(3:153;4:387)
3:893
(3:286;4:459)
4:232
(3:558;4:923)
4:379
(3:715;5:033)
k 1:293
(1:059;1:427)
1:351
(1:218;1:440)
2:070
(1:847;2:243)
2:076
(1:879;2:234)
2:627
(2:362;2:867)
2:622
(2:380;2:842)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:039
(0:022;0:067)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:028
(0:017;0:049)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:025
(0:015;0:043)
log md  706:071  712:442  712:925
Loose BK priors
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:030
(0:011;0:070)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:076
(0:028;0:185)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:082
(0:031;0:199)
k 2:177
(1:391;3:174)
2:133
(1:551;2:737)
2:371
(1:566;3:575)
3:245
(2:218;4:275)
2:454
(1:677;3:681)
3:381
(2:323;4:641)
k 1:075
(0:637;1:397)
1:215
(0:912;1:414)
1:440
(0:867;2:076)
1:887
(1:531;2:213)
1:629
(1:001;2:544)
2:165
(1:624;2:798)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:038
(0:021;0:069)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:030
(0:017;0:055)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:028
(0:016;0:051)
log md  706:612  711:835  712:184
Tight BK priors
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:032
(0:016;0:064)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:049
(0:024;0:097)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:053
(0:027;0:100)
k 2:211
(1:802;2:671)
2:191
(1:827;2:583)
2:428
(1:995;2:955)
2:635
(2:159;3:188)
2:520
(2:098;3:046)
2:728
(2:259;3:305)
k 1:184
(0:987;1:332)
1:212
(1:042;1:339)
1:584
(1:274;1:897)
1:756
(1:460;2:015)
1:804
(1:431;2:242)
2:002
(1:620;2:410)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:040
(0:023;0:069)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:031
(0:018;0:054)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:029
(0:017;0:049)
log md  707:157  710:401  710:349
Note: For each conguration, the prior (left) and posterior (right) median is reported with the 10th
and 90th percentile in parentheses. The logarithm of the Marginal Posterior (log md) is approximated
with Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean.
140
Table 3: Parameter Estimates, symmetric loose priors
K = 4 K = 6 K = 8
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:039
(0:020;0:077)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:103
(0:054;0:197)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:168
(0:093;0:305)
!1 0:206
(0:017;0:632)
0:312
(0:167;0:487)
0:129
(0:010;0:451)
0:172
(0:090;0:281)
0:094
(0:007;0:348)
0:125
(0:070;0:198)
!2 0:206
(0:017;0:632)
0:229
(0:101;0:396)
0:129
(0:010;0:451)
0:157
(0:078;0:265)
0:094
(0:007;0:348)
0:121
(0:066;0:195)
!3 0:206
(0:017;0:632)
0:178
(0:071;0:330)
0:129
(0:010;0:451)
0:129
(0:064;0:220)
0:094
(0:007;0:348)
0:104
(0:056;0:168)
!4 0:206
(0:017;0:632)
0:254
(0:125;0:412)
0:129
(0:010;0:451)
0:130
(0:063;0:224)
0:094
(0:007;0:348)
0:105
(0:056;0:171)
!5   0:129
(0:010;0:451)
0:198
(0:101;0:321)
0:094
(0:007;0:348)
0:137
(0:075;0:218)
!6   0:129
(0:010;0:451)
0:184
(0:091;0:305)
0:094
(0:007;0:348)
0:127
(0:068;0:206)
!7     0:094
(0:007;0:348)
0:126
(0:068;0:204)
!8     0:094
(0:007;0:348)
0:128
(0:070;0:206)
k 2:497
(1:664;3:333)
2:389
(1:998;2:775)
3:498
(2:433;4:559)
3:594
(3:129;4:049)
4:502
(3:239;5:763)
4:577
(4:119;5:030)
k 0:981
(0:620;1:317)
1:158
(0:993;1:294)
1:558
(1:094;2:009)
1:756
(1:579;1:925)
2:136
(1:580;2:679)
2:296
(2:101;2:487)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:002;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:002)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:150
(0:990;1:306)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:151
(0:988;1:308)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:150
(0:988;1:309)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:368
( 0:518; 0:214)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:356
( 0:506; 0:202)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:346
( 0:496; 0:193)
m 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:004)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:199
( 0:036;0:420)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:250
(0:015;0:480)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:274
(0:052;0:493)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:029
( 0:111;0:175)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:085
( 0:074;0:251)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:107
( 0:053;0:267)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:047
(0:026;0:079)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:037
(0:021;0:064)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:033
(0:019;0:056)
log md  706:128  711:854  713:388
Note: For each conguration, the prior (left) and posterior (right) median is reported with the 10th and
90th percentile in parentheses. The logarithm of the Marginal Posterior (log md) is approximated with
Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates, symmetric tight priors
K = 4 K = 6 K = 8
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:043
(0:025;0:076)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:098
(0:057;0:174)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:163
(0:095;0:281)
!1 0:242
(0:110;0:419)
0:264
(0:191;0:347)
0:159
(0:070;0:288)
0:169
(0:127;0:216)
0:119
(0:052;0:220)
0:125
(0:097;0:157)
!2 0:242
(0:110;0:419)
0:245
(0:174;0:326)
0:159
(0:070;0:288)
0:164
(0:123;0:212)
0:119
(0:052;0:220)
0:124
(0:096;0:156)
!3 0:242
(0:110;0:419)
0:232
(0:163;0:311)
0:159
(0:070;0:288)
0:158
(0:117;0:204)
0:119
(0:052;0:220)
0:120
(0:093;0:152)
!4 0:242
(0:110;0:419)
0:251
(0:181;0:332)
0:159
(0:070;0:288)
0:158
(0:118;0:205)
0:119
(0:052;0:220)
0:121
(0:093;0:152)
!5   0:159
(0:070;0:288)
0:174
(0:130;0:224)
0:119
(0:052;0:220)
0:127
(0:099;0:161)
!6   0:159
(0:070;0:288)
0:171
(0:128;0:221)
0:119
(0:052;0:220)
0:125
(0:097;0:158)
!7     0:119
(0:052;0:220)
0:125
(0:097;0:158)
!8     0:119
(0:052;0:220)
0:126
(0:097;0:158)
k 2:499
(2:099;2:901)
2:474
(2:277;2:672)
3:498
(2:997;4:003)
3:520
(3:312;3:729)
4:499
(3:911;5:091)
4:515
(4:305;4:726)
k 1:090
(0:917;1:242)
1:129
(1:048;1:204)
1:678
(1:456;1:889)
1:721
(1:634;1:806)
2:258
(2:000;2:513)
2:294
(2:203;2:383)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:002)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:151
(0:990;1:308)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:151
(0:989;1:309)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:148
(0:986;1:307)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:370
( 0:520; 0:216)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:358
( 0:507; 0:204)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:345
( 0:496; 0:192)
m 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:004)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:177
( 0:002;0:361)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:240
(0:056;0:429)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:273
(0:090;0:462)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:019
( 0:100;0:145)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:076
( 0:063;0:223)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:100
( 0:043;0:246)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:050
(0:029;0:082)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:038
(0:022;0:065)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:033
(0:020;0:056)
log md  706:204  711:667  713:329
Note: For each conguration, the prior (left) and posterior (right) median is reported with the 10th and
90th percentile in parentheses. The logarithm of the Marginal Posterior (log md) is approximated with
Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean.
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates, Nakamura-Steinssson loose priors
K = 4 K = 6 K = 8
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:038
(0:015;0:086)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:130
(0:053;0:289)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:171
(0:069;0:395)
!1 0:233
(0:023;0:659)
0:443
(0:215;0:695)
0:247
(0:046;0:591)
0:211
(0:069;0:443)
0:254
(0:066;0:548)
0:178
(0:061;0:389)
!2 0:018
(0:000;0:323)
0:059
(0:000;0:359)
0:031
(0:000;0:278)
0:048
(0:000;0:279)
0:039
(0:001;0:250)
0:047
(0:001;0:238)
!3 0:041
(0:000;0:389)
0:028
(0:000;0:209)
0:057
(0:001;0:335)
0:036
(0:001;0:169)
0:066
(0:003;0:302)
0:042
(0:002;0:161)
!4 0:569
(0:178;0:902)
0:386
(0:171;0:618)
0:069
(0:002;0:358)
0:034
(0:001;0:178)
0:079
(0:005;0:323)
0:043
(0:003;0:179)
!5   0:021
(0:000;0:252)
0:113
(0:000;0:423)
0:028
(0:000;0:226)
0:139
(0:002;0:398)
!6   0:375
(0:109;0:713)
0:431
(0:164;0:700)
0:099
(0:008;0:355)
0:134
(0:012;0:394)
!7     0:030
(0:000;0:230)
0:038
(0:000;0:261)
!8     0:172
(0:030;0:454)
0:207
(0:040;0:453)
k 3:009
(1:873;3:786)
2:395
(1:757;2:993)
3:796
(2:435;5:043)
4:159
(3:074;4:968)
4:224
(2:790;5:716)
4:816
(3:550;5:936)
k 1:195
(0:629;1:466)
1:348
(1:095;1:479)
1:955
(1:403;2:336)
1:998
(1:607;2:290)
2:501
(1:888;3:021)
2:430
(1:947;2:878)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:001;0:002)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:002)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:145
(0:985;1:301)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:148
(0:988;1:306)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:150
(0:986;1:308)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:354
( 0:506; 0:201)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:345
( 0:495; 0:191)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:339
( 0:489; 0:186)
m 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:359
(0:028;0:583)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:419
(0:005;0:680)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:435
(0:076;0:694)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:002
( 0:153;0:187)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:038
( 0:154;0:287)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:047
( 0:139;0:287)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:035
(0:020;0:065)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:029
(0:016;0:055)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:027
(0:016;0:050)
log md  706:038  712:613  712:648
Note: For each conguration, the prior (left) and posterior (right) median is reported with the 10th and
90th percentile in parentheses. The logarithm of the Marginal Posterior (log md) is approximated with
Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean.
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates, Nakamura-Steinssson tight priors
K = 4 K = 6 K = 8
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:051
(0:026;0:099)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:110
(0:056;0:214)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:130
(0:067;0:241)
!1 0:266
(0:127;0:446)
0:345
(0:214;0:497)
0:268
(0:151;0:413)
0:254
(0:150;0:385)
0:269
(0:165;0:394)
0:250
(0:158;0:364)
!2 0:057
(0:008;0:181)
0:073
(0:011;0:206)
0:061
(0:014;0:160)
0:066
(0:016;0:164)
0:064
(0:019;0:147)
0:067
(0:020;0:150)
!3 0:085
(0:018;0:223)
0:077
(0:017;0:192)
0:089
(0:028;0:199)
0:079
(0:026;0:166)
0:091
(0:035;0:184)
0:083
(0:033;0:160)
!4 0:560
(0:376;0:733)
0:479
(0:328;0:626)
0:101
(0:034;0:215)
0:087
(0:030;0:181)
0:104
(0:042;0:200)
0:092
(0:038;0:175)
!5   0:050
(0:010;0:143)
0:067
(0:013;0:178)
0:053
(0:014;0:131)
0:069
(0:018;0:163)
!6   0:386
(0:248;0:537)
0:408
(0:272;0:552)
0:123
(0:055;0:225)
0:134
(0:061;0:240)
!7     0:054
(0:014;0:133)
0:057
(0:015;0:139)
!8     0:193
(0:105;0:308)
0:201
(0:111;0:314)
k 2:952
(2:447;3:390)
2:702
(2:285;3:078)
3:780
(3:153;4:387)
3:893
(3:286;4:459)
4:232
(3:558;4:923)
4:379
(3:715;5:033)
k 1:293
(1:059;1:427)
1:351
(1:218;1:440)
2:070
(1:847;2:243)
2:076
(1:879;2:234)
2:627
(2:362;2:867)
2:622
(2:380;2:842)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:002)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:001;0:002)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:001;0:002)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:147
(0:986;1:303)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:146
(0:984;1:306)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:146
(0:982;1:306)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:359
( 0:509; 0:206)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:341
( 0:492; 0:187)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:330
( 0:482; 0:175)
m 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:338
(0:124;0:533)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:421
(0:199;0:632)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:457
(0:243;0:666)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:020
( 0:155;0:130)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:043
( 0:117;0:208)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:055
( 0:109;0:221)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:039
(0:022;0:067)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:028
(0:017;0:049)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:025
(0:015;0:043)
log md  706:071  712:442  712:925
Note: For each conguration, the prior (left) and posterior (right) median is reported with the 10th and
90th percentile in parentheses. The logarithm of the Marginal Posterior (log md) is approximated with
Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean.
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates, Bils-Klenow loose priors
K = 4 K = 6 K = 8
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:030
(0:011;0:070)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:076
(0:028;0:185)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:082
(0:031;0:199)
!1 0:376
(0:072;0:783)
0:457
(0:215;0:725)
0:383
(0:114;0:719)
0:287
(0:105;0:556)
0:386
(0:143;0:679)
0:288
(0:114;0:534)
!2 0:194
(0:014;0:619)
0:193
(0:024;0:454)
0:210
(0:032;0:550)
0:177
(0:034;0:396)
0:217
(0:048;0:508)
0:185
(0:046;0:387)
!3 0:058
(0:000;0:426)
0:030
(0:000;0:209)
0:075
(0:002;0:368)
0:038
(0:001;0:174)
0:085
(0:006;0:333)
0:048
(0:003;0:174)
!4 0:205
(0:017;0:631)
0:259
(0:086;0:492)
0:077
(0:002;0:372)
0:039
(0:001;0:198)
0:087
(0:006;0:336)
0:053
(0:003;0:207)
!5   0:005
(0:000;0:185)
0:154
(0:000;0:490)
0:009
(0:000;0:168)
0:133
(0:000;0:430)
!6   0:054
(0:001;0:329)
0:176
(0:005;0:509)
0:007
(0:000;0:157)
0:021
(0:000;0:300)
!7     0:005
(0:000;0:146)
0:019
(0:000;0:280)
!8     0:006
(0:000;0:153)
0:026
(0:000;0:278)
k 2:177
(1:391;3:174)
2:133
(1:551;2:737)
2:371
(1:566;3:575)
3:245
(2:218;4:275)
2:454
(1:677;3:681)
3:381
(2:323;4:641)
k 1:075
(0:637;1:397)
1:215
(0:912;1:414)
1:440
(0:867;2:076)
1:887
(1:531;2:213)
1:629
(1:001;2:544)
2:165
(1:624;2:798)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:003)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:147
(0:985;1:303)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:146
(0:986;1:306)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:148
(0:987;1:309)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:358
( 0:509; 0:202)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:343
( 0:495; 0:190)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:339
( 0:492; 0:185)
m 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:251
( 0:049;0:511)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:317
( 0:028;0:609)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:328
(0:020;0:608)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:063
( 0:104;0:227)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:115
( 0:094;0:318)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:125
( 0:073;0:316)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:038
(0:021;0:069)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:030
(0:017;0:055)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:028
(0:016;0:051)
log md  706:612  711:835  712:184
Note: For each conguration, the prior (left) and posterior (right) median is reported with the 10th and
90th percentile in parentheses. The logarithm of the Marginal Posterior (log md) is approximated with
Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean.
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates, Bils-Klenow tight priors
K = 4 K = 6 K = 8
 1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:032
(0:016;0:064)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:049
(0:024;0:097)
1:678
(0:355;4:744)
0:053
(0:027;0:100)
!1 0:392
(0:226;0:577)
0:414
(0:265;0:577)
0:393
(0:255;0:544)
0:378
(0:251;0:520)
0:394
(0:273;0:524)
0:381
(0:267;0:504)
!2 0:231
(0:102;0:407)
0:223
(0:105;0:373)
0:234
(0:124;0:375)
0:218
(0:120;0:342)
0:235
(0:138;0:356)
0:223
(0:134;0:333)
!3 0:103
(0:026;0:249)
0:085
(0:022;0:204)
0:107
(0:038;0:223)
0:087
(0:031;0:177)
0:109
(0:046;0:208)
0:091
(0:039;0:171)
!4 0:241
(0:109;0:418)
0:254
(0:136;0:401)
0:109
(0:039;0:226)
0:098
(0:036;0:200)
0:111
(0:047;0:210)
0:104
(0:044;0:193)
!5   0:027
(0:002;0:104)
0:051
(0:005;0:165)
0:029
(0:004;0:095)
0:048
(0:008;0:137)
!6   0:086
(0:026;0:194)
0:126
(0:043;0:251)
0:026
(0:003;0:088)
0:035
(0:004;0:114)
!7     0:022
(0:002;0:083)
0:032
(0:003;0:108)
!8     0:024
(0:003;0:086)
0:036
(0:004;0:114)
k 2:211
(1:802;2:671)
2:191
(1:827;2:583)
2:428
(1:995;2:955)
2:635
(2:159;3:188)
2:520
(2:098;3:046)
2:728
(2:259;3:305)
k 1:184
(0:987;1:332)
1:212
(1:042;1:339)
1:584
(1:274;1:897)
1:756
(1:460;2:015)
1:804
(1:431;2:242)
2:002
(1:620;2:410)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:000
( 0:002;0:002)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:148
(0:987;1:306)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:147
(0:985;1:305)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
1:145
(0:983;1:303)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:360
( 0:511; 0:207)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:344
( 0:495; 0:190)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
 0:337
( 0:488; 0:183)
m 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:005
(0:004;0:005)
0 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:004)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:001
( 0:001;0:003)
1 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:229
(0:017;0:438)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:290
(0:082;0:500)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:307
(0:104;0:510)
2 0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:058
( 0:082;0:199)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:116
( 0:037;0:267)
0:000
( 8:224;8:224)
0:123
( 0:027;0:270)
n 0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:040
(0:023;0:069)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:031
(0:018;0:054)
0:017
(0:004;0:047)
0:029
(0:017;0:049)
log md  707:157  710:401  710:349
Note: For each conguration, the prior (left) and posterior (right) median is reported with the 10th and
90th percentile in parentheses. The logarithm of the Marginal Posterior (log md) is approximated with
Gewekes (1999) modied harmonic mean.
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Figure 6: Symmetric loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 4
148
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Figure 7: Symmetric loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 6
149
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Figure 8: Symmetric loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 8
150
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Figure 9: Nakamura-Steinsson loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 4
151
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Figure 10: Nakamura-Steinsson tight prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 4
152
0 2 4
0
5
10
z
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
w1
0 0.5 1
0
20
40
w2
0 0.5 1
0
20
40
w3
0 0.5 1
0
20
40
w4
0 0.5 1
0
20
40
w5
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
w6
-0.01 0 0.01
0
200
400
r0
0 1 2
0
2
4
r1
-2 0 2
0
2
4
r2
0 0.005 0.01
0
1000
2000
sm
-0.02 0 0.02
0
200
400
d0
-2 0 2
0
2
4
d1
-1 0 1
0
2
4
d2
0 0.1 0.2
0
20
40
sn
0 5 10
0
0.5
1
Avg. k
0 2 4
0
1
2
sk
Figure 11: Nakamura-Steinsson loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 6
153
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Figure 12: Nakamura-Steinsson tight prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 6
154
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Figure 13: Nakamura-Steinsson loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 8
155
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Figure 14: Nakamura-Steinsson tight prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 8
156
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Figure 15: Bils-Klenow loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 4
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Figure 16: Bils-Klenow tight prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 4
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Figure 17: Bils-Klenow loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 6
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Figure 18: Bils-Klenow tight prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 6
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Figure 19: Bils-Klenow loose prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 8
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Figure 20: Bils-Klenow tight prior and posterior (bold) distributions, K = 8
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Figure 21: Prior and (bold) posterior distributions, xed 2-quarter contracts (!2 = 1)
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Figure 22: Prior and (bold) posterior distributions, xed 3-quarter contracts (!3 = 1)
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Figure 23: Prior and (bold) posterior distributions, xed 4-quarter contracts (!4 = 1)
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Figure 24: Prior and (bold) posterior distributions, xed 6-quarter contracts (!6 = 1)
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Figure 25: Prior and (bold) posterior distributions, xed 8-quarter contracts (!8 = 1)
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1 Introduction
This note documents the equations obtained in Dam and Linaa (2005). The model is
basically identical to Kollmann (2001, 2002) with Calvo pricing on both the product
market and on the labour market. Consumption habits are introduced and we focus on
a central bank conducting monetary policy according to an imperfect peg. Additionally,
a variety of exogenous shocks are added.
2 Derivation of the Model
2.1 Final Goods
Final goods Zt are produced using intermediate-good bundles from home, Qdt , and abroad,
Qmt respectively. These intermediary aggregates are combined with a Cobb Douglas
technology;
Zt =

Qdt
d
d 
Qmt
m
m
; d + m = 1: (2.1)
Each bundle of intermediate goods is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of individual intermediate-
goods, qit (s). Here, we follow the assumptions of the cee model and let the net markup
rate t be an i.i.d. process with mean ;
Qit =
Z 1
0
qit (s)
1
1+t ds
1+t
; i = d;m:
Domestic rms face the problem of minimizing the cost of producing Zt units of the nal
good;
Both authors were doctoral students at the University of Copenhagen when this work was conducted.
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min
Qdt ;Q
m
t
P dt Q
d
t + P
m
t Q
m
t (2.2)
s.t.

Qdt
d
d 
Qmt
m
m
= Zt; (2.3)
where individual intermediate-goods prices are pit (s) and appropriate ces price indices
are given as
P it 
Z 1
0
pit (s)
  1
t ds
 t
; i = d;m: (2.4)
The associated Lagrangian is
Lt = P dt Qdt + Pmt Qmt
 t
24Qdt
d
d  
Qft
1  d
!1 d
  Zt
35 ;
where t is the Lagrange multiplier. The rst order condition with respect to Qit gives
P it = t
iZt
Qit
=) Q
i
t
i
= t
Zt
P it
(2.5)
Inserting equation (2.5) in the budget constraint (2.2) yields 
P dt
d
(Pmt )
1 d = t: (2.6)
The appropriate aggregate price index Pt is the cost of producing one unit of the nal
good (Zt = 1). Thus, we use equation (2.5) again to obtain
Qdt
d
d  
QEU;dt
1  d
!1 d
= 1)
Pt  P dt Qdt + Pmt Qmt
= t
 
d + m

= t
=
 
P dt
d
(Pmt )
m (2.7)
Prot-maximizing demands are found by combining (2.5) with (2.7);
Qit = 
it
Zt
P it
= i
PtZt
P it
; i = d;m: (2.8)
2.2 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate-goods producers have access to Cobb-Douglas technology
yt (s) = tKt (s)
 Lt (s)
1  ; 0 <  < 1;
170
and operate in a monopolistic competitive market, where each producer sets the price of
her variety, taking other prices as given and supplying whatever amount is demanded at
the price set. Cost minimization implies the following rst-order conditions
(1   ) yt (s) =Lt (s) =Wt
 yt (s) =Kt (s) = Rt;

) Lt (s)
Kt (s)
=
1   
 
Rt
Wt
;
where Rt is the rental price of capital and Wt is the wage rate. Thus,
Lt (s) =
1   
 
Rt
Wt
Kt (s)) (2.9)
yt (s) = tK (s)
 
t

1   
 
Rt
Wt
Kt (s)
1  
= tKt (s)

1   
 
Rt
Wt
1  
)
Kt (s) =
1
t

1   
 
Rt
Wt
 (1  )
yt (s) ; (2.10)
Lt (s) =
1
t

 
1   
Wt
Rt
  
yt (s) :
Hence, the rms total and marginal costs are
TC (yt (s)) = WtLt +RtKt
=
1
t
"
Wt

 
1   
Wt
Rt
  
+Rt

1   
 
Rt
Wt
 (1  )#
yt (s)
=
1
t
"
W 1  t R
 
t

 
1   
  
+W 1  t R
 
t

 
1   
1  #
yt (s)
=
1
t
W 1  t R
 
t
"
 
1   
  
+

 
1   
1  #
yt (s)
=
1
t
W 1  t R
 
t
"
 
1   
  
1
1   
#
yt (s)
=
1
t
W 1  t R
 
t  
  (1   ) (1  ) yt (s))
MCt =
1
t
W 1  t R
 
t  
  (1   ) (1  ) : (2.11)
Final-good producers have the following demands for individiual varieties of interme-
diaries
qit (s) =

pit (s)
P it
  1+t
t
Qit; i = d;m:
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Firm prots are thus
dx
 
pdt (s) ; p
x
t (s)

=
 
pdt (s) MCt

qdt (s) + (etp
x
t (s) MCt) qxt (s) (2.12)
=
 
pdt (s) MCt
pdt (s)
P dt
  1+t
t
Qdt
+(etp
x
t (s) MCt)

pxt (s)
P xt
  1+t
t
Qxt
with pxt (s) being the price of the individual foreign intermediary and where we assumed
Dixit-Stiglitz demands from foreign nal-goods producers;
qxt (s) =

pxt (s)
P xt
  1+t
t
Qxt ;
Qxt =

P xt
P t
 
Y t ;  > 0: (2.13)
Likewise, foreign exporters generate the following prots in the domestic market;
m (pmt (s)) = (p
m
t (s)  etP t )

pmt (s)
Pmt
  1+t
t
Qmt
Hence, as we have assumed local currency pricing and infrequent reoptimization ac-
cording to Calvo (1983), a domestic rm reoptimizing its domestic price faces the following
problem:
pdt;t = argmax
!
1X
=t
d tEt

t;
dx (!; pxt (s))

;
t;   t (UC;=UC;t) (Pt=P ) (2.14)
where t;t+ appropriately discounts prots at time  > t, and d
 t is the probability
that the current pricing decision is still in e¤ect in period  . Substituting from the prot
expression (2.12) yields
1X
=t
d tEt
24t;  pdt;t  MC
 
pdt;t
P d
!  1+

Qd
35
=
1X
=t
d tEt
h 
pdt;t  MC
  
pdt;t
  1+
 t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qd
i
;
resulting in the following rst-order condition;
1X
=t
d tEt

  1

 
pdt;t
  1+
 +
1 + 

 
pdt;t
  1+2
 MC

t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qd

= 0)
1X
=t
d tEt
24 pdt;t   (1 +  )MC t;
 
pdt;t
P d
!  1+
 Qd
pdt;t
35 = 0: (2.15)
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Analogously, the optimal price for sales to foreign nal-goods producers is determined
from the following condition;
1X
=t
d tEt
" 
ep
x
t;t   (1 +  )MC

t;

pxt;t
P x
  1+
 Qx
pxt;t
#
= 0: (2.16)
Import rms are owned by risk-neutral foreigners who discount future prots at the
foreign nominal interest rate Rt;   1s=t (1 + is) 1 ; Rt;t  1. Thus, when they reop-
timize, they set their prices in order to maximize discounted future prots measured in
foreign units;
pmt;t = argmax
!
1X
=t
d tEt [Rt;m (!) =e ]
=
1X
=t
dEt [Rt;
m (!) =e ]
=
1X
=t
dEt
"
Rt;
 
pmt;t   eP 
 pmt;t
Pm
  1+
t+
Qm =e
#
=
1X
=t
dEt
h
Rt;
 
pmt;t=e   P 
  
pmt;t
  1+
 (Pm )
1+
 Qm
i
;
with rst-order condition
1X
=t
d tEt

  1

pmt;t
  1+
 =e +
1 + 

 
pmt;t
  1+2
 P 

(Pm )
1+
 Qm

= 0)
1X
=t
d tEt
" 
pmt;t (s) =e   (1 +  )P 
 pmt;t
Pm
  1+
 Qm
pmt;t
#
= 0: (2.17)
Considering aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz prices of the intermediate goods (equation (2.4)),
we apply to the law of large numbers and the fact that the fraction d of rms that
reoptimize is completely random to nd that
 
P it
  1
t =
Z 1
0
pit (s)
  1
t ds = d
Z 1
0
 
pit 1 (s)
  1
t ds+ (1  d)  pit;t  1t
= d
 
P it 1
  1
t + (1  d)  pit;t  1t ; i = d;m; x: (2.18)
2.3 Households
A representative household is characterized by the following preferences with external
habit formation in consumption:
E0
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct ; Lt)
#
; U (Ct ; Lt) = [u (C

t )  v (Lt)] ; (2.19)
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with preference shocks bt and 
L
t . We dene
Ct = Ct   h Ct 1 (2.20)
where Ct is the average consumption level; which is considered exogenous to the repre-
sentative household.
Labour enters as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate in the intermediate-goods rm production;
thus, letting lt (s; j) be the amount of labour service j utilized by rm s we nd that rm
s uses the following amount of labour services;
Lt (s) =
Z 1
0
lt (s; j)
1
1+ dj
1+t
; t > 1; (2.21)
and total labour is Lt =
R 1
0
Lt (s) ds.
The representative household can invest in domestic and foreign one-period bonds as
well as in domestic capital. Capital Kt earns rental rate Rt and accumulates as follows;
Kt+1 = Kt (1  ) + It    (Kt+1; Kt) ; 0 <  < 1; (2.22)
where  (Kt+1; Kt) is an adjustment cost. Domestic bonds At earns net interest it, while
the interest ift accruing to foreign bonds Bt held by domestic agents deviates from the
foreign interest level it as follows;
1 + ift

= 
jt (1 + i

t ) ; (2.23)

t = t exp

 etBt+1
Pt

;  =
eP xQx
P
(2.24)
where  is the steady-state value of export in units of the domestic nal good.
The household owns domestic rms and thus earns prot from the intermediate-goods
rms and rental rates (Rt) on the capital in addition to wage income from its variety of
labour services. The budget constraint is thus
At+1 + etBt+1 + Pt (Ct + It) = (2.25)
At (1 + it 1) + etBt

1 + ift 1

+RtKt +
Z 1
0
dxt (s) ds+
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
wt (j) lt (s; j) djds:
Wage setting is staggered a la Calvo (1983). The household takes the average wage rate
Wt =
hR 1
0
wt (j)
  1
1+t dj
i (1+t)
as given when reoptimising the optimal wage wt;t, and
will meet any demand for the given type of labour;
lt (j) =
Z 1
0
l (s; j) ds: (2.26)
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The household thus faces the following problem
max
fCt;At+1;Bt+1;Kt+1wt;tg1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct ; Lt)
#
(2.27)
s.t. (2.20)-(2.26).
Solving (2:25) with respect to Ct yields
Ct =
1
Pt

At (1 + it 1) + eEUt B
EU
t
 
1 + iEUt 1

+ eROWt B
ROW
t
 
1 + iROWt 1

+RtKt   At+1   etBt+1g
 It + 1
Pt
Z 1
0
dxt (s) ds+
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
wt (j) lt (s; j) djds

()
Ct =
1
Pt
h
At (1 + it 1) + etBt

1 + ift 1

+RtKt   At+1   etBt+1
i
  [Kt+1  Kt (1  ) +  (Kt+1; Kt)]
+
1
Pt
Z 1
0
dxt (s) ds+
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
wt (j) lt (s; j) djds

  h Ct 1;
Thus, an interior solution to the households problem (2.27) yields the following rst-
order conditions:
Capital,
tUC;t
 1  1;t+ t+1Et UC;t+1Rt+1Pt+1 + (1  )  2;t+1

= 0()
t+1Et

UC;t+1

Rt+1
Pt+1
+ (1  )  2;t+1

= tUC;t

1 + 1;t
()

Et
h
UC;t+1

Rt+1
Pt+1
+ (1  )  2;t+1
i
UC;t

1 + 1;t
 = 1()
Et
24t;t+1Pt+1Pt

Rt+1
Pt+1
+ (1  )  2;t+1


1 + 1;t

35 = 1: (2.28)
Domestic bonds,
tUC;t

  1
Pt

+ t+1Et

UC;t+1

1 + it
Pt+1

= 0()
(1 + it) Et

UC;t+1
UC;t
Pt
Pt+1

= 1()
(1 + it)Et

t;t+1

= 1: (2.29)
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Foreign bonds,
tUC;t

  et
Pt

+ t+1Et
24UC;t+1
0@et+1

1 + ift

Pt+1
1A35 = 0()
Et
24UC;t+1
0@et+1

1 + ift

Pt+1
1A35 = UC;t et
Pt
()

1 + ift

Et

UC;t+1
UC;t
et+1
et
Pt
Pt+1

= 1()
1 + ift

Et

t;t+1
et+1
et

= 1; (2.30)
where t;t+k is dened in equation (2.14) above.
Since the household meets the demand for labour at its chosen wage level, we nd the
following relations;
l (s; j) =

wt;t
W
  1+t
t 1   
 
R
W
K (s))
dlt (s; j)
dwt (j)
=  1 + t
t
w
  1+2t
t
t;t
1   
 
RtKt (s)W
1
t
t )Z
dlt (s; j)
dwt (j)
ds =  1 + t
t
w
  1+2t
t
t;t t;
and
Z
d (lt (s)wt (j))
dwt (j)
ds =   1
t
w
  1+t
t
t;t t;
where t 
1   
 
Rt
Z
Kt (s) dsW
1
t
t =
1   
 
RtKtW
1
t
t : (2.31)
Thus, we nally obtain the following rst-order condition with respect to the wage rate;
1X
=t
(D) tEt

 UC;
P
1

wt;t
  1+
  + UL;
1 + 

w
  1+2

t;t 

= 0)
1X
=t
(D) t


w
  1+2

t;t Et

UC;
P
wt;t   (1 +  )UL;

= 0: (2.32)
Analogously to equation (2.18), the aggregate wage level is determined as
Wt =
h
D (Wt 1)
  1
t + (1 D) (wt;t) 
1
t
i t
: (2.33)
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2.4 Steady State
In the steady state we have
P d = pd = (1 + )MC =) P
d
P
= (1 + )mc (2.34)
P x = px = (1 + )
MC
e
=) P x = (1 + )mc

P
e

(2.35)
Pm = pm = (1 + ) eP  =) P
m
P
= (1 + )
e
P
; P  = 1 (2.36)
W = w = (1 + )
UL
UC
P =) W
P
= (1 + ) [(1  h)C]C LL (2.37)
From (2:14) we have that in the steady state
 =  (2.38)
that, combined with (2:29) and (2:30), leads to
i = if =
1

  1; (2.39)
and from (2:28) we get


R
P
+ (1  )

= 1()
R
P
=
1

  (1  )
= i+ : (2.40)
Hence, marginal costs can be written as
mc =
MC
P
=

W
P
1  
R
P
 
   (1   ) (1  )
= [(1 + ) [(1  h)C]C LL ]1  (i+ )    (1   ) (1  ) (2.41)
= (1 + )(1  ) [(1  h)C](1  )C L(1  )L (i+ )    (1   ) (1  ) ;
from which we can get the following expression for consumption;
[(1  h)C](1  )C = (1 + ) (1  ) L (1  )L (i+ )    (1   )1  mc()
C =
1
1  h (1 + )
  1
C L
  L
C (i+ )
   
(1  )C  
 
(1  )C (1   ) 1C mc 1(1  )C :(2.42)
Note also the following implication of equation (2.41) which will prove useful below;
(i+ )    (1   )(1  )mc = [(1 + ) [(1  h)C]C LL ]1  :
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Now, we can determine the relative factor prices as follows;
R=P
W=P
=
R
W
=
i+ 
(1 + ) [(1  h)C]C LL
= (1 + ) 1 (i+ ) [(1  h)C] C L L : (2.43)
Since
P =
 
P d
d
(Pm)1 
d
;
we have from equation (2:7) that
1 =

P d
P
d 
Pm
P
1 d
= [(1 + )mc]
d

(1 + )
e
P
1 d
()
(1 + )
e
P
= (1 + )
  d
1 d mc
  d
1 d ()
e
P
= (1 + )
  1
1 d mc
  d
1 d ; (2.44)
and we can now normalize P .
Using this, (2:35) and (2:36) we then have
P x = (1 + )mc

(1 + )
  1
1 d mc
  d
1 d
 1
= (1 + )
2 d
1 d mc
1
1 d ; (2.45)
Pm
P
= (1 + )
  d
1 d mc
  d
1 d : (2.46)
In the steady state the nfa accumulation looks like
P xQx =
Pm
e
Qm;
and foreign demands is expressed, cf. (2:13), as
Qx =

P x
P 
 
Y 
= (P x)  ;
since in the steady state we assume that P  = Y  = 1, implying
P x (P x)  =
Pm
e
Qm ()
Qm = (P x)1 
e
Pm
=
1
1 + 
(P x)1  ;
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where we used that
e
Pm
=
e
P
Pm
P
=
(1 + )
  1
1 d mc
  d
1 d
(1 + )
  d
1 d mc
  d
1 d
=
1
1 + 
:
Now use (2:45) to obtain
Qx = (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d ; (2.47)
Qm =
1
1 + 
(1 + )
(1 )(2 d)
1 d mc
1 
1 d
= (1 + )
(1 )(2 d) 1+d
1 d mc
1 
1 d
= (1 + )
1 (2 d)
1 d mc
1 
1 d (2.48)
= (1 + )
1 
1 d mc
1 
1 d :
From (2:8) we obtain
Qd =
d
1  d

P d
P
 1
Pm
P

Qm:
Now, substitute from (2:34) ; (2:46) and (2:48) and re-arrange to get
Qd =
d
1  d

P d
P
 1
Pm
P

Qm
=
d
1  d [(1 + )mc]
 1

(1 + )
  d
1 d mc
  d
1 d

(1 + )
1 (2 d)
1 d mc
1 
1 d
=
d
1  d (1 + )
1 (2 d)
1 d  1 
d
1 d mc
1 
1 d 
d
1 d 1
=
d
1  d (1 + )
1 (2 d) (1 d) d
1 d mc
1  d (1 d)
1 d
=
d
1  d (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d :
Furthermore,
Qm =
 
1  d PZ
Pm
()
Z =
1
1  d
Pm
P
Qm
=
1
1  d (1 + )
  d
1 d mc
  d
1 d (1 + )
1 (2 d)
1 d mc
1 
1 d
=
1
1  d (1 + )
1 (2 d) d
1 d mc
1  d
1 d (2.49)
=
1
1  d (1 + )
1  2 d
1 d mc
1  
1 d :
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Given the various quantities of intermediaries we can obtain a steady-state expression
for real gdp;
Y = Qd +Qx
=
d
1  d (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d + (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d
= (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d

d
1  d + 1

=
1
1  d (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d : (2.50)
Turning to labour and capital, we have from (2:10) that
K = Y

1   
 
R
W
 (1  )
=
1
1  d (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d

1   
 
i+ 
(1 + ) [(1  h)C]C LL
 (1  )
=
1
1  d (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d

 
1   
(1  )
(i+ ) (1  ) [(1 + ) [(1  h)C]C LL ]1  
=
1
1  d (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d

 
1   
(1  )
(i+ ) (1  ) (i+ )    (1   )(1  )mc
=
 
(1  d) (i+ ) (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
1  
1 d ; (2.51)
where we made use of (2.41). Thus, using (2.9) we can solve for labour as follows;
L =
1   
 
R
W
K
=
1   
 
i+ 
(1 + ) [(1  h)C]C LL
 
(1  d) (i+ ) (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
1  
1 d
=
1   
1  d (i+ )
h
(i+ )
  
1   
 
1  (1   )mc 11  
i 1
(1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
1  
1 d
=
1
(1  d) 
   
1  (i+ )
 
1  (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
1  
1 d 
1
1  
=
1
(1  d) 
   
1  (i+ )
 
1  (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
1  
1 d 
1
1  : (2.52)
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Substituting (2.52) into (2.42) yields
C =
1
1  h (1 + )
  1
C L
  L
C (i+ )
   
(1  )C  
 
(1  )C (1   ) 1C mc 1(1  )C
=
1
1  h (1 + )
  1
C
 
1  d LC  LC  1  +  (1  )C (1   ) 1C (i+ )  LC  1     (1  )C (1 + ) LC 2 d1 d
mc 1(1  )C  
L
C

1  
1 d 
1
1  

=
(1 + )
  1
C
1  h
 
1  d LC   
i+ 
 (1+L)
C
 
1  
(1   ) 1C (1 + )
L
C
2 d
1 d
mc 1(1  )C  
L
C

1  
1 d 
1
1  

;
so dening
C  (1 + )
  1
C
1  h
 
1  d LC   
i+ 
 (1+L)
C
 
1  
(1   ) 1C (1 + )
L
C
2 d
1 d ;
we can write
C = Cmc
1
(1  )C  
L
C

1  
1 d 
1
1  

: (2.53)
Now, combine the goods market equilibrium and the capital accumulation equations
evaulated in the steady state in order to obtain
Z = C + I = C + K )
Zmc
1  
1 d = Cmc
1
(1  )C  
L
C

1  
1 d 
1
1  

+ Kmc
1  
1 d ; (2.54)
where we have dened
Z  1
1  d (1 + )
1  2 d
1 d ; K   
(1  d) (i+ ) (1 + )
  2 d
1 d : (2.55)
Hence, we can now obtain a closed-form solution for the real marginal cost from (2.54); 
Z   Kmc1  1 d = Cmc 1(1  )C   LC 1  1 d  11   ()
mc
1
(1  )C  
L
C

1  
1 d 
1
1  

 

1  
1 d

=
Z   K
C
()
mc =

Z   K
C
h 1
(1  )C  
L
C

1  
1 d 
1
1  

 

1  
1 d
i 1
=

Z   K
C
 1+L
(1  )C  
C+L
C
1 d 
1 d
 1
:
We note that
Z   K
C
= C

1
1  d (1 + )
1  2 d
1 d    
(1  d) (i+ ) (1 + )
  2 d
1 d

= C

(1 + )   
(i+ )

(1 + )
  2 d
1 d
1  d :
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2.5 Various steady-state ratios
Using the results above, we can derive the following steady-state ratios for use in the
log-linearised system below;
Qd
Y
=
d
1 d (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d
1
1 d (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
 
1 d
= d;
Qx
Y
= 1  d;
Z = 1
1 d (1 + )
1  2 d
1 d mc
1  
1 d = Zmc
1  
1 d
K =  
(1 d)(i+) (1 + )
  2 d
1 d mc
1  
1 d = Kmc
1  
1 d
9=;)
K
Z
=
K
Z
=
 
(1  d) (i+ ) (1 + )
  2 d
1 d

1
1  d (1 + )
1  2 d
1 d
 1
=
 
(i+ ) (1 + )
;
I
Z
= 
K
Z
=
 
(i+ ) (1 + )
;
C
Z
= 1   
(i+ ) (1 + )
:
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3 Log-linearised Model
Q^dt = P^t + Z^t   P^ dt ; (3.1)
Q^mt = P^t + Z^t   P^mt ; (3.2)
Q^xt =  P^ xt + P^ t + Y^ t ; (3.3)
P^t = 
dP^ dt +
 
1  d P^mt ; (3.4)
L^t = R^t   W^t + K^t; (3.5)
K^t =  ^t   (1   ) R^t + (1   ) W^t + Y^t; (3.6)dMCt =  ^t + (1   ) W^t +  R^t; (3.7)
^t+1 = U^Ct+1   U^Ct + P^t   P^t+1; (3.8)
P^ dt   dP^ dt 1 = (1  d) (1  d)
hdMCt + ^ti+ dEt P dt+1   dP dt  ; (3.9)
P^ xt   dP^ xt 1 = (1  d) (1  d)
dMCt   e^t + ^t+ dEt hP^ xt+1   dP^ xt i ; (3.10)
P^mt   dP^mt 1 = (1  d) (1  d)

e^t + P^

t + ^t

+ dEt
h
P^mt+1   dP^mt
i
; (3.11)
W^t  DW^t 1 = (1 D) (1 D)

P^t + U^L;t   U^C;t + ^t

+DEt
h
W^t+1  DW^t
i
;
(3.12)
K^t+1 = (1  ) K^t + I^t; (3.13)
B^t+1 = (1 +{) B^t + P^
x
t + Q^
x
t   P^mt + e^t   Q^mt ; B^t 
Bt
P xQx
; (3.14)
U^C;t = ^
b
t  
C
(1  h)C^t +
hC
(1  h)C^t 1; (3.15)
U^L;t = ^
b
t + ^
L
t + LL^t; (3.16)
 (1 + ) K^t+1 = Et^t+1   P^t +  (1  )EtP^t+1 + [1   (1  )]EtR^t+1 + K^t + EtK^t+2;
(3.17)
{^t =  Et^t+1; (3.18)
{^ft =  Et^t+1   Ete^t+1 + e^t; (3.19)
{^ft = {^

t + ^t   B^t+1; (3.20)
e^t = ^t; (3.21)
Y^t = 
dQ^dt +
 
1  d Q^xt ; (3.22)
Z^t =
C
Z
C^t +
I
Z
I^t: (3.23)
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The system has 24 endogenous and 10 exogenous variables. Of the latter we assume
that the markup shocks and the uip shock (t; t; t) are i.i.d. and the remaining seven
are ar(1) processes;
^
b
t = %
b^
b
t 1 + "
b
t ; (3.24)
^
l
t = %
l^
l
t 1 + "
l
t; (3.25)
^t = %
t^t 1 + "tt; (3.26)
^t = %
m^t 1 + "
m
t ; (3.27)
{^t = %
i^t 1 + "
i
t; (3.28)
P^ t = %
P P^ t 1 + "
P
t ; (3.29)
Y^ t = %
Y Y^ t 1 + "
Y
t : (3.30)
3.1 Solving the Log-linearised Model with gensys
We solve the log-linearised system (3.1)-(3.30) with the gensysmethod developed by Sims
(2002). For this purpose we collect the 23 endogenous variables with 6 lagged variables
and 9 exogenous processes (excluding the policy shock t) in the (38 1) vector t;1
t : B^t; C^t; e^t; {^t; {^
f
t ; I^t; K^t; L^t;dMCt; P^t; P^ dt ; P^ xt ; P^mt ; Q^dt ; Q^xt ; Q^mt ; R^t; ^t+1; U^C;t; U^L;t; W^t; Y^t; Z^t;
K^t 1; P^ dt 1; P^
x
t 1; P^
m
t 1; W^t 1;
^
b
t ; ^
l
t; ^t; ^t; ^t; ^t; {^

t ; P^

t ; Y^

t :
The i.i.d. shocks are included in the vector "t 
 
"bt ; "
l
t; "
t
t; ^t; "
m
t ; "
pm
t ; "
wm
t ; "
i
t; "
P
t ; "
Y
t

includes the set of i.i.d. shocks, and the seven expectational errors are included in the
vector t =
 
dt ; 
x
t ; 
m
t ; 
W
t ; 
K
t ; 
A
t ; 
B
t

so that we can write the model in the canonical
var(1) gensys form;
 0t =  1t 1 +	"t +t:
Applying the gensys method recasts the system in the solved form
t = 1t 1 +zZt:
1Hence, we add six identity equations to the system (3.1)-(3.30), corresponding to the six lagged
endogenous variables included in t, and two denitions of the mark-up shocks (^t = "
mp
t ; ^t = "
mw
t ).
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1 Introduction
This note derives the model analysed in Dam and Linaa (2005a) and cast it in the form
Et [t;t+1; "t; "t+1] = 0;
thus fascilitating a second-order approximation according to the methodology laid out in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
The structure of the model is basically identical to the one estimated in Dam and
Linaa (2005b), which again built on the model in Kollmann (2001, 2002) with Calvo
pricing in both the product market and in the labour market. Compared with the Koll-
mann model we have introduced consumption habits, and we focus on a central bank
conducting monetary policy according to an imperfect peg. Additionally, a variety of
exogenous shocks are added in line with those utilised by Christiano et al. (2001) and
Smets and Wouters (2003). The model is fairly rich in variables and parameters which
are summarised in Table 1.
2 The Model
2.1 Final Goods
Domestic nal goods are produced from Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of a continuum of trad-
able intermediate goods. These are produced domestically and abroad;
Qit =
Z 1
0
qi (s)
1
1+ ds
1+
; i = d;m:
Here,  turns out to be the net markup rate.
Both authors were doctoral students at the University of Copenhagen when this work was conducted.
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Zt is the production of nal goods using the Cobb Douglas technology
Zt =

Qdt
d
d 
Qmt
m
m
; d + m = 1:
Assuming domestic rms face the problem of minimizing the cost of producing Zt units
of the nal good, demands for goods produced domestically and abroad can be written
as
Qit = 
i Pt
P it
Zt; i = d;m;
where Pt is the appropriate price index given by
Pt =
 
P dt
d
(Pmt )
m :
Thus, Pt is the marginal cost of the nal-goods producing rm. With perfect compe-
tition in the nal-goods market, the price of one unit is also Pt.
2.2 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced from labour Lt and capital Kt using Cobb-Douglas
technology. Thus, the production function of rm s is
yt (s) = tKt (s)
 Lt (s)
1  ; 0 <  < 1;
where t is the exogenously given aggregate level of technology. Producers operate in
a monopolistic competitive market, where each producer sets the price of her variety,
taking other prices as given and supplying whatever amount is demanded at the price
set.
Cost minimization implies the following rst-order conditions
(1   ) yt (s) =Lt (s) =Wt
 yt (s) =Kt (s) = Rt;

) Lt (s)
Kt (s)
=
1   
 
Rt
Wt
;
where Rt is the rental price of capital and Wt is the wage rate. Therefore we have
Lt (s) =
1   
 
Rt
Wt
Kt (s))
and
Kt (s) =
1
t

1   
 
Rt
Wt
 (1  )
yt (s) :
As a consequence, the rms marginal costs are
MCt =
1
t
W 1  t R
 
t  
  (1   ) (1  ) :
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that the rm only reoptimizes its prices in any
given period with probability 1 d. Producers sell their good variety to both domestic and
foreign nal-goods producers; yt (s) = qdt (s) + q
m
t (s) and are able to price discriminate
between the two markets. As is well-known from the Dixit-Stiglitz models, nal-good
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Table 1: Variables and Parameters
Variables Exogenous Variables
Zt Final goods t Technology level in intermediary sector
Pt Price of Z bt Preference discount rate shock
Qit Intermediate goods 
l
t Labor supply shock
P it Price of Q
i t uip shock
pit; Intermediary price optimized in period  t Exchange-rate policy (peg) shock
P it Price dispersion measure Y t Foreign gdp
Yt gdp
 
Qd +Qx

P t Foreign price level
Rt Rental rate of capital it Foreign interest rate
MCt Marginal cost in intermediary sector
et Exchange rate
t; Discount factor between periods t and 
Rt; Foreign discount factor Parameters (time invariant)
Ct Final consumption  Net price markup (intermediaries)
Lt Aggregate labor supply  Net wage markup
wt; Wage level optimized in period  d Share of Qd in nal output
Wt Aggregate wage level  Capital share in intermediate goods
l t (s; j) Labor of type j supplied to rm s d Calvo parameter, intermedaries
Kt Capital stock  Utility discount factor
It Investment h Habit persistence
At Domestic bonds (0 in eqlm.)  1C Household ies
Bt Foreign bonds in foreign currency  1L Work e¤ort elasticity
it Domestic interest rate  Capital depreciation rate
ift Return on Bt to domestic agents  Capital adjustment cost

t Wedge between it and i
f
t  ss export in units of Z
t Compound variable in wage eqtn.  Debt premium on foreign bonds
UC;t Marginal utility of consumption D Calvo parameter, wages
UL;t Marginal disutility of labor  Export demand elasticity
N it Auxiliary variable (pit;t and wt;t)
Dit Auxiliary variable (pit;t and wt;t)
producers demand individiual varieties of intermediaries as follows
qit (s) =

pit (s)
P it
  1+

Qit; i = d;m:
and thereby rm prots can be written as
dx
 
pdt (s) ; p
x
t (s)

=
 
pdt (s) MCt

qdt (s) + (etp
x
t (s) MCt) qxt (s) (2.1)
From foreign nal-goods producers we assume Dixit-Stiglitz as well;
qxt (s) =

pxt (s)
P xt
  1+

Qxt ; Q
x
t =
P xt
P t
Y t ;
where the foreign aggregates P t ; Y

t are exogenous. Likewise, foreign exporters generate
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the following prots in the domestic market;
m (pmt (s)) = (p
m
t (s)  etP t )

pmt (s)
Pmt
  1+

Qmt :
Hence, a domestic rm reoptimizing its domestic price faces the problem:
pdt;t = argmax
!
1X
=t
d tEt

t;
dx (!; pxt (s))

;
t;   (UC;=UC;t) (Pt=P ) ; (2.2)
where t; discounts prots at time  , and d
 t is the probability that the current pricing
decision is still in e¤ect in period  . Substituting from the prot expression (2.1) yields
1X
=t
d tEt
24t;  pdt;t  MC
 
pdt;t
P d
!  1+

Qd
35
=
1X
=t
d tEt
h 
pdt;t  MC
  
pdt;t
  1+
 t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qd
i
:
The rst-order condition is
1X
=t
d tEt
h 
pdt;t   (1 + )MC

t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qd
i
= 0 ()
pdt;t = (1 + )
P1
=t d
 tEt
h
t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qdt+MC
i
P1
=t d
 tEt
h
t; (P
d
 )
1+
 Qd
i ;
which we can cast as
pdt;t =
N dt
Ddt
;
where N dt 
1X
=t
d tEt
h
t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qd (1 + )MC
i
;
Ddt 
1X
=t
d tEt
h
t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qd
i
:
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Since
N dt =
 
P dt
 1+
 Qdt (1 + )MCt +
1X
=t+1
d tEt
h
t;
 
P d
 1+
 Qd (1 + )MC
i
=
 
P dt
 1+
 Qdt (1 + )MCt
+dEt
"
t;t+1
1X
=t+1
d (t+1)Et+1
h
t+1;
 
P d
 1+
 Qd (1 + )MC
i#
=
 
P dt
 1+
 Qdt (1 + )MCt + dEt

t;t+1N dt+1

;
Ddt =
 
P dt
 1+
 Qdt + dEt

t;t+1Ddt+1

;
and aggregate prices evolve according to
P it =
Z 1
0
pit (s)
  1
 ds
 
=

d
Z 1
0
 
pit 1 (s)
  1
 ds+ (1  d)  pit;t  1  
=
h
d
 
P it 1
  1
 + (1  d)  pit;t  1 i  ; i = d; x;m; (2.3)
we can establish the following system of equations for the price of domestic intermediaries;
N dt =
 
P dt
 1+
 Qdt (1 + )MCt + dEt

t;t+1N dt+1

;
Ddt =
 
P dt
 1+
 Qdt + dEt

t;t+1Ddt+1

;
P dt =
h
d
 
P dt 1
  1
 + (1  d)  N dt =Ddt   1 i  :
Analogously, the optimal price for sales to foreign nal-goods producers is
pxt;t = (1 + )
P1
=t d
 tEt
h
t; (P
x
 )
1+
 QxMC
i
P1
=t d
 tEt
h
t; (P
x
 )
1+
 Qxe
i :
Thus, we obtain the following system of equations for the export price;
N xt = (P xt )
1+
 Qxt (1 + )MCt + dEt

t;t+1N xt+1

;
Dxt = (P xt )
1+
 Qxt et + dEt

t;t+1Dxt+1

;
P xt =
h
d
 
P xt 1
  1
 + (1  d) (N xt =Dxt ) 
1

i 
:
Import rms are owned by risk-neutral foreigners who discount future prots at the
foreign nominal interest rate Rt;   1s=t (1 + is) 1. Thus, they set their prices in order
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to maximize discounted future prots measured in foreign currency;
pmt;t = argmax
!
1X
=t
d tEt [Rt;m (!) =e ]
= (1 + )
P1
=t d
 tEt
h
Rt; (P
m
 )
1+
 Qm eP


i
P1
=0 d
 tEt
h
Rt; (Pm )
1+
 Qm
i ;
which follows from the rst-order condition
1X
=t
dEt
h 
pdt;t   (1 + ) eP 

Rt; (P
m
 )
1+
 Qm
i
= 0:
Hence, we obtain the following pricing equations;
Nmt = (Pmt )
1+
 Qmt (1 + ) etP

t +
1X
=t+1
d tEt
h
Rt; (P
m
 )
1+
 Qm (1 + ) eP


i
= (Pmt )
1+
 Qmt (1 + ) etP

t +
+ dEt
"
Rt;t+1
1X
=t+1
d (t+1)Et+1
h
Rt+1; (P
m
 )
1+
 Qm (1 + ) eP


i#
)
Nmt = (Pmt )
1+
 Qmt (1 + ) etP

t +
d
1 + it
Et
Nmt+1 ;
Dmt = (Pmt )
1+
 Qmt +
d
1 + it
Et
Dmt+1 ;
Pmt =
h
d
 
Pmt 1
  1
 + (1  d) (Nmt =Dmt ) 
1

i 
:
2.3 Households
Like Erceg et al. (2000) we assume a continuum with unity mass of symmetric households
who obtain utility from consumption of the nal good and disutility from labour e¤orts.
Thus, they are all characterized by the following preferences:
E0
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct (j) ; lt (j))
#
; U (Ct ; lt (j)) = 
b
t
"
Ct (j)
1 C
1  C   
L
t
lt (j)
1+L
1 + L
#
; (2.4)
where bt represents a shock to the discount rate and 
L
t represents a shock to the labour
supply, while j 2 [0; 1] signies the household. We assume external habit formation in
consumption; thus, utility is obtained from
Ct (j) = Ct (j)  h Ct 1; (2.5)
where Ct is the aggregate consumption level; which is considered exogenous to each
household. We further assume a security market where households completely diversify
their individual income uncertainty, so that consumption is equalised across households;
Ct (j) = Ct; 8j.
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Each household supplies an idiosyncratic variety of labour service lt (j). These labour
services enter as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate in the intermediate-goods rm production;
thus, letting lt (s; j) be the amount of labour service j utilized by rm s we nd that rm
s uses the following amount of labour services;
Lt (s) =
Z 1
0
lt (s; j)
1
1+ dj
1+
;  > 0; (2.6)
where  turns out to the net wage markup.
As was the case of intermediary prices, wage setting is staggered a la Calvo (1983).
That is, in each period household j only optimizes its wage wt (j) with probability 1 D.
The household takes the average wage rate Wt =
hR 1
0
wt (j)
  1
1+ dj
i (1+)
as given when
it chooses its optimal wage wt;t and will meet any demand for the given type of labour;1
lt (j) =
Z 1
0
lt (s; j) ds =
Z 1
0

wt (j)
Wt
  1+

Lt (s) ds (2.7)
=

wt (j)
Wt
  1+

Lt
In addition to consumption, households can invest in domestic and foreign one-period
bonds as well as in domestic capital. Capital Kt earns rental rate Rt and accumulates as
follows;
Kt+1 = Kt (1  ) + It   
2
(Kt+1  Kt)2
Kt
; 0 <  < 1: (2.8)
Here, we have followed Kollmann (2002) and assumed quadratic adjustment costs. Do-
mestic bonds At earns net interest it, while the interest i
f
t accruing to foreign bonds
Bt held by domestic agents deviates from the exogenously given foreign interest level it
as follows; 
1 + ift

= 
jt (1 + i

t ) ; (2.9)

t = t exp

 etBt+1
Pt

;  =
eP xQx
P
; (2.10)
where  is the steady-state value of export in units of the domestic nal good. Thus, the
interest on foreign bonds is growing in the foreign debt level which ensures the existence
of a unique equilibrium, cf. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), while t is a uip shock.
Households own equal shares of domestic rms and thus earn prot from the intermediate-
goods rms (t (j)) in addition to rental rates Rt on the capital, wage income from their
labour services and payments from their state-contingent securities (St (j)). Hence, the
budget constraint of household j is
At+1 (j) + etBt+1 (j) + Pt (Ct (j) + It (j)) =
At (j) (1 + it 1) + etBt (j)

1 + ift 1

+RtKt (j) + t (j) + wt (j) lt (j) + St (j) : (2.11)
1Note that the optimal wage in any period is identical across households, which is the reason why
wt;t can be written without index j.
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Thus, households face the following problem
max
fCt(j);At+1(j);Bt+1(j);Kt+1(j);wt;tg1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
tU (Ct (j) ; lt (j))
#
(2.12)
s.t. (2.4)-(2.11),
and the rst-order conditions with respect to capital, domestic bonds and foreign bonds
can be written as
Et
2664t;t+1Pt+1Pt

Rt+1
Pt+1
+ (1  )  
2

1 

Kt+2
Kt+1
2
h
1 + Kt+1 Kt
Kt
i
3775 = 1; (2.13)
(1 + it)Et

t;t+1

= 1; (2.14)
1 + ift

Et

t;t+1
et+1
et

= 1; (2.15)
where t;t+k is dened in equation (2.2) above.
Having assumed that the household always meets demand for labour at its chosen
wage level, we nally arrive at the rst-order condition with respect to the wage rate;
1X
=t
(D) tEt
"
 UC;
P
1


wt;t
W
  1+

L + 
b
t
L
t
1 + 


wt;t
W
  1+

(1+L) L1+L
wt;t
#
= 0)
w
1+ 1+

L
t;t
1X
=t
(D) tEt

UC;
P
W
1+

 L

=
1X
=t
(D) tEt

bt
L
t (1 + )W
1+

 L
1+L


)
w
1+ 1+

L
t;t =
P
(D) tEt

bt
L
t (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
 L1+L

P
(D) tEt

UC;
P
W
1+

 L
  NwtDwt ;
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where
Nwt =
1X
=t
(D) tEt

b
L
 (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
 L
1+L


= bt
L
t (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
t L
1+L
t
+
1X
=t+1
(D) tEt

b
L
 (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
 L
1+L


= bt
L
t (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
t L
1+L
t
+DEt
"

1+

(1+L)
t+1
1X
=t+1
(D) (t+1)Et+1

b
L
 (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
 L
1+L

#
= bt
L
t (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
t L
1+L
t +DEt
Nwt+1 ;
Dwt =
1X
=t
(D) tEt

UC;
P
W
1+

 L

=
UC;t
Pt
W
1+

t Lt +DEt
" 1X
=t
(D) (t+1)Et+1

UC;
P
W
1+

 L
#
=
UC;t
Pt
W
1+

t Lt +DEt
Dwt+1 :
Analogously to equation (2.3), the aggregate wage level is determined as
Wt =
h
D (Wt 1)
  1
 + (1 D) (wt;t) 
1

i 
:
Combining these, we obtain a four-equation system for aggregate wages similar to the
pricing equations above;
Nwt = btLt (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
t L
1+L
t +DEt
h
N^wt+1
i
;
Dwt =
UC;t
Pt
W
1+

t Lt +DEt
h
D^wt+1
i
;
wt;t = (Nwt =Dwt )

+(1+)L ;
Wt =

DW
  1

t 1 + (1 D)w
  1

t;t
 
:
2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
All intermediaries are demanded from either domestic or foreign nal goods producers
Yt = Q
d
t +Q
x
d:
In the nal goods market equilibrium requires
Zt = Ct + It; (2.16)
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Turning to the capital market, we consider rst the capital demand of rm s;
Kt (s) =
1
t

1   
 
Rt
Wt
 (1  ) 
qdt (s) + q
x
t (s)

=
1
t

1   
 
Rt
Wt
 (1  ) "
pdt (s)
P dt
  1+

Qdt +

pxt (s)
P xt
  1+

Qxt
#
:
It follows directly that aggregate demand for capital is
Kt =
Z 1
0
Kt (s) ds
=
1
t

 
1   
Wt
Rt
1  Z 1
0
"
pdt (s)
P dt
  1+

Qdt +

pxt (s)
P xt
  1+

Qxt
#
ds
=
1
t

 
1   
Wt
Rt
1  "Pdt
P dt
  1+

Qdt +
Pxt
P xt
  1+

Qxt
#
;
where we introduce
P it 
Z 1
0
 
pit
  1+

  
1+
; i = d; x:
Under the assumptions of the Calvo pricing model, these indices of individual prices
evolve as follows;
P it =
h
d
 P it 1  1+ + (1  d)  pit;t  1+ i  1+ ; i = d; x:
Hence, equilibrium in the capital market (Kt = Kt) implies
Kt =
1
t

 
1   
Wt
Rt
1  "Pdt
P dt
  1+

Qdt +
Pxt
P xt
  1+

Qxt
#
:
Finally, we assume that only domestic agents hold the domestic bond, implying that
At = 0 in equilibrium.
2.5 The Household Budget Constraint and Net Foreign Assets
Aggregating and manipulating the household budget constraint (2.11) and using the nal-
good market equilibrium (2.16) yields the following equation which simply states that the
net foreign assets position (nfa) changes with accruing interest and the net export.
etBt+1 + Pt (Ct + It) = etBt

1 + ift 1

+RtKt +WtLt
+P dt Q
d
t + etP
x
t Q
x
t   (RtKt +WtLt))
Bt+1 = Bt

1 + ift 1

+ P xt Q
x
t  
Pmt
et
Qmt :
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2.6 Monetary Policy
We postulate an imperfect peg against the euro as the monetary policy; in our model the
interest rate is the instrument, which is thus used to keep et constant up to an exogenous
policy shock pegt with unity mean;
et = e
peg
t : (2.17)
Log-linearizing equations (2.9) and (2.10) yields the following relation between the
internal foreign interest rate and that paid to domestic holders of foreign bonds;
{^ft = {^

t + ^t   B^t:
Combining this relation with log-linearised versions of equations (2:14) and (2:15) yields
Ete^t+1 = {^t   {^ft = {^t   {^t +

B^t   ^t

;
{^t  log

1 + it
1 +{

; ^t  log (t=) ; B^t  log (Bt+1=P

t )

;
which we can combine with (2.17) to obtain
{^t = {^

t +

^t   B^t

+ Et^
peg
t+1;
that is, the interest rate responds (virtually) one-to-one with the foreign interest rate and
the uip shock and is additionally skewed by the spread and the policy shock.
As an alternative to the peg rule (2.17) we can close the model with a Taylor (1993)
like rule;
it = iit 1 + (1  i)

 (t   1) + y
Yt   Yt 1
Yt 1

+ TRt ; (2.18)
where TRt is a policy shock, and the s are restricted to imply a determinate equilibrium,
cf. the discussion in Dam and Linaa (2005a).
2.7 Welfare and the Dispersion of Wages and Labour
We use the unconditional expectation of the average household utility in a given period
as our measure of welfare. This amounts to the following;
SWt =
Z 1
0
U (Ct (j) ; lt (j)) dj
=
Z 1
0
 
bt
(Ct )
1 C
1  C  
bt
L
t
1 + L
lt (j)
1+L
!
dj
=
bt
1  C
 
Ct   h Ct 1
1 C   btLt
1 + L
Z 1
0
lt (j)
1+L dj;
implying that we need an expression for
R 1
0
lt (j)
1+L dj: This illustrates how the wage
dispersion only a¤ects the economy through the unequal labour supply across the house-
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holds. Since
lt (s; j) = (wt (j) =Wt)
  1+
 Lt (s))
lt (j) =
Z 1
0
lt (s; j) ds = (wt (j) =Wt)
  1+
 Lt;
we obtain Z 1
0
lt (j)
1+L dj = L1+Lt
Z 1
0

wt (j)
Wt
  1+

(1+L)
dj
= L1+Lt
Wt
Wt
  1+

(1+L)
;
where
Wt 
Z 1
0
wt (j)
  1+

(1+L) dj
  
(1+)(1+L)
:
Due to the assumptions of the Calvo-like wage setting, this index of wage dispersion
evolves as follows;
Wt =

DW 
1+

(1+L)
t 1 + (1 D)w
  1+

(1+L)
t;t
  
(1+)(1+L)
:
Thus, the welfare measure can be cast as follows;
SWt =
bt
1  C
 
Ct   h Ct 1
1 C   btLt
1 + L
L1+Lt
Wt
Wt
  1+

(1+L)
:
3 Model in Real Terms
We recast the model in real terms, meaning that all prices are stated relative to the
price of domestic (or foreign) nal goods, e.g., ~P dt  P dt =Pt. Consider now the optimal
intermediary prices;
pdt;t =
N dt
Ddt
) ~pdt;t =
N dt =Pt
Ddt
=
 N dt =Pt =  P dt  1+
Ddt =
 
P dt
 1+


~N dt
~Ddt
;
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where,
~N dt 
1X
=t
d tEt
"
t;

P d
P dt
 1+

Qd (1 + )
MC
Pt
#
= Qdt (1 + )mct + Et
" 1X
=t+1
d tt;

P d
P dt
 1+

Qd (1 + )
MC
Pt
#
=

~P dt
 1+

Qdt (1 + )mct
+dEt
"
t;t+1

P dt+1
P dt
 1+
 Pt+1
Pt
1X
=t+1
d (t+1)Et+1
"
t+1;

P d
P dt+1
 1+

Qd (1 + )
MC
Pt+1
##
=

~P dt
 1+

Qdt (1 + )mct
+dEt
"
t;t+1
1X
=t+1
d (t+1)Et+1
"
t+1;

P d
P dt+1
 1+

Qd (1 + )
MC
Pt+1
##
= Qdt (1 + )mct + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P dt+1
~P dt
! 1+


1+2

t+1
~N dt+1
35 ;
~Ddt 
1X
=t
d tEt
"
t;

P d
P dt
 1+

Qd
#
= Qdt + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P dt+1
~P dt
t+1
! 1+
 1X
=t+1
d (t+1)t+1;

P d
Pt+1
 1+

Qd
35
= Qdt + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P dt+1
~P dt
t+1
! 1+

~Ddt+1
35 :
Turning to the optimal price on exports and introducing the real exchange rate Et 
etP

t =Pt, we get
pxt;t =
N xt
Dxt
) ~pxt;t =
N xt
Dxt P t
=
(N xt =Pt) = (P xt )
1+

Dxt P

t
Pt

= (P xt )
1+


~N xt
~Dxt
;
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where
~N xt =
1X
=t
d tEt
"
t;

P x
P xt
 1+

Qx (1 + )
MC
Pt
#
= Qxt (1 + )mct +
1X
=t+1
d tEt
"
t;

P x
P xt
 1+

Qx (1 + )
MC
Pt
#
= Qxt (1 + )mct
+dEt
24t;t+1
 
P^ xt+1
P^ xt
t+1
! 1+
 1X
=t+1
d (t+1)Et+1

t+1;Q
x
 (1 + )
MC
Pt+1
35
= Qxt (1 + )mct + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P xt+1
~P xt
t+1
! 1+

~N xt+1
35 ;
~Dxt+1 =
1X
=t
d tEt
"
t;

P x
P xt
 1+

Qx
eP

t
Pt
#
= Qxt Et + dEt
"
t;t+1

P xt+1
P xt
 1+

t+1=

t+1
1X
=t+1
d (t+1)Et
"
t+1;

P x
P xt+1
 1+

Qx
eP

t+1
Pt+1
##
= Qxt Et + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P xt+1
~P xt
! 1+
  
t+1
 1
 t+1 ~Dxt+1
35 :
Finally, the optimal relative import price evolves as follows;
pmt;t =
Nmt
Dmt
) ~pmt;t =
Nmt
Dmt Pt
=
(Nmt =P t ) = (Pm )
1+

(Dmt Pt=P t ) = (Pm )
1+


~Nmt
~Dmt
;
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where
~Nmt =
1X
=t
d tEt
"
Rt;

Pm
Pmt
 1+

Qm (1 + )
P 
P t
#
= Qmt (1 + )
+dEt
24Rt;t+1 P^m
P^mt
t+1
! 1+

t+1
1X
=t+1
d (t+1)Et+1
"
Rt+1;

Pm
Pmt+1
 1+

Qm (1 + )
P 
P t+1
#35
= Qmt (1 + ) +
d
1 + it
Et
24 ~Pm
~Pmt
t+1
! 1+

t+1 ~Nmt+1
35 ;
~Dmt =
1X
=t
d tEt
"
Rt;

Pm
Pmt
 1+

Qm
Pt
P t e
#
=
Qmt
Et +
1X
=t+1
d tEt
"
Rt;

Pm
Pmt
 1+

Qm
Pt
P t e
#
=
Qmt
Et + dEt
"
Rt;t+1

Pmt+1
Pmt
 1+

t+1=t+1
1X
=t+1
d (t+1)Et+1
"
Rt+1;

Pm
Pmt+1
 1+

Qm
Pt+1
P t+1e
##
=
Qmt
Et +
d
1 + it
Et
24 ~Pmt+1
~Pmt
! 1+

(t+1)
1
 t+1 ~Dmt+1
35 :
Turning to the wage setting, we have
w
1+ 1+

L
t;t =
P
(d) tEt

bt
L
t (1 + )W
1+

(1+L)
 L1+L

P
(d) tEt

UC;
P
W
1+

 L
  NwtDwt ;
w^t;t  wt;t
Pt
)
~w
1+ 1+

L
t;t =

wt;t
Pt
1+ 1+

L
=
Nwt
Dwt P
1+ 1+

L
t
=
Nwt =P
1+

(1+L)
t
Dwt =P
1

t

~Nwt
~Dwt
;
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where
~Nwt =
1X
=t
(d) tEt
"
b
L
 (1 + )

W
Pt
 1+

(1+L)
L1+L
#
= bt
L
t (1 + )

W^t
 1+

(1+L)
L1+Lt
+
1X
=t+1
(d) tEt
"
b
L
 (1 + )

W
Pt
 1+

(1+L)
L1+L
#
= bt
L
t (1 + )

~Wt
 1+

(1+L)
L1+Lt
+dEt
"

1+

(1+L)
t+1
1X
=t+1
(d) (t+1)Et+1
"
b
L
 (1 + )

W
Pt+1
 1+

(1+L)
L1+L
##
= bt
L
t (1 + )

~Wt
 1+

(1+L)
L1+Lt + dEt


1+

(1+L)
t+1
~Nwt+1

;
~Dwt = P
  1

t
1X
=t
(d) tEt

UC;
P
W
1+

 L

=
1X
=t
(d) tEt
"
UC;

P
Pt
 1

~W
1+

 L
#
= UC;t ~W
1+

t Lt + dEt
"

1

t+1
1X
=t
(d) (t+1)Et+1
"
UC;

P
Pt+1
 1

~W
1+

 L
##
= UC;t ~W
1+

t Lt + dEt


1

t+1
~Dwt+1

:
Thus,
~Nwt = btLt (1 + )

~Wt
 1+

(1+L)
L1+Lt + dEt


1+

(1+L)
t+1
~Nwt+1

;
~Dwt = UC;t ~W
1+

t Lt + dEt


1

t+1
~Dwt+1

;
~wt;t =
"
~Nwt
~Dwt
# 
+(1+)L
;
~Wt =

D

~Wt 1=t
  1

+ (1 D) ~w 
1

t;t
 
;
Ultimately, we turn to the monetary policy rule. Straightforward manipulation of the
imperfect peg rule (equation (2.17) above) gives
Et
Et 1
t
t
=
t
t 1
;
where, again, t is an ar(1) policy shock with Gaussian innovations.
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4 Model Summary
This section simply summarises the model in real terms;
Qdt = 
d Zt
~P dt
; (4.1)
Qmt =
 
1  d Zt
~Pmt
; (4.2)
Qxt =

~P xt
 
Y t ; (4.3)
1 =

~P dt
d 
~Pmt
1 d
; (4.4)
Lt =
1   
 
~Rt
~Wt
Kt; (4.5)
mct =
1
t
~W 1  t ~R
 
t  
  (1   ) (1  ) ; (4.6)
t;t+1 =  (UC;t+1=UC;t)
 1
t+1; (4.7)
UC;t = 
b
t (Ct   hCt 1) C ; (4.8)
~N dt = Qdt (1 + )mct + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P dt+1
~P dt
! 1+


1+2

t+1
~N dt+1
35 ; (4.9)
~Ddt = Qdt + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P dt+1
~P dt
t+1
! 1+

~Ddt+1
35 ; (4.10)
~P dt =

d

~P dt 1=t
  1

+ (1  d)

~N dt = ~Ddt
  1

 
; (4.11)
~N xt = Qxt (1 + )mct + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P xt+1
~P xt
t+1
! 1+

~N xt+1
35 ; (4.12)
~Dxt = Qxt Et + dEt
24t;t+1
 
~P xt+1
~P xt
! 1+
  
t+1
 1
 t+1 ~Dxt+1
35 ; (4.13)
~P xt =

d

~P xt 1=

t
  1

+ (1  d)

~N xt = ~Dxt
  1

 
; (4.14)
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~Nmt = Qmt (1 + ) +
d
1 + it
Et
24 ~Pmt+1
~Pmt
t+1
! 1+

t+1 ~Nmt+1
35 (4.15)
~Dmt = Qmt Et +
d
1 + it
Et
24 ~Pmt+1
~Pmt
! 1+

(t+1)
1
 t+1 ~Dmt+1
35 ; (4.16)
~Pmt =

d

~Pmt 1=t
  1

+ (1  d)

~Nmt = ~Dmt
  1

 
; (4.17)
Kt+1 = Kt (1  ) + It   1
2
 (Kt+1  Kt)2
Kt
; (4.18)
~Bt+1 =

1 + ift 1

~Bt=

t +
~P xt Q
x
t  
~Pmt
Et Q
m
t ; (4.19)
Et
2664t;t+1t+1

~Rt+1 + (1  )  2

1 

Kt+2
Kt+1
2
h
1 + Kt+1 Kt
Kt
i
3775 = 1; (4.20)
(1 + it)Et

t;t+1

= 1; (4.21)
1 + ift

Et

t;t+1
Et+1
Et
t+1
t+1

= 1; (4.22)
~Nwt = btLt (1 + )

~Wt
 1+

(1+L)
L1+Lt + dEt


1+

(1+L)
t+1
~Nwt+1

; (4.23)
~Dwt = UC;t ~W
1+

t Lt + dEt


1

t+1
~Dwt+1

; (4.24)
~wt;t =
"
~Nwt
~Dwt
# 
+(1+)L
; (4.25)
~Wt =

D

~Wt 1=t
  1

+ (1 D) ~w 
1

t;t
 
; (4.26)

1 + ift

= (1 + it ) t exp
(
 Ett+1
~Bt+1

)
;  = EP^xQx; (4.27)
Et
Et 1
t
t
=
t
t 1
; (4.28)
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Yt = Q
d
t +Q
x
t ; (4.29)
Zt = Ct + It; (4.30)
Kt =
1
t
 
 
1   
~Wt
~Rt
!1  24 ~Pdt
~P dt
!  1+

Qdt +
 
~Pxt
~P xt
!  1+

Qxt
35 ; (4.31)
~Pdt =

d

~Pdt 1=t
  1+

+ (1  d)  ~pdt;t  1+   1+ ; (4.32)
~Pxt =

d

~Pxt 1=t
  1+

+ (1  d)  ~pxt;t  1+   1+ ; (4.33)
~Wt =

D

~Wt 1=t
  1+

(1+L)
+ (1 D) ~w 
1+

(1+L)
t;t
  
(1+)(1+L)
; (4.34)
SWt =
bt
1  C
 
Ct   h Ct 1
1 C   btLt
1 + L
L1+Lt
 
~Wt
~Wt
!  1+

(1+L)
; (4.35)
and the model is closed with a monetary policy rule; either in the form of the imperfect
peg rule
Et
Et 1
t
t
=
pegt
pegt 1
; (4.36)
or the generalised Taylor rule
it = iit 1 + (1  i)

 (t   1) + y
Yt   Yt 1
Yt 1

+ TRt : (4.37)
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